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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the institution of city-county separation in Ontario. City-
county separation was the original form of municipal organization in the province, 
introduced as a method of distinguishing between urban and rural areas by politically 
separating one from the other. Over time, this practice lost ground to institutions such as 
regional government, which sought to connect urban and rural areas. Despite this 
institutional shift, 18 cities and towns in Ontario remain separated from their counties, 
establishing a situation where some of the province’s most populous communities lack 
institutional linkages to their surrounding rural municipalities.  
 Exploring four different thematic areas – planning, border expansion, social 
service delivery and agreement formation – this thesis finds that separated cities and 
counties are not forming cooperative agreements at expected rates. This is largely 
attributed to the nature of rural and urban life: there are few common servicing demands 
and, as such, cooperation is not a natural phenomenon. Additionally, this thesis finds that 
growth is threatening the continued viability of city-county separation. The municipalities 
in some counties across the province are content to remain rural and are adhering to the 
original logic of city-county separation; the county remains rural and directs development 
toward the urban separated city. However, in many other counties, the once-rural areas 
around separated cities are experiencing high rates of growth and are actively attempting 
to attract development. The original bargain behind city-county separation is breaking 
down in these areas. Provincial officials, who have extended the usable life span of city-
county separation as an institution in many urban areas by allowing continuous rounds of 
outward expansion, may need to re-examine the organizational design of these areas and 
consider alternative institutions that would better link urban and growing suburban areas. 
 
Keywords: City-County Separation, Institutional Collective Action, Inter-Local 
Agreements; Ontario, Urban, Rural 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.     Introduction 
 Linking urban and rural areas is one of the great challenges of municipal 
governance. Traditionally, the two areas have been seen as distinct with different sets of 
values, economies, labour trends and ways of life (Sweet 1999; Clarke 1955). These 
differences have been described as both vast and entrenched. Nevertheless, despite these 
cultural and geographic divergences, rural and urban have always had a reciprocal 
relationship and both play an important role in the strength of the national economy, 
trade, commerce and population growth. 
 This complex inter-connectedness presents a challenge to policy makers. In 
Ontario, more recent structural responses to this divide have tended to view a city and its 
rural periphery as part of a common political unit, if not a sociological or economic one 
(Fyfe 1975; Jacek 1985). To grow, and to extend the economic benefits of urban life to 
rural areas, some organizational thinking suggests that cities require an institutional 
linkage to the rural communities that lie on and just beyond their borders. This mode of 
institutional thinking is relatively new when considering hundreds of years of municipal 
evolution. The more traditional solution to this urban-rural divide—and the one that has 
been dominant throughout most of our municipal history—has been to politically 
separate urban and rural areas (Bain 1967). 
 This practice has its roots in the early English municipal system (Pinchbeck 1940; 
Archer 2000). Cities were thought to be so unique that they required a complete 
separation from their rural peripheries. While the country was rooted in agrarian and 
subsistence living, cities began to take on increased importance with the advent of new 
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technology (Wilson and Game 1988). Urban areas grew at a rapid pace and took on new 
significance as centres of industry, commerce and innovation. As cities became the 
economic drivers of nations, the creation of local government capable of managing and 
promoting this growth became paramount (Merewhether and Stephens 1972). It became 
clear that the demands inherently connected with increased density—poverty, housing, 
and the creation of advanced infrastructure—required a government with a broader 
functional scope. In theory, a separate urban government could address distinct urban 
opportunities and problems (Magnusson 1983).  
 Consequently, the separation of urban and rural municipalities was seen as 
mutually beneficial. Since both areas had different cultures and economies, the inclusion 
of each in a common political structure was neither desirable nor practical. Rural 
inhabitants viewed urban areas with suspicion due to the fluidity and relative anonymity 
of urban life, which challenged the ordered nature of rural living (Sweet 1999, 223). 
Sweet summarizes this sentiment, stating that, “the dirt, the filth and physical corruption 
of urban streets were repeatedly employed as a metaphor for the immorality and spiritual 
corruption which urban living engendered among its inhabitants” (Sweet 1999, 223). 
Rural residents were considered to be harder working and honest, taking simple pleasure 
in their agrarian lifestyle, and rarely deviating into vice. Political Scientist David Siegel 
suggests that many rural residents believed that “urban dwellers were tainted in ways that 
people living in idyllic rural settings close to the soil were not” (1997, 134). While some 
urban and rural areas may have been physically linked, there was nevertheless a 
pervasive belief that political separation could prevent urban life from tainting the 
supposed idyll of rural living.  
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Many of these notions were instilled into rural inhabitants through literature. 
Historian Rosemary Sweet argues that these views originally stemmed from the 
representation of cities as centres of evil and vice in biblical texts, namely in the Old 
Testament’s depiction of Sodom and Gomorrah or Babylon (1999, 223). These notions 
also found their way into popularized poetry from the period, such as book four of 
William Cowper’s, “The Task”: 
The town has ting’d the country; and the stain 
Appears a spot upon a vestal’s robe, 
The worse for what it soils. The fashion runs 
Down into scenes still rural; but alas,  
Scenes rarely grac’d with rural manners now! (553-7)1 
 
Consequently, these types of views manifested themselves in structural distinctions. 
Rural inhabitants believed that the establishment of common political institutions would 
only encourage the spread of these values and vices to rural areas. Thus, early municipal 
structures favoured a political separation between the two areas.  
The institutional practice of city-county separation evolved slowly. As early as the 
Middle Ages English boroughs were exempt from the power of local courts and 
administrations, setting them on a different plane than their more rural counterparts 
(Meremether and Stephens 1972). In the early English municipal system, some urban 
areas of importance were granted Royal Charters and formally distinguished from the 
more rural shires and counties (Innes and Rogers 2000). Although this practice would not 
receive official codification until the creation of the 1888 Municipal Corporations Act, 
the beliefs behind urban-rural separation in Great Britain laid the basis for a more 
                                                 
1
 Originally quoted from Rosemary Sweet, The English Town, 1680-1840: Government, Society and 
Culture. London, Longman, 1999.  
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organized system of city-county separation to emerge in the American and Canadian 
colonies (Bain 1967).  
Early Ontario policy-makers were influenced by the concept of rural and urban 
distinctiveness and eventually adopted this institutional practice when founding our 
provincial municipal system. Under the stipulations contained in the 1849 Baldwin Act, 
urban areas in Ontario were politically separated from their surrounding counties as soon 
as they became incorporated as cities. This system lasted for more than a century, until 
provincial officials began an institutional shift towards regional government in the 1950s. 
Rapid urbanization changed how the province viewed urban and rural areas. During this 
period, urban growth spilled over into areas once thought to be “rural”. This growth 
created shifts in labour and settlement patterns. Increased suburbanization caused 
provincial policy makers to see urban and rural areas as connected, therefore requiring 
greater policy coordination.  
This shift in organizational thinking was accompanied by institutional change. 
Following the creation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953, Toronto became the first city in 
Ontario to be part of a two-tier structure. The inception of Metropolitan Toronto followed 
nearly two decades of efforts to find solutions to the region’s growing infrastructure 
deficiencies and social problems. Policy makers argued that the solution was to align the 
urban core of Toronto with its neighbouring suburban communities and mostly rural 
townships in order to create continuity between service and infrastructure. This same 
mode of institutional thinking was behind the creation of the province’s ten regional 
governments in the 1960s and 1970s, when common political institutions were introduced 
into southern Ontario’s rapidly suburbanizing areas.  
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Despite this evolution in Ontario’s municipal system towards regional 
government, numerous cities remained separate from their counties.2 Today, eighteen 
cities and towns in Ontario remain separated: Barrie, Windsor, Guelph, London, 
Kingston, Peterborough, Orillia, Pembroke, Brockville, Prescott, Gananoque, Cornwall, 
Smiths Falls, St. Thomas, Belleville, Quinte West, Stratford and St. Mary’s.3 While long 
histories and hundreds of inter-local agreements exist between Ontario’s counties and 
separated cities, we still know very little about their relationship. This study seeks to 
remedy this situation by completing the first in-depth study of the province’s system of 
city-county separation.  
 
1.1.     Study Framework 
 This study will concentrate on the nature of cooperation between separated cities 
and counties by examining the continued use of city-county separation as an institutional 
practice. Consequently, this project asks two main research questions:  
1. Under what conditions does cooperation occur between these 
institutionally autonomous municipal governments?  
2. Does the continued use of city-county separation as an institution still 
achieve its intended objectives? 
                                                 
2
 Counties are not utilized in northern Ontario.  
3
 Pelee Township is also a separated municipality. Created as separate from Essex County in 1869, Pelee 
Township is a small island community located midway in Lake Erie and approximately 16.5 miles from the 
Town of Leamington. Access to the island is by a 1.5-hour ferry trip or by air. There are less than 100 
permanent households on the island, which is primarily a seasonal destination in the summer months. 
While still within the geographic territory of Essex County, Pelee Township has no relation to other 
municipalities within the county or little reason to cooperate with mainland jurisdictions. As such, it was 
not included in this study, as it did not have the standard relationships typical of other separated 
municipalities. 
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These questions are important for a number of reasons. First and foremost, very little is 
known about city-county separation. As previously described, the provincial government 
has demonstrated a preference for institutions that formally link urban municipalities to 
neighbouring suburban and rural communities. Furthermore, the provincial government 
identified increased suburbanization as a key factor in the introduction of regional 
government in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of Ontario’s counties with separated cities are 
currently experiencing similar trends in suburbanization today, forcing the inevitable 
question of whether the continued use of city-county separation serves these areas 
effectively as a governance model.  
Second, in the absence of the types of institutions that link urban municipalities to 
surrounding areas, this study hypothesizes that these municipalities must use inter-local 
cooperation to overcome institutional deficits. While very little has been written about the 
nature of inter-municipal cooperation in Canada, existing research demonstrates that most 
municipalities engage in some form of cooperation with neighbouring jurisdictions, either 
formal or informal (Hulst and van Montfort 2007). Separated cities and counties provide 
a good venue to begin the work of examining the process of cooperation between 
municipalities in Canada. 
The relationship between institutionally distinct multi-municipal regions has 
attracted attention from academic researchers for decades. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Studenski (1930), Jones (1942) and Gulick (1962), researchers have attempted to 
find solutions to metropolitan “fragmentation”. This group believed that the lack of a 
clear institutional connection within metropolitan areas negatively affected policy 
coordination and service continuity. Public choice theorists criticized this view, believing 
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that the fragmentation inherent within metropolitan regions, and the competition that 
inevitably resulted from it, was functional (Bish 1971; Bish and Ostrom 1974; Oakerson 
1999; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961). As a counterbalance to both perspectives, 
“new regionalists” believe that voluntary networks of cooperation can overcome the 
negative externalities that result from municipal fragmentation (Salet, Thornley and 
Kreukels 2003; Savitch and Vogel 1996).  
A subset of the new regionalism paradigm, the Institutional Collective Action 
perspective, provides a set of factors that both positively and negatively affect 
cooperation. Introduced by Feiock (2004, 6) as a “second generation” rational choice 
explanation for voluntary cooperation, literature on American local government uses the 
ICA framework extensively to explain cooperation, competition and policy variation 
within metropolitan areas. The framework presents several factors, such as geographic 
density, political leadership and power disparities, that are believed to both hinder and 
help in achieving cooperation between jurisdictions.  
These factors may help our understanding of the relationship between separated 
cities and counties. However, the application of the ICA framework in Canada is 
challenging for two central reasons. First, the ICA framework has been used primarily in 
American literature and, as a result, been applied almost exclusively to larger American 
case studies. Consequently, applying the ICA framework to Canadian multi-municipal 
regions that are much smaller in size and population, generally have fewer municipalities, 
and experience much more control from central governments, may prove problematic. 
Secondly, the ICA framework has been developed to examine metropolitan regions, 
which are generally composed of a central city surrounded by suburban municipalities. 
 8 
As such, ICA has traditionally been employed to explore urban-suburban relationships. 
This project explores urban-rural relationships, which inherently involve much different 
servicing demands, interests, and ideologies in addition to stark asymmetries in resources 
and governing capacity. Although overcoming these differences will be challenging, it is 
believed that the ICA framework holds promise and presents a number of variables that 
should be able to overcome institutional context and prove helpful in studying inter-
governmental relationships. 
 At the centre of the ICA framework—and a key variable in this study—is 
cooperation. This study defines cooperation as the result of two actors—or a series of 
actors—who believe that the end result of cooperation is mutually beneficial. 
Municipalities, like other actors, cooperate with each other after conducting a strict cost-
benefit calculation: if the rewards of cooperation exceed the costs involved in the 
agreement, cooperation is likely; if they do not, cooperation is unlikely. Ultimately, both 
parties must foresee receiving a clear benefit from participating in a cooperative 
agreement before such an arrangement can be reached.  
How can cooperation be operationalized? Stephanie Post (2004) provides a broad 
definition that ICA scholars in the United States largely utilize: 
Local intergovernmental cooperation, broadly defined, includes all policy 
activities that require some level of policy coordination between local 
governments. These efforts may include formal or informal agreements among 
local jurisdictions, and they may (or may not) require the exchange of revenue. 
Formal intergovernmental cooperation often includes written agreements among 
local governments. (69)  
 
While this definition is broadly useful, the inclusion of informal agreements can be 
problematic. Informal agreements are difficult to gauge for external observers and can, in 
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some aspects, include norms embedded into area governance that even local policy 
makers would have difficulty articulating. A more useful definition, therefore, might 
define cooperation as policy activity that requires inter-jurisdictional coordination 
between governing units and is formalized through written agreements. Such a definition 
is not a large departure from how traditional ICA scholars view cooperation and would 
not be overly restrictive, as most inter-jurisdictional cooperation is now formalized to 
provide legal protection for participating governments.  
Cooperation is necessary in counties with separated cities. Unlike municipalities 
in regional governments that are connected through their upper-tier, there are no 
institutional linkages between separated cities and the municipalities that surround them. 
In the absence of cooperation, service interruption and policy incoherence would likely 
result. As such, I expect that counties with separated cities will rely extensively upon the 
formation of written agreements to bridge the institutional gap between both jurisdictions. 
Examining how and why cooperation is achieved will elucidate the policies these areas 
use and help better understand governance within these regions.    
A study of this nature is important for a number of reasons. First, cooperation 
within multi-municipal regions is a relatively unexplored area of Canadian political 
science. Extensive research has been conducted into inter-jurisdictional cooperation in 
the United States (Feicok 2004; Post 2004; Steinacker 2004) and has identified a variety 
of factors that may be able to improve governance within American metropolitan areas. 
Despite these gains, very few studies have exclusively examined the use of inter-local 
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agreements and inter-jurisdictional agreements in Canada.4 Feldman (1979) found 15 
agreements in place between the County of Strathcona, Alberta and its immediate 
neighbours, including Edmonton. In 2000, Sancton, James and Ramsay examined eight 
case studies to compare amalgamation and inter-local cooperation. Of these case studies, 
four utilized amalgamation and four utilized inter-local agreements. Their findings reveal 
that the two are not mutually exclusive and amalgamation does not necessarily mean that 
the need for inter-local agreements and inter-municipal cooperation wanes.  
Two more recent studies, Nelles (2009) and Alcantara and Nelles (2009), use the 
ICA framework to examine inter-local relations with respect to the economic 
development in both Canada and Germany and relations between municipalities and 
Aboriginal governments, respectively. Yet, while both of these studies use variations of 
the ICA framework, they do not investigate the relationship between multiple regions nor 
extensively test the relationship between municipalities and provincial governments. As 
such, this project presents a unique investigation into Canadian local government 
institutional structure, provincial-municipal relations, inter-local relations and policy 
processes.  
Second, while very little is known about the relationship among municipalities in 
Canada, even less is known about the relationship between separated cities and counties. 
In Ontario, regional governments have been the dominant form of regional organization 
since the 1950s. While an extensive amount of research has examined regional 
government (McDougall 1986; Fyfe 1975; Jacek 1985), very little research has explored 
                                                 
4
 The Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing has recently begun studying the use of inter-local 
agreements amongst Ontario municipalities. In 2012, they created the Shared Services Survey, which was 
sent to all municipalities in the province, gauging their use (or non-use) of shared services agreements. The 
results should be released in the latter half of 2013.  
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the continued use of city-county separation. Consequently, this project will be the first of 
its kind to specifically examine the relationship between these areas.  
 
1.2.     Case Studies and Methodology 
In Ontario, there are currently eighteen cities and towns separated from their 
adjoining counties. Each area is distinct: some areas are primarily rural and some more 
urbanized. Additionally, some counties comprise nearly two-dozen lower-tier 
municipalities, whereas other areas contain only a few. The counties, their corresponding 
separated cities and their lower-tier municipalities, are listed in Appendix A. Within the 
thirteen counties with a separated municipality, there are 136 governing units, which 
provide this study with a wide range of potential observations.  
This study utilizes two main research techniques: the analysis of primary 
documents and interviews. I gathered agreements from every county in Ontario with a 
separated city, for a total of 275 agreements. For the purpose of this project, I included 
only agreements initiated between 1995 and 2011. Although I chose this time frame for a 
number of reasons, chief among them is that it is long enough to account for major 
provincial initiatives, such as amalgamation and various rounds of service downloading, 
but recent enough that many of these agreements are still relevant and active. 
Additionally, municipalities may have difficulty securing these documents dated before 
1995. These methods provide the necessary breadth and depth that a study of this nature 
requires. 
In addition, I conducted interviews in three regions: 1) London and Middlesex 
County, 2) Barrie, Orillia and Simcoe County, and 3) Guelph and Wellington County. 
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Each region adds a unique dimension to the study. London is much larger than Middlesex 
County, encompassing not only the majority of the land but also the population within the 
county’s borders. The ICA framework proposes that the interaction between stronger and 
weaker actors creates different relationships. As such, this case study will allow for the 
analysis of power differentials that exist between separated cities and counties. The 
second case study in Simcoe County includes two separated cities, Barrie and Orillia, 
both of which have been affected in differing ways by the rapid growth in southern 
Ontario. Consequently, studying this region can help elucidate the dynamics of having 
multiple separated cities within one county. Finally, Guelph and Wellington County 
provide a much more balanced case study both in terms of population and size. 
Additionally, since several regional governments also border Wellington County and the 
area is much closer in proximity to the Greater Toronto Area, this case provides valuable 
insight into the influence of much larger, populated urban centers on separated cities and 
counties.  
Overall, rates of growth and development vary in each case study. Moreover, as I 
previously acknowledged, it will be challenging to easily utilize the ICA framework for 
this project, mainly due to the inherent differences in urban-rural relationships with city-
county separation and urban-suburban relationships that American ICA research 
traditionally examines. Each case study provides some variation on this factor. Guelph 
and Wellington County adhere very closely to Ontario’s early system of city-county 
separation: the county is largely rural and wishes to remain that way and growth and 
development proposals tend to focus on the urbanized separated city. Conversely, Simcoe 
County and Middlesex County are much different. Municipal officials in both counties 
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actively seek growth and development, skewing the traditional relationship between 
separated cities and their counties. As such, the varying levels of growth may expose 
some adverse dynamics between separated cities and counties.  
Finally, it is anticipated that studying counties with more populous and urbanized 
separated cities should provide more insights into the nature of cooperation, as 
envisioned under the ICA framework. As noted the dynamic between urban and rural is a 
much different relationship than the urban-suburban relationships traditionally seen in 
ICA research. Examining regions that more closely compare to those seen in the United 
States may allow for a more complete investigation into the dynamics of agreement 
formation and cooperation. Larger cities also provide for more points of contact between 
local officials, which will provide for more potential interview respondents and access to 
officials with inter-governmental responsibilities.  
 While formal documentation exists for many of the meetings and subsequent 
agreements between separated cities and counties, there is much that these documents do 
not reveal. As a result, the experiences of political leaders and senior municipal staff are 
valuable resources that need to be documented and examined in order to gain a more 
accurate understanding of the relationship between counties and separated cities. In total, 
I conducted 68 interviews, with approximately 20 respondents for each case study. As per 
the conditions of the Research Ethics Board approval5 for this project, the names of those 
interviewed will not be published. The position of those interviewed may be noted, 
however, in certain areas. While this does sacrifice some anonymity, it was believed to be 
necessary in order to provide the reader with some context to the authority in which the 
                                                 
5
 UWO REB # 17905S 
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respondent is speaking. The research ethics approval for this project is included in 
Appendix E.  
A full listing of these interviews along the corresponding municipal region are 
listed in Appendix D. I utilized an interview matrix throughout the study, except in areas 
where a specific agreement or line of discussion warranted further investigation. I include 
the interview matrix for this project in Appendix B. In conducting these interviews, I 
applied the snowball sampling method. After I made initial contact with certain senior 
municipal and county officials (eg. mayors, councilors, reeves, CAOs, and clerks), I 
asked them to identify any other individuals with a significant amount of inter-
jurisdictional interaction and responsibility. The majority of smaller municipalities had 
very small administrations and tended to assign only one person to deal with inter-
jurisdictional issues. In these cases, it was unnecessary to conduct further interviews 
within the municipality. However, larger municipalities and counties generally had more 
staff members to resolve inter-local issues. I received the contact information for 
municipal staff and politicians primarily from municipal websites. The majority of the 
interviews included in this study were conducted in person; however, where this was not 
possible, I utilized telephone interviews. In total, I conducted 11 interviews by telephone 
and 57 in person.  
 
 
 
1.3.     Thesis Organization 
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This thesis proceeds in several stages. In the first part, I introduce my study and 
theoretical framework and provide a detailed overview of municipal organization in 
Ontario. The second chapter provides an overview of the various institutional designs 
utilized in Ontario, charting the evolution of the county system to the regional 
governments created from the 1950s to 1970s and, finally, to the amalgamation push that 
occurred in the 1990s. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the trend towards connecting 
urban municipalities to surrounding neighbours has turned counties with separated cities 
into institutional anachronisms. Consequently, I argue that suburbanization was one of 
the key factors that led to the creation of regional government in Ontario. Over time, the 
distinction between urban and rural areas began to blur, prompting the provincial 
government to largely abandon the belief that urban and rural areas should be separated. 
In response, the province began building institutional linkages between urban and rural in 
the hope that connecting the two would allow the government to better control and 
facilitate economic growth and development.   
The following chapter examines existing theories of regionalism and introduces 
the ICA framework in more depth. While researchers have successfully used ICA to 
explain the dynamics of inter-local cooperation in other jurisdictions, I argue that the 
application of the ICA framework to the study of separated cities and counties has several 
significant limitations. Not only do American metropolitan regions have vastly different 
institutional designs than separated cities and counties in Ontario, but also operate under 
markedly different regulatory regimes than their Canadian counter-parts. Additionally, 
the ICA framework has historically been used primarily to explain relationships between 
urban and suburban communities, rather than urban and rural municipalities of the type 
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under examination by this study. However, despite these differences, I am hopeful that 
the ICA framework can help identify many of the factors that promote cooperation 
between municipalities despite differences in institutional design and variations in 
population density.  
 The second part of this thesis delves deeper into city-county separation in Ontario 
and contains four chapters arranged thematically: border issues and expansion, planning, 
social service delivery and the creation of formal agreements. I present the chapters on 
border expansion and planning first because they are closely connected and provide a 
good contrast to many of the functions of Ontario’s regional governments. Similarly, I 
present the chapters on social service delivery and the creation of formal agreements last 
because, again, they are closely connected and provide a distinction between the types of 
voluntary and mandated cooperation discussed in the ICA framework.  
The fourth chapter examines border issues and the consequences of central city 
expansion in London-Middlesex, Guelph-Wellington and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe. This 
study argues that urban municipalities will always have some concerns about 
development, especially when growth occurs on the periphery of its borders. Whereas 
municipalities in regional governments have some input in the placement and direction of 
development beyond its borders, separated cities have no control over this type of 
growth. Indeed, an examination of each city in the fourth chapter demonstrates that these 
regions all expanded their borders precisely in an effort to control growth. By analyzing 
each city’s most recent annexations, I find that the amicability of border expansion 
depends on the degree of development in the county and the desire of officials from rural 
municipalities surrounding separated cities to grow. Officials from Guelph found it 
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relatively easy to annex county land because their counterparts from surrounding rural 
municipalities wanted to remain rural and direct growth toward their urban neighbour. In 
contrast, officials from London and Barrie found annexation much more challenging 
because their desire to contain development clashed with the ambitions of officials from 
adjoining rural and suburbanizing municipalities. 
The next chapter examines planning issues. In this chapter, I establish a clear 
comparison with regional government: municipalities in regional governments have the 
ability to provide input in regional planning issues while separated cities do not. This 
study examines three strategies for overcoming this challenge. First, this study details the 
dispute over the extension of water services from London to its more rural neighbouring 
municipality, Middlesex Centre. Officials from London have vociferously refused to 
extend further servicing to their neighbour out of fear that this action may encourage 
growth outside the City’s borders. Second, the joint planning board in Elgin-St. Thomas 
is explored. The board has recently seen its smallest member leave amidst concern that 
all development was being directed towards the city. Finally, I explore the impact of the 
provincial Places to Grow legislation on Simcoe County, which has sought to tightly 
control the region’s growth by directing development toward several “growth nodes”. 
This plan led to some divisions between areas identified as growth nodes and those that 
were not, creating divisions in the county where they previously did not exist.  
The sixth chapter examines social service delivery; specifically, the province’s 
Consolidated Municipal Service Managers (CMSM) initiative and its effect on 
cooperation in London-Middlesex, Guelph-Wellington and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe. The 
CMSM forced separated cities and counties to reach an amicable funding arrangement for 
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social services. Reaching an agreement resurrected many of the old tensions between 
rural and urban areas: officials from separated cities largely wanted to share the financial 
burden, while officials from county lower-tier municipalities generally saw CMSM 
services as “urban” in nature. In some cases this disagreement led to arbitration. In 
Guelph and Wellington County, this disagreement caused long-term damage to their 
relationship.  
The seventh chapter examines the 275 formal agreements created in every county 
with a separated municipality across the province. I find that the majority of the 
agreements signed between separated cities and counties concern emergency or social 
services, areas largely mandated and regulated by the provincial government. Only a 
minority of the agreements between separated cities and counties are genuinely 
voluntary. However, as case studies in Guelph-Wellington, London-Middlesex and 
Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe suggest, the use of informal agreements varies. London and 
Middlesex County report having dozens in place, while Guelph-Wellington and Barrie-
Orillia-Middlesex tend to avoid using informal agreements.  
The final section of this thesis discusses some of the trends identified in the 
previous chapters and attempts to draw conclusions about the nature of cooperation 
between Ontario’s separated cities and counties. I argue that increased suburbanization 
has fundamentally challenged the system of city-county separation. Without mechanisms 
to control planning and development outside of their borders, separated cities have 
clashed with neighbouring county municipalities in several areas. Consequently, city-
county separation finds continued success in areas where officials from county 
municipalities are content to remain primarily rural. The province has continuously 
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allowed the expansion of separated cities and helped facilitate annexation, which has 
prolonged the lifespan of an institution that is now ill fitting and ill-equipped to address 
the challenges of suburbanization in many areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Municipal Organization in Ontario 
 20 
 
2.     Introduction 
Municipal organization in Ontario has undergone vast changes since the first 
European settlers arrived and demanded the establishment of local institutions. Over 
time, central governments slowly ceded more power to local governments, culminating in 
the passage of the Baldwin Act and the establishment of basic municipal institutions that 
mostly remain intact today. One such institution was the introduction of counties with the 
provision that urban areas should be allowed to separate from these two-tiered 
governments once they became classified as a city. Over time, numerous jurisdictions 
separated with the prevailing logic that rural and urban areas were so distinct that their 
separation was mutually beneficial.  
 Since the introduction of the Baldwin Act in 1849, the province’s local 
governments have experienced various rounds of institutional change. This change began 
in the 1950s with the creation of Metropolitan Toronto. Soon after, the idea that urban 
areas required some modicum of control over their surrounding rural and suburban areas 
in order to promote growth and control development led to the creation of ten regional 
governments in the province. These same growth pressures were identified in Ontario’s 
counties and, as a result, a number of reports in the 1980s and 1990s recommended the 
re-integration of separated cities into their counties. However, little change came from 
this and the province’s county system remains largely intact. Despite further rounds of 
restructuring in the 1990s, the county system and their separated cities went unaddressed.   
 Consequently, city-county separation is an enduring part of Ontario’s municipal 
system. While the practice of city-county separation has since been effectively 
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discontinued, eighteen cities and towns remain separated from counties across the 
province. What follows is a discussion about the evolution of Ontario’s municipal system 
with a focus on counties and the provinces separated cities.  
  
2.1.     Early Institutional Organization 
The majority of Ontario’s early townships were created when the Loyalists 
arrived in Upper Canada in 1783-84 (Armstrong 1985, 137). Eventually, early settlers 
demanded a voice in local affairs. Central governments responded to these claims by 
appointing local magistrates to hear and settle minor disputes and generally preserve the 
peace (Ross 1949, 6). In 1785, the government passed an ordinance allowing for the 
“granting of a limited civil power and jurisdiction to His Majesty’s Justices of the Peace 
in the remote parts of this Province” (Ross 1949, 6). The aim of the ordinance was to 
provide consistent administration throughout the colony, rather than only its more urban 
parts.  
Despite the strengthened role of Justices of the Peace in local administrations 
across the colony, central authorities retained control over many aspects of local life 
(Careless 1990, 265). Calls for greater local powers continued, and the government 
eventually responded with the creation of districts and the appointment of special officers 
for their administration (Ross 1949, 6). In 1788, eight districts were created across the 
colony: Western, London, Niagara, Home, Newcastle, Midland, Johnstown and Eastern 
(Armstrong 1985, 138). In 1836, Bathurst, Dalhousie, Ottawa, Wellington, and Gore 
districts were added to the existing district system (Armstrong 1985, 139). Each of these 
districts was appointed a set number of officials: judges of the Court of Commons Pleas, 
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justices of the peace, coroners, a sheriff and a clerk of the Court of the Common Pleas 
and of the Sessions of the Peace (Ross 1949, 6). This system also established Courts of 
the Quarter session across the province that, until 1793, constituted the only form of local 
administration in many parts of the colony (Ross 1949, 6).  
The colony’s counties were originally established for two main functions: to act 
as organizing units for the militia and to elect members to the Legislative Assembly  
(Careless 1980, 29). Of these two tasks, the most dominant was military organization. 
Writing in 1887, early historian John George Bourinot recounts the Duke de la 
Rochefoueault-Liancourt referring to Canada’s counties as, “purely military, and related 
merely to the enlisting, completing and assembling of the militia” (Ontario 1987, 9).  
J.M.S. Carless contends that the limited amount of power afforded to local 
administrators at this time resided with the district administrations (1980, 29). Each 
county contained locally appointed magistrates, or Justices of the Peace, who met in the 
district Court of Quarter Sessions to perform both administrative and judicial functions 
(Careless 1980, 29).  Central governments directly controlled districts, providing 
directives for their operations (Ross 1949, 23). Much of their autonomy involved 
providing administration for the district grammar school, courthouse and jail located in 
each district’s capital town (Careless 1980, 29). In 1793, Governor Simcoe reluctantly 
permitted the passage of the Parish and Town Officers Act, providing for the limited 
election of local officials (Ontario 1987, 9). This Act enabled the Justices of the Peace to 
assemble the inhabitants of any “parish, township, reputed township or place” to meet 
and elect certain parish and town officers, including a clerk, two assessors, a collector, 
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two to six overseers of highways and roads, one or more pound keepers and two town 
wardens (Ontario 1987, 9).  
Despite limited local elections, colonial governments continued to control local 
affairs. There was, however, a strong push for more local control during this period as 
certain communities began to receive special powers and authorities. Kingston, York and 
Niagara received special police acts from their Courts of the Quarter Session in 1816, 
1817 and 1819, respectively (Careless 1990, 266). In 1816, the legislature passed the first 
public school act for Upper Canada, giving citizens in each local jurisdictions the right to 
meet, free from the interference of magistrates of the local Court of Quarter Sessions, 
make arrangements for common schools and appoint school trustees (Ross 1949, 10). 
After Brockville received an elected Police Board in 1832, Hamilton followed suit in 
1833 along with Belleville, Cornwall and Port Hope in 1834 (Careless 1990, 266). York 
took perhaps the greatest step forward towards achieving incorporation as Toronto in 
1834, when it received its own elected council and mayor (Careless 1990, 266).  
The Rebellion of 1837 halted the evolution of municipal organization in the 
province, but the Durham Report, written the wake of the rebellion, began the process of 
creating truly representative local institutions (Ross 1949, 13). In his report, Durham 
wrote the following about local government in the colonies:  
The establishment of a good system of municipal institutions throughout these 
Provinces is a matter of vital importance. A general legislature, which manages 
the private business of every parish, in addition to the common business of the 
country, wields a power which no single body, however popular in the 
constitution, ought to have…the power of local assessment, and the application of 
the funds arising from it, should be entrusted to local management (Ross 1949, 
13).  
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The introduction of the District Councils Act in 1841 provided for the election of district 
councils and gave more power to local officials, while ensuring that central authorities 
retained a significant amount of control over local affairs (Careless 1990, 266). The Act 
reorganized local administrations by creating a district council composed of a warden, 
appointed by the Governor of the province, and councilors elected at-large (Ross 1949, 
14). The districts incorporated under the District Councils Act also took over some of the 
functions previously administered by the Courts of the Quarter Session, such as the 
responsibility for certain roads and bridges, supporting local schools and raising funds for 
“district purposes” (Ontario 1987, 9). Each council was allowed to pass by-laws, 
although each by-law still required approval from the Governor in Council (Ross 1949, 
14).  
While central authorities continued to hold a significant amount of power under 
the District Councils Act, Romaine Ross argues that this act signaled a change in the 
province’s outlook towards local administrations: “it was apparent that Lord Durham’s 
inquiry into the affairs of the colonies was already producing an effect upon the minds of 
legislators, and the astute political observer could foresee a complete change in British 
colonial policy…the [District Councils] Act was but preparing the way for complete local 
self-government in the not too distant future” (Ross 1949, 14).  
From the unorganized demands of early settlers for local administration to the 
slow easing of power away from central governments, citizens began managing more of 
their own affairs locally. Local governments took on more responsibility during this 
period, evolving from units of military organization and electoral districts for the 
Legislative Assembly. Over time, the colony’s counties and districts assumed the 
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responsibility for many local tasks and the delivery of certain services and, in the process, 
entrenched themselves in the province’s early governance structure.  
At this point, municipal organization in Upper Canada closely resembled local 
institutions in Great Britain. The most obvious difference between the two systems was 
that the British utilized the county as the basic unit of municipal organization while 
Upper Canada used the district. Despite this difference, the district in Upper Canada had 
many of the same functions as the English county (Aitchison 1949, 107). The Upper 
Canada districts were much larger—mainly because of the sparse early settlement in the 
colony—but, like the early British county, were nevertheless controlled by central 
authorities (Glazebrook 1974, 36). As Glazebrook documents, only “pockets of 
democracy” existed in the British county system during this period (1974, 36). County 
officials, all drawn from the landed gentry, were appointed (Glazebrook 1974, 36). 
Consequently, Justices of the Peace—who presided over the Courts of the Quarter 
Sessions—assumed administrative responsibilities (Glazebrook 1974, 36). In Upper 
Canada, the same appointed officials and Justices of the Peace administered early local 
affairs with the district serving as the boundary of their jurisdiction. 
Over time, in Upper Canada—as in Great Britain—local administrations received 
more powers although central authorities retained significant control over local affairs. 
Nevertheless, the creation of a locally-appointed administrator would eventually make 
way for the adoption of elected town councils and leadership. Following from the British 
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, which created major advances for local 
democratization in British municipalities, Robert Baldwin initiated similar measures with 
the introduction of the 1849 Municipal Corporations Act. Baldwin’s efforts created the 
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basic structure of municipal government in Ontario and provided local populations with 
the right to govern their own affairs.  
 
2.2.     The Baldwin Act and Beyond: The Introduction of City-County 
Separation in Ontario 
Robert Baldwin’s insistence in creating a more complete organization for Upper 
Canada’s municipalities stemmed from his passionate belief in responsible government. 
Chief among Baldwin’s beliefs was that local affairs should be handled directly by local 
authorities that are elected by the people they intend to serve (Wilson 1933, 260). 
Importantly, this concept runs counter to the institutional designs of early colonial 
administrations and, notably, even to the central tenets of the District Councils Act.  
Baldwin opposed earlier attempts at municipal organization in Upper Canada. For 
many years, there were calls to create municipal institutions in the colony, supported by 
figures such as Lord Durham and Lord Sydenham (Wilson 1933, 134). The summarily 
introduced District Councils Act was met with resistance from the legislature, with Sir 
Allan MacNab and the Tories criticizing it for creating small republics in Upper Canada’s 
rural areas (Wilson 1933, 134). Similarly, Baldwin opposed the measure because he 
believed that it was not democratic enough (Wilson 1933, 134). The Act, Baldwin argued, 
gave too much power to the Governor General and too little to local authorities (Wilson 
1933, 134).  
Despite the measures that ultimately created locally elected councils in the 
District Councils Act, local administrators desired even more control over their affairs. In 
1843, Baldwin introduced a bill that would have created general municipal administration 
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throughout the province; however, despite being passed by the assembly, the bill was 
ultimately vetoed by the Governor in Council (Ross 1949, 14). In 1844, the Baldwin-
Lafontaine administration failed in their re-election bid, temporarily stalling the issue of 
local self-government until Baldwin and Lafontaine returned to power in 1848 (Ross 
1949, 15). Baldwin’s bill was subsequently re-introduced and passed in the assembly; this 
time, however, Lord Elgin—the more progressive successor to Lord Durham who 
believed strongly in self-government, both centrally and locally—approved the bill (Ross 
1949, 15).  
The Baldwin Act defined the organizational status of local government along with 
the powers of municipal councils and their relationship with the central government 
(Ross 1949, 38). Furthermore, a central tenet of the Baldwin Act was the abolition of the 
districts created in the Territorial Divisions Act (Higgins 1986, 49). In place of districts, 
the Act created two categories of local government: local municipalities—which included 
cities, towns, villages, and townships—and counties (Higgins 1986, 49). Additionally, the 
Baldwin Act created population standards to classify each local government, defining 
villages as having less than two thousand inhabitants, towns as having two thousand 
people or more and cities as having a population of more than fifteen thousand (Ross 
1949, 38).  
The Baldwin Act also created smaller police villages, which were established with 
very limited powers and intended mainly to provide fire suppression and basic police 
protection services (Wilson 1933, 261). Townships and Towns were created as larger 
political units than the police villages, having larger populations and greater servicing 
responsibilities. The colony’s three cities—Hamilton, Kingston and Toronto—held 
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additional powers and were effectively treated as counties (Baldwin and Baldwin 1969, 
216). Consistent with Baldwin’s passionate belief in responsible government, the Act 
specified how local officials should be elected and what powers they would hold. Every 
township was to elect five councilors who, from amongst themselves, would elect a reeve 
(Wilson 1933, 261). If townships contained more than five hundred taxpayers, they 
would elect a deputy-reeve (Wilson 1933, 261). The reeve of each township would also 
sit on county council (Baldwin and Baldwin 1969, 216).  
Importantly, the Baldwin Act strengthened the ability of local governments to 
provide servicing to residents. Under the Act, counties became the key provider of local 
services and given distinct powers that were not transferred to townships, towns and 
villages. The county assumed responsibility for certain roads and bridges, the county 
court house and jail, the maintenance of shire halls, and some licensing powers, 
particularly in the field of transportation (Ontario 1987, 12). More significantly, no limit 
was placed on the taxation powers of counties—or other municipal levels—as the 
Governor General could no longer disallow local by-laws, which he could previously 
veto under the District Councils Act (Ontario 1987, 12). As counties gradually increased 
their service responsibilities, they eventually gained responsibility for local school 
superintendents (1850), social services—such as the creation of houses of industry and 
refuge (1866)—road maintenance for local roads intersecting with county roads (1896), 
the purchasing of toll roads (1901) and library services (1947)  (Ontario 1987, 16).  
Like much of Upper Canada’s municipal development, Baldwin’s 1849 Municipal 
Corporations Act followed trends and institutions from the United Kingdom. The 1835 
Municipal Corporations Act laid the groundwork for increased independence for local 
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governments in the United Kingdom and provided Baldwin with a guide in his attempt at 
municipal reform in Upper Canada.  
The 1835 Municipal Corporations Act had its initial roots in an 1833 Royal 
Commission that was established to investigate “the state of municipal government in 
England and Wales” (Chandler 2007, 42). The ensuing report found that many boroughs 
in the county were prone to maladministration, with ineffectiveness and corruption rife 
amongst appointed local officials (Chandler 2007, 43). The report’s findings led Britain’s 
Parliament to approve the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. The Act established a 
uniform system of government in 178 incorporated towns, with the intention of reducing 
abuses found by the Royal Commission (Clarke 1955, 45). Additionally, the Act outlined 
a number of steps to help reduce the influence of corrupt officials, such as the extension 
of the franchise to more people—namely rate payers—which allowed for more control 
and accountability of local officials. The Act also separated administrative and judicial 
powers by removing appointed Justices of the Peace from key administrative positions 
(Clarke 1955, 45). Furthermore, the Act abolished trading monopolies, placed borough 
police forces under a special Watch Committee and introduced a borough audit system, 
giving further layers of accountability to the financial affairs of local administrations 
(Clarke 1955, 45). The Act maintained the right of the crown to grant municipal charters, 
but regulated the functions that local bodies could perform (Clarke 1955, 45) 
Overall, the most important aspect of the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act was 
the replacement of appointed officials with elected officials in key local administrative 
positions. While the rampant corruption and maladministration discovered by the 1833 
Royal Commission is often identified as the main impetus for re-designing the municipal 
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system in Great Britain, C.F.J Whebell argues that the rise of European liberalism and the 
belief in responsible governments was also a key factor in the establishment of more 
democratic local institutions (1974, 50). According to Whebell, this trend was “beginning 
to erode the very core of centralized authority in the British Empire” (1974, 50).  
It was in the midst of the democratizing spirit, and in the shadow of the Municipal 
Corporations Act of 1835, that Robert Baldwin set out to reform the municipal 
government system in Upper Canada. While spending time in Great Britain during the 
introduction of the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act and the reform period, Baldwin 
appears to have met with Joseph Hume, one of the leaders of this movement (Baldwin 
and Baldwin 1969, 148). As such, it is not surprising that Baldwin’s reforms mirrored 
those in Great Britain and upheld the trend experienced elsewhere in the British Empire 
to vest more control and authority in local decision-makers.  
Since the establishment of the Act, only slight alterations to the system that 
Baldwin established have occurred. The most major change came with the 1866 
Municipal Act, which changed the composition of county councils, and the Act’s 1896 
amendment, which significantly reduced the size of county councils and prohibited local 
councilors from being elected to county council (Ontario 1987, 13). Over time, new 
counties were created. This process remained in place until the introduction of The 
Municipal Amendment Act of 1903, which made no provision for the formation of new 
counties, other than stating that the creation of new counties was “a matter for special 
legislation” (Ross 1949, 31). A 1930 amendment to the Municipal Act once again 
changed the composition of county councils, allowing communities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants to have the reeve and deputy reeve sit on county council, as well as 
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introducing the multiple vote system whereby the reeve received an additional vote in 
municipalities with more than 2,000 electors. In municipalities with more than 300 
electors, the deputy reeve also received an additional vote (Ontario 1987, 14).   
 Traditionally, when an Ontario municipality became urbanized— defined as 
having more than fifteen thousand inhabitants—it could be politically separated from its 
county. According to the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849, whenever any 
incorporated town reached a population of fifteen thousand through census returns, the 
Governor of the Province could, through an order in council, declare the town a “city” 
(Province of Upper Canada, 1849 [64]). As the Act itself states with regards to the 
relationship between these new cities and their former counties: 
 LXXXV. And be it enacted, That each of the Cities which shall be or remain  
 incorporated as such under the authority of this Act, with the liberties thereof,  
 shall, for all Municipal purposes, and such Judicial purposes as are herein or  
 hereby specially provided for, but no other, be a County in itself; (Province of  
 Upper Canada, 1849).  
 
As such, although these cities became independent, they nevertheless remained 
geographically attached to their former counties. Thus, while these areas were politically 
and judicially distinct, these new separated cities could not prevent officials from their 
former counties from meeting at existing county offices within their borders. 
Accordingly, many of these new separated cities remained as county seats. Additionally, 
while county Justices of the Peace had no authority within the new city itself, the city 
could not prevent county officials from holding Courts of the Quarter Sessions within its 
boundaries. Several other provisions in the Act defined the relationship between counties 
and their separated cities with the overall provision being that separated cities could not 
interfere with county property or mobility within its borders.  
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 Over time, 38 cities and towns became separated from counties in Ontario, 
eighteen of which remain separated today. Table 2.1, below, lists the historical listing of 
separated cities and counties in Ontario:  
Table 2.1: City-County Separation History 
City  County Year Separated Notes 
Barrie Simcoe 1959  
Belleville Hastings 1860  
Brantford Brant 1877 Brant county re-
organized as a 
single-tier 
municipality in 
1999 
Brockville Leeds and Grenville 1859  
Cambridge Waterloo 1916 Galt was separated 
from Waterloo 
County in 1916 and 
returned as the City 
of Cambridge (after 
Galt was 
amalgamated with 
Hespler, Blair and 
Preston) with the 
creation of regional 
government in 1973 
Chatham Kent 1880 The Town of 
Chatham was 
separated from Kent 
County in 1880, 
declared a city in 
1895, amalgamated 
in 1997 
Cornwall Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
1945  
Eastview Carleton 1963 Incorporated into 
the Ottawa-Carleton 
Regional 
Government with its 
inception in 1969. 
Eastview’s name 
was also changed to 
Vanier during this 
time. Later 
amalgamated into 
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the new City of 
Ottawa in 2001 
Gananoque Leeds and Grenville 1922  
Guelph Wellington 1879  
Hamilton Wentworth  Incorporated as a 
city in 1846. 
Hamilton was one 
of three jurisdictions 
proclaimed cities 
under the Baldwin 
Act and excluded 
from Wentworth 
County. Returned 
with the creation of 
regional government 
in 1973 and 
amalgamated in 
2001 
Ingersoll Woodstock County 1913 Re-joined he 
County in 1975 
under Bill 95, “An 
Act to Restructure 
Oxford County”. 
Kingston Frontenac County  Incorporated into a 
town in 1838 and a 
city in 1846. 
Kingston was one of 
three jurisdictions 
proclaimed cities 
under the Baldwin 
Act and excluded 
from the County of 
Frontenac 
Kitchener Waterloo  1912 Returned with the 
creation of regional 
government in 1973 
London Middlesex  1855  
Niagara Falls Welland 1904 Returned with the 
creation of the 
Regional 
Municipality of 
Niagara in 1970 
Orillia Simcoe 1969  
Oshawa Durham 1917 Returned with the 
creation of the 
Durham Region in 
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1974 
Ottawa Carleton 1855 Returned with the 
creation of the 
Regional 
Municipality of 
Ottawa-Carleton in 
1969. Amalgamated 
in 2001. 
Owen Sound Grey 1920 Re-joined the 
county on January 
1, 2001 
Pelee Township Essex  Created as a 
separated township 
in 1869 
Pembroke Renfrew  1971  
Peterborough Peterborough 1850  
Prescott Leeds and Grenville 1868  
Quinte West Hastings 1998 Created as a 
separated city from 
Hastings County 
through 
amalgamation in 
1998 of the City of 
Trenton, Sidney 
Township and 
Village of Frankford 
and Murray 
Township from 
Northumberland 
County 
Riverside Essex 1921 Annexed by 
Windsor in 1966 
Sarnia Lambton 1914 Sarnia re-joined 
Lambton County 
with the passage of 
Bill 35 on July 13, 
1989, which 
amalgamated Sarnia 
with the Town of 
Clearwater and, 
together, both 
rejoined the county 
Smiths Falls Lanark 1902  
St. Catherines Lincoln 1876 Returned as part of 
the creation of the 
Regional 
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Municipality of 
Niagara in 1970 
Stratford Perth 1854 Incorporated as a 
village separate 
from Perth County 
in 1854 
St. Mary’s Perth 1855  
St. Thomas Elgin 1881  
Toronto York  Incorporated as a 
city in 1834. 
Toronto was one of 
three jurisdictions 
proclaimed cities 
under the Baldwin 
Act and excluded 
from York County. 
In 1953, 
Metropolitan 
Toronto was 
created, which 
separated the area 
from York County. 
The county seat 
subsequently moved 
to Newmarket 
Trenton Hastings 1880 Was amalgamated 
in 1998 with Sidney 
Township, Murray 
Township and the 
Village of Frankford 
to create the City of 
Quinte West 
Waterloo Waterloo 1947 Returned with the 
creation of regional 
government in 1973 
Welland Welland 1917 Returned as part of 
the creation of the 
Regional 
Municipality of 
Niagara in 1970 
Windsor Essex 1853  
Woodstock Woodstock  1901 Incorporated as a 
municipality 
separate from the 
county in 1901. Re-
joined the county in 
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1975 under Bill 95, 
“An Act to 
Restructure Oxford 
County”. 
 
Of these cities, four eventually returned to their counties and five were absorbed into new 
regional structures and eighteen cities and towns currently remain separated. Yet, while 
the relationship between separated cities and counties is administratively and politically 
clear, separated cities remain both absent from county life yet present within their 
borders, establishing a unique relationship from the time of separation.  
Political scientist Warren Magnusson argues that the idea that the powers of a 
municipality should vary with its size and character was a key principle of the Baldwin 
Act (1983, 7). Magnusson suggests that the belief that rural and urban areas are distinct, 
and need to be treated as such, has always been an important consideration: “there was 
from the beginning a recognition that the governments of cities would be different from 
the governments of other polities at the municipal level – more complex, more ambitious, 
more powerful and certainly more expensive” (1983, 7). Consequently, cities require the 
administrative independence to provide the types of improvement and regulation required 
by their density whereas rural communities neither needed the same power and autonomy 
nor wanted to finance the type of projects and services that cities find necessary. 
Moreover, since many rural leaders were fearful of urban expansion and exploitation, the 
severance of formal relations with urban areas was, from a rural perspective, beneficial 
(Magnusson 1983, 7).  
David Siegel provides similar justification for the creation of city-county 
separation in Ontario. Siegel, like Magnusson, argues that the interests of urban and rural 
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areas were considered so distinct that it would be inappropriate to combine them (1997, 
134). Siegel provides an interesting dimension to this justification, however, in his 
argument that there were additional motivations for separating not only urban and rural 
areas, but also urban and rural people. Siegel argues that, “there was also a strong 
moralistic streak in old Ontario which held that urban dwellers were tainted in ways that 
people living in idyllic rural settings close to the soil were not…therefore it was 
beneficial to have this separation to prevent any contamination” (1997, 134). Urban and 
rural areas, then, were as different sociologically as they were administratively.  
The logic behind city-county separation also fit with the urbanization trend in the 
mid-1800s. The urban population of Upper Canada increased by 4.5 percent in the 1850s 
and 4.1 percent in the 1860s (Careless 1980, 21). Shortly after Confederation, a fifth of 
the province’s population lived in urban communities (Careless 1980, 21). Historian 
J.M.S. Careless argues that this was a persistent and lasting trend: “the urban segment [of 
the population] was thus already growing faster than the rural population, which in some 
areas had its peak by the early 1860s” (1980, 21).6 The growing industrialization and 
commercialization not only attracted people from the farm to the city, but also deepened 
the distinction between urban and rural areas. These conditions created the perception 
that both areas would benefit from having separate political institutions.  
The Baldwin Act not only established the foundations of modern local 
government in Ontario, but also established how policy makers viewed the distinctions 
                                                 
6
 Despite these rapid rates of urban population growth, Canada was still a primarily rural nation. As late as 
1851, only 13% of Canadians lived in cities. By 1900, this number had increased to 35%. This rapid 
increase, combined with the dominance of rural Canada, provided political motivation to separate the two 
areas. The majority rural population wished to remain distinct from a growing urban population. For more 
information, see Harris 2004.  
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between urban and rural parts of the province. As a policy tool, city-county separation 
was considered to be beneficial to both areas: rural areas would be free from urban 
expansion and urban interests would not dominate county councils. Moreover, rural areas 
would not be forced to meet the very different servicing demands that urban areas 
inevitably require, while urban areas would be free from the limitation of narrowly 
focused rural politics. This mutually beneficial system remained in place for many years, 
until the attitudes of provincial policy makers toward the relationship between urban and 
rural began to change. 
 
2.3.     The Creation of Metropolitan Toronto 
 For more than one hundred years, the belief in urban and rural uniqueness 
perpetuated the continuation of a system of city-county separation in Ontario until an 
ideological and institutional shift began emerging with the creation of regional and 
metropolitan government. The main site for this shift was Toronto, which, in 1953, 
became the first Ontario city to be part of a two-tier structure (Sancton 2011, 118). After 
the Second World War, Toronto emerged as a metropolis. Marked by high rates of 
suburbanization, Toronto quickly became a major centre for inward migration (Robinson 
1991, 113). In 1941, Toronto and its immediate neighbours had a population of 
approximately 925,000 residents; however, by 1961, that figure had more than doubled to 
1.9 million (Nader 1975, 230).  
This rapid suburbanization forced policy makers to address the infrastructure 
deficits and social demands that were accumulating within the Toronto region (Frisken 
2007, 55). Consequently, many saw the creation of Metropolitan Toronto as the solution 
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to area-wide problems that crossed jurisdictional boundaries. Urban areas, in this case, 
needed more control over their surrounding rural and developing areas to maintain 
service continuity and plan on a regional scale.  
 Toronto grew slowly by annexing suburban territory. Neighbouring jurisdictions 
frequently petitioned the city to be annexed (Colton 1980, 53). This process was halted in 
1912, when city administrators determined that proposals for annexation were too costly 
for the city (Crouch 1954, 85). By 1912, however, Toronto had legally absorbed thirty 
bordering communities (Colton 1980, 53). Although Toronto itself engaged in only 
marginal boundary adjustments after 1912, smaller suburban municipalities began to 
grow and serve outlying populations after annexation was halted (Colton 1980, 53). The 
village of Weston became a town in 1915; Mimico and New Toronto became towns in 
1919; York was reorganized, creating the new municipality of North York; East York and 
Forest Hill were incorporated in 1924; and, in 1926, the village of Swansea was created 
(Crouch 1954, 85).  
Toronto and its growing suburban municipalities used inter-local agreements to 
coordinate services and infrastructure development. Between 1915 and 1950, 
municipalities in the Toronto area made approximately 163 agreements (Crouch 1954, 
86). Despite this cooperation, requests for annexation did not stop, with suburban towns, 
such as Forest Hill, making several requests for annexation during the 1920s and 1930s 
(Colton 1980, 55).  
Attempts at creating a two-tier structure began in the early 1900s. In 1924, a 
member of the Ontario legislature, George S. Henry, asked cabinet to draft legislation 
that would have created a “metropolitan district” for the area (Frisken 2007, 55). Henry’s 
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proposal called for a “metropolitan district” that would include representation from both 
the city and its surrounding suburban municipalities and provide several major services to 
the area, leaving the existing municipalities in the area intact to provide all other services 
(Frisken 2007, 56).  
However, Henry’s colleagues rejected his proposal and, by the time he came to 
power as Premier, his government was focused on combating the economic downturn of 
the Great Depression (Frisken 2007, 56). As a policy issue, metropolitan government was 
quietly removed as a priority since the majority of the municipalities around Toronto 
were declared insolvent (Colton 1980, 55). Nevertheless, Henry continued to believe that 
Toronto and its suburban area needed some type of regional organization. In October 
1933, Henry commissioned a formal inquiry into Ontario’s metropolitan problems 
(Colton 1980, 56). The inquiry recommended the creation of a type of county system for 
Toronto and its immediate area, which would perform regional services for the city and 
its suburbs (Colton 1980, 56). Yet, when the Liberals came to power in 1934, they 
dissolved Henry’s inquiry before it had completed its work. Although the incoming 
Minister of Municipal Affairs, David A. Croll, proposed a bill in 1936 that would 
amalgamate sections of the area surrounding Toronto into the city, Croll left cabinet in 
1937 and his bill was never subsequently introduced (Colton 1980, 56).  
At the beginning of the post-war period, there were thirteen municipalities within 
Greater Toronto (Rose 1975, 334). Despite the many failed attempts to coordinate the 
area through institutional change, the area remained fragmented. James Milner describes 
the general attitude towards the growing region:  
“the problems of local government in the Toronto metropolitan area…derived 
essentially from the inability of the thirteen existing municipal governments to 
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engage in concerted action to solve their obviously common problems, such as 
arterial road construction; from the financial inability of individual municipalities 
to provide obviously local services, such as schools; and from the widely 
recognized fact that many of the local services could be most efficiently supplied 
only on an area basis” (Milner 1957, 570). 
 
The City of Toronto held a similar attitude towards its surrounding area. In a 1943 master 
plan, the city argued that future population growth “must largely be accommodated in the 
vacant land of adjacent suburbs” (Colton 1980, 59). The report continued by emphasizing 
that “the political boundaries of the City bear no relation to the social and economic life 
of its people” before proposing “a partnership of all the municipalities in the 
Metropolitan Area” (Colton 1980, 59).  
Eventually, the City of Toronto applied to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) 
for an order that would amalgamate the thirteen municipalities within the Greater Toronto 
Area (Rose 1975, 334). While the OMB rejected the city’s application for amalgamation, 
it did recommend a type of metropolitan federation that could allow for the expansion of 
services for the growing area (Frisken 2007, 70). This new metropolitan organization 
would be responsible for area-wide services while existing municipalities would be 
responsible for more local services (Frisken 2007, 70). The province obliged, and with 
the passage of Bill 80—the Metropolitan Toronto Act—Metropolitan Toronto was born 
in 1954 (Crouch 1954, 85).  
Metropolitan Toronto was established with a twenty-four member council that 
consisted of the twelve suburban reeves, or mayors, and twelve members of the Toronto 
city council (Kaplan 1965, 538). The twelve members of the Toronto council comprised 
the mayor, the two controllers receiving the most votes and the nine aldermen who led 
the polls in their wards (Colton 1980, 71). The twenty-fifth member of the council was 
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the Chairman, who was originally appointed by the province, but thereafter elected by the 
members of council (Kaplan 1965, 538).  
Metropolitan Toronto was established as a unique entity, with two key financial 
distinctions from traditional county governments; namely, it was able to assess real estate 
for taxation purposes and allowed to issue debentures on behalf of itself and all local 
governments within its territory (Colton 1980, 71). Metropolitan Toronto also had a large 
amount of service responsibility, as it was initially tasked with the construction and 
maintenance of arterial roads, major sewage and water facilities, regional planning, 
public transportation, the administration of justice, metropolitan parks and housing issues 
that council chose to address (Colton 1980, 71). The old City of Toronto and the twelve 
suburban municipalities would be responsible for police and fire protection, business 
licensing, public health and libraries (Colton 1980, 71). In other service areas, they would 
share jurisdiction with Metropolitan Toronto (Colton 1980, 71).  
Albert Rose argues that the primary motivation for creating Metropolitan Toronto 
was to correct serious inadequacies in basic municipal services in order to accommodate 
the city’s rapidly growing suburban population (1972, ix). Frisken, in a comprehensive 
political history of the region, concurs, arguing that the principal objective of pursuing 
Metropolitan government was, “to speed up the provision of infrastructure to support 
suburban population growth and industrial expansion” (2007, 81). As Toronto states in its 
1943 master plan, not only would future population growth need to be accommodated in 
the suburban parts of the metropolitan area, but the city and its surrounding area were 
also becoming socially and economically intertwined, if still politically separated.  
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The logic behind bringing these areas together ran counter to traditional thinking 
about cities and their hinterland. In this instance, the city and its outlying areas were not 
so distinct that they required total separation, but were instead slowly growing together. 
The city needed its surrounding area to grow, making shared common political 
institutions necessary to facilitate outward expansion and growth. This same thinking 
soon found its way into the creation of additional provincial regional governments, as 
Ontario’s other major urban areas also began growing into their once separate rural and 
suburban areas.  
 
2.4.     The Creation of Regional Government in Ontario 
 The rhetoric used to justify the creation of further regional governments in 
Ontario throughout the late 1960s and 1970s relied on much of the same rationale as the 
creation of Metropolitan Toronto. Finding disparities in regional growth rates, the 
province identified the need for regions to be able to plan on a regional scale to better 
facilitate economic growth (Higgins 1986, 198). Consequently, the notion that urbanized 
centres required more control over their periphery was no longer isolated to Toronto. In 
order to sensibly grow, develop and address growing rates of suburbanization, other 
urban centres—principally around Metropolitan Toronto—also needed common political 
institutions.  
 Widespread suburbanization was occurring not only in Toronto, but also around 
major urban centres in Southern Ontario, such as Hamilton, Oshawa, Barrie, Newmarket 
and Brampton (Robinson 1991, 113). Harris (2004) points to the increase in automobile 
sales as a key factor in promoting suburban expansion and outward migration from urban 
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centres. In 1910, Harris agues that the majority of workers lived near their workplaces 
and either walked or took the streetcar to work (2004, 129). By the 1960s, however, the 
majority drove automobiles, allowing them to live considerably further distances away 
from their workplace (Harris 2004, 129). In 1945, just over 1.1 million cars were 
registered in Canada. By 1952, that number had doubled and, less than a decade later in 
1961, had redoubled again, reaching 4.3 million (Harris 2004, 130). As a result, some 
municipalities on the outskirts of major cities experienced 20 percent - 40 percent growth 
rates in the post-war period (Robinson 1991, 113). This growth inevitably challenged the 
traditional system of city-county separation and forced the provincial government to 
examine the fitness of municipal institutions to address such a demographic challenge.  
In the 1960s, two key reports highlighted the rapid urbanization in the province 
and recommended the creation of regional governments. The first was the 1965 report of 
the Select Committee on the Municipal Act and Related Acts, which found that Ontario’s 
rapid urbanization required larger municipal units. The second was the report of the 
Ontario Committee on Taxation, which drew on the recommendations of the Committee 
on the Municipal Act and Related Acts and recommended a tiered system of regional 
government across the province with varying service and policy responsibilities. Shortly 
after the submission of these two reports, several individual regional studies assessed the 
viability of regional government in many of the province’s most rapidly urbanizing areas. 
The result was the creation of ten regional governments and a permanent change in the 
way the province viewed urban areas in relation to their rural peripheries.  
 The Beckett Committee, named after its Chairman Hollis E. Beckett—then the 
Member of Provincial Parliament for York East—submitted the first major report 
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addressing the need for regional government in the 1960s. The mandate of the Select 
Committee on the Municipal Act and Related Acts was to investigate the province’s large 
body of statutes and recommend solutions. While Beckett examined a number of 
provincial Acts, his recommendations on the Municipal Act were the most intriguing.  
 The Beckett Committee began its discussion on local and regional government by 
emphasizing that the character of separated cities and counties in the province had 
changed dramatically since the introduction of the Baldwin Act:  
The combination of population growth and urbanization coupled with economic 
prosperity and futuristic thinking has created a need for greater forethought and a 
demand for community services never envisioned by the original authors of our 
municipal legislation. Not only have our cities developed a new vigour but 
population has spilled over into rural areas which were neither financially or 
politically equipped to deal with the resulting problems (Ontario 1965, 167).  
 
The report further notes that steady—and, in some areas, rapid—urbanization was 
changing the nature of certain communities. Rural areas slowly became more developed, 
earning the moniker “dormitory municipalities” (Ontario 1965, 168). As these problems 
intensified, local politicians struggled to find solutions since urbanization crept over 
several jurisdictions. The Beckett Committee, therefore, recommended restructuring as 
the only alternative: “in order to restore responsibility to the elected representatives and 
increase the possibility of economical and efficient administration of municipal services, 
larger units of government are necessary” (Ontario 1965, 168). The report presented 
several reasons for this conclusion, which included: the growing complexity of local 
government activities, the extent by which many functions were affected by 
developments outside the local municipality, the need for more highly qualified staff, the 
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increasing cost of many services and the difficulty of dealing with some problems on the 
basis of the smaller existing municipalities (Ontario 1965, 169).  
 The committee suggested that larger municipal units would correct these 
problems. In fact, it laid out seven benefits of increasing the size of local governments. In 
particular, it argued that larger municipal units would: 
1. Facilitate the provision of services which require large areas 
2. Facilitate agreement on common policies and the co-ordination of activities 
3. Eliminate the justification of some special purpose bodies which had been 
created to deal with problems of extending beyond the limited area of local 
municipalities 
4. Make it more feasible to employ more highly qualified staff and staff with 
specialized qualifications 
5. Provide a more fiscally sound municipal unit 
6. Reduce competition for commercial and industrial assessment 
7. Enlarge the tax base, thereby reducing inequalities in the burden of taxation 
To account for newly urbanizing areas, the committee saw a clear benefit in increasing 
the size of local governments, essentially arguing that the functional scope of each area 
needed to be increased.  
 Although defining the borders of new regions proved challenging, the report did 
note that certain aspects— such as population, logical planning areas, watersheds, and 
economic and social conditions—should be criterion factors (Ontario 1965, 173). The 
report also found that Ontario’s counties presented natural geographical units that could 
be converted into regional governments. Separated cities would be included into the new 
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regional governments, with the report noting that their inclusion would create a “strong 
nucleus” and provide “added vitality” for the rest of the region (Ontario 1965, 173). The 
report also lists several other benefits for absorbing separated cities into new regional 
units: “the larger area would also give greater scope to planning through the natural 
extension and co-ordination of existing facilities, and would eliminate the constant threat 
and fear of annexation of amalgamation…in addition, many thousands of dollars are 
being wasted in the battles over boundary changes” (Ontario 1965, 173).  
 The committee did, however, note that the conversion of a county into a regional 
government may not always be ideal and that an examination of each area should be 
conducted prior to the implementation of any regional government, largely out of concern 
that the inclusion of a large separated city or town in the new region’s political life would 
have negative effects (Ontario 1965, 173). Nevertheless, the committee was mostly 
unconcerned about this aspect and recommended proceeding with the implementation of 
regional government in spite of these concerns.  
 With respect to the new responsibility provided to new upper-tier municipal units, 
the committee noted that individual studies should be conducted for each new region in 
order to determine which services would be best handled by the upper- or lower-tier 
(Ontario 1965, 176). However, it did recommend that the new regional councils have the 
responsibility to assess, tax, plan, maintain arterial roads and administer public health, 
hospitals, welfare and policing (Ontario 1965, 185). The report also suggested that 
regional councils assume responsibility for storm and sanitary trunk sewers, sewage 
treatment plants, trunk watermains, water purification plants, “regional type” parks and 
fire services (Ontario 1965, 185).  
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 The Beckett Committee acknowledged that the same trends in urbanization that 
occurred during the 1950s in Toronto were present throughout the province. Rapid 
suburbanization in certain areas was stretching the functional limits of the province’s 
counties, while simultaneously blurring the distinction between urban and rural Ontario 
that had existed for nearly one hundred years.  
 The second report published in the 1960s by the Ontario Committee on Taxation 
also addressed a similar notion of regional government. Formed in 1963 under the 
chairmanship of Lancelot J. Smith, the committee extensively studied Ontario’s taxation 
system, publishing their findings 1967 (Ontario 1967a, vii). It had one mandate, which 
was to produce a “tax and revenue system [that] is as simple, clear, equitable, efficient, 
adequate and as conducive to the sound growth of the Province as can be devised” 
(Ontario 1967b, 495). Published across three volumes, the committee’s report examined 
all facets of taxation in Ontario, including retail sales taxes, income taxes, and even 
revenue from alcoholic beverages and motor vehicle sales. The second volume was 
dedicated to local revenue, specifically the property tax, which the committee described 
as “unpopular” and “vulnerable to criticism” (Ontario 1967b, 1).  
Although the committee ultimately proposed major reforms to the property tax 
system, the report’s major contribution to Ontario’s municipal organization was its 
concerns about the relationship between municipal structure and finance. While it was 
reluctant to delve into the municipal structure, the committee nevertheless provided three 
reasons for doing so (Ontario 1967b, 495):  
1. Efficiency in the raising of revenue by property tax demands assessment and 
collection on a regional basis 
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2. Equity in local finance can hardly be achieved under the structure of our 
present municipal institutions 
3. Municipal capacity to develop non-property source of tax revenue, whether 
individually or in partnership with the Province, is severely circumscribed by 
limited territorial jurisdictions 
Thus, although the focus of municipal restructuring in the past had largely dealt with 
lower-tier municipalities—generally leaving upper-tier units intact—the committee 
recognized an important exception to this trend: the 1953 creation of Metropolitan 
Toronto (Ontario 1967b, 498). The committee praised the new Metro model, noting that 
it has been “hailed throughout North America, and indeed much of the world,” and that it 
had “achieved high standards of success” (Ontario 1967b, 499).  
Desiring the replication of this success throughout the province, the committee 
proposed a regional government scheme that would enhance access and service across the 
entire province. Consequently, the report recommended the creation of twenty-two 
regions for Ontario with three distinct classes: metropolitan (the province’s most densely 
populated areas), urbanizing (the province’s rapidly growing areas, generally on the 
periphery of Ontario’s “metropolitan” areas), and county (the province’s more rural 
areas) (Ontario 1967b, 510). A fourth class—the district—was reserved exclusively for 
northern Ontario communities (Ontario 1967b, 512).  
The distinctions between each classification—metropolitan, urbanizing, county 
and district—were primarily for servicing purposes since the committee believed that 
each classification would require differing responsibilities at the upper tier (Ontario 
1967b, 514). Servicing, then, is perhaps best understood as a spectrum including all four 
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models, with metropolitan areas having more servicing responsibility at the upper tier and 
northern districts having less (Ontario 1967b, 535). However, this does not necessarily 
mean that lower-tier municipalities were to be strengthened in these areas. Instead, the 
committee suggested that the province maintain servicing responsibility in many remote 
and heavily rural areas (Ontario 1967b, 535); in these instances, responsibility for certain 
services would be shifted from the county or region to the province. 
Overall, the report emphasized the need to reconcile municipal structure with 
financing. The Ontario Committee on Taxation recommended that the provincial 
government plan and schedule detailed studies of boundaries, functions and forms of 
municipal organization throughout the province (Ontario 1967a, 238). Additionally, the 
report also recommended that each of these new regional governments be responsible for 
assessment, tax collection and capital borrowing on behalf of their constituent 
municipalities (Ontario 1967a, 238). Finally, the report recommended that where it was 
impossible to include a community into a regional government, the province should 
provide regional services to the community on a contractual basis (Ontario 1967a, 238).  
The reports of both committees set the stage for wide-ranging reform. Although 
the province did not implement all of the major reforms suggested by both reports, the  
government did follow the recommendation calling for in-depth individual reviews of 
Ontario’s rapidly urbanizing areas. Following local reviews in the Ottawa area beginning 
in 1963, ten regional governments were created: Ottawa-Carleton, Niagara, York, Peel, 
Halton, Waterloo, Hamilton-Wentworth, Sudbury, Durham and Haldimand-Norfolk 
(Fyfe 1975, 360). Table 2.2, below, lists each of Ontario’s regional governments along 
with the date of their review and the date of their eventual implementation.  
 51 
Table 2.2: Implementation of Regional Government in Ontario 
Regional Government Review Implementation 
Ottawa-Carleton 1963-1965 1969 
Niagara 1964-1966 1970 
Peel 1965-1966 1973 
Halton 1965-1966 1973 
Waterloo 1966-1970 1973 
Hamilton-Wentworth 1967-1969 1973 
Sudbury 1968-1970 1973 
York 1967-1969 1970 
Durham 1969 (Discontinued) 1973 
Norfolk-Haldimand 1969-1973 1974 
 
Although the reports that recommended creating these regions stressed the importance of 
bringing urban and rural areas together, they also argued that the eventual success of 
governments were regionally-dependent. For example, the Niagara Local Government 
Review Report argued that, “the separation of cities (and towns) from the county made 
good sense in an earlier age when the distinction between urban and rural was sharper” 
(Mayo and Moore 1966, 59). To allow separated cities to remain independent from 
regional governments was “disastrous” (Mayo and Moore 1966, 59), a sentiment shared 
by authors of many other studies such as the Hamilton-Burlington-Wentworth Local 
Government Review Commission (Steele, Jarrett and Morison 1969).  
Conversely, the authors of the Waterloo Area Local Government Review argued 
that the differences between urban and rural within their study area remained significant 
and that the implementation of a regional government would have a negative effect on 
rural areas, including the dilution of rural voices on any re-organized regional council and 
the potential requirement to fund services for which rural areas had little use (Fyfe and 
Morrow 1970, 182). As such, the authors recommended the implementation of a re-
organized city-county system that would create two large separated urban municipalities 
 52 
through amalgamation (Kitchener-Waterloo and Galt) and five enlarged rural 
municipalities within the county borders (Fyfe and Morrow 1970, 178). Although the 
report reiterated its concerns about rural representation and servicing, the provincial 
government dismissed these concerns in their charge toward regional reform.  
Instead, the provincial government believed that the distinction between rural and 
urban was eroding and, in some cases, non-existent. The government also held the belief 
that the economic benefits of urban life could only be extended to the surrounding area 
through common political institutions (Fyfe 1975, 362). John Robarts, Ontario’s premier 
from 1961-1971, argued that the organization of local government was directly related to 
regional economic development; thus, for a region to grow economically, Roberts argued 
that urban and rural areas needed to be linked through a shared political life (Robarts, 
Ontario Legislature 1968). Believing that the conditions were right for the 
implementation of regional government, Robarts argued the following in the Ontario 
legislature (Ontario Legislature, 1968):  
1. There is a general realization that society now lives on a regional scale  
2. There is a genuine willingness to study development problems objectively 
3. That the sharing of assessment and dormitory expenditures will bring about 
regional thinking and budgeting faster than any other single influence 
4. That urban areas should not be separated from their surrounding rural areas  
5. That annexation as an adjustment factor in territory is of limited value today 
Similarly, Darcy McKeough, then the Minister of Municipal Affairs, outlined some of the 
criteria necessary to create a region (McKeough, Ontario Legislature, 1968):  
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1. A sense of community identity based on sociological characteristics, economics, 
geography and history  
2. A balance of interests  
3. An adequate financial base  
4. A large enough area to take advantage of economies of scale  
5. Boundaries that facilitate maximum interregional cooperation  
6. Community participation 
7. Community acceptability  
These criteria guided the establishment of the regions that McKeough and Robarts 
created. Each had an upper tier unit created for a large urban centre while its hinterland, 
commonly—although not universally—followed the old county boundaries, thereby 
reducing the number local municipalities within the region to provide the urban centre 
with more control over its surrounding area (Fyfe 1975, 362)  
The introduction of regional government in Ontario marked a shift in how 
provincial policy-makers viewed urban and rural areas. The reports of both the Select 
Committee on the Municipal Act and Related Acts and the Ontario Committee on 
Taxation identified the changing nature of urbanization in the province’s counties. 
Counties were becoming more urbanized and, as such, the vast differences previously 
identified between the two areas were quickly diminishing. This logic brought about ten 
regional governments and the re-introduction of several once separated cities into its 
surrounding areas. As a result, focus then shifted back to the county system where the 
same forces of urbanization identified as the rationale for creating Ontario’s new regional 
governments were still at work.  
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2.5.     The County Reform Era 
 Following its creation, the county system proved resilient. For more than one 
hundred years, the county system remained largely unchanged until the formation of 
Metropolitan Toronto and, subsequently, the establishment of regional government. The 
creation of regional government created new political problems for the province and the 
government soon shifted its focus to the reorganization of the county system (Williams 
and Downey 1999, 163). In October 1973, John White, then Minister of Treasury, 
Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, ushered in, “a new phase of local government 
reform – a phase in which the initiative will come, not from Queen’s Park, but from the 
counties themselves” (Williams and Downey 1999, 163).  
 The first of these reform proposals came from the Association of Counties and 
Regions of Ontario (ACRO), which proposed four specific calls for reform (Williams and 
Downey 1999, 163):  
1. Consolidate local municipalities 
2. Strengthen the second tier in counties by including separated towns and cities 
3. Ensure equitable representation on county councils 
4. Enlarge and update the responsibility of county units 
Many of these recommendations reflected long-standing concerns of mayors, council 
members and representatives of the counties themselves, especially with respect to 
equitable representation on county councils.  As a result, many of these proposals were 
included in various provincial reports on the county system throughout the decade.  
 Three successive provincial reports investigated Ontario’s county system and 
subsequently made recommendations intended to strengthen the province’s counties. The 
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first report, Patterns for the Future (1987), called for greater flexibility in service 
delivery and adjustments in county representation. The second, County Government in 
Ontario (1988), emphasized a strengthened upper-tier through the inclusion of separated 
cities and towns. The final report, Toward an Ideal County (1990), provided a set of 
principles intended to ensure consistency in policy-creation and service delivery across 
the province.  
 Patterns for the Future was the result of a task force formed in February 1987 by 
then Minister of Municipal Affairs, Bernard Grandmaitre (Ontario 1987, i). The report 
clearly stated that it was a proactive attempt to improve governance in Ontario’s counties 
and was not responding to any identified need for reform (Ontario 1987, i). The Minister 
tasked the committee—headed by MPP Ray Haggerty and composed of three mayors of 
lower-tier municipalities, two from counties and one from the Ottawa-Carleton regional 
government—to examine “retooling and reshaping” the county system, but not 
restructuring (Ontario 1987, i). In fact, the terms of reference for the review were quite 
narrow: accountability, representation and the distribution for responsibility for services 
(Ontario 1987, 4).  
The report began by identifying some of the potential problems in the county 
system: disproportionately growing populations, growing representation inequity, and 
evolving service demands (Ontario 1987, 2). Much of this, the report noted, was due to 
the pressures of suburbanization and growth:  
Urban development has placed a continuous pressure on local municipalities and 
their counties…Few municipalities are now predominantly rural in nature. 
Suburban development has created a climate for annexation disputes. Some 
townships are now larger than towns; some could qualify for city status, which 
would mean separation from the county system. The disparity in size among 
municipalities has placed strains on representation, which become particularly 
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contentious as pressures for new services at the county level are felt (Ontario 
1987, 19).  
 
The committee’s main concern with regard to these pressures was representation at the 
county level. As such, they recommended a series of reforms to the county council 
system, such as a higher population base for a second municipal representative on county 
council (Ontario 1987, 45), and a rebalancing of service responsibilities, such as the 
delivery of general social services (Ontario 1987, 61).  
 Although the report made several other recommendations, perhaps most important 
to this discussion are the two items that fell outside of the committee’s terms of 
reference: small municipalities and separated cities. The committee felt that smaller 
municipalities, specifically those with fewer than 2,500 electors, were skewing the 
balance of representation at the county level (Ontario 1987, 24). While the report stops 
short of recommending structural change to correct this imbalance, it does recommend 
that a future report examine the issue more closely (Ontario 1987, 24).  
 Separated cities were also a problem for the committee. From their meetings with 
county officials, the committee learned that many areas feared that a large number of city 
separations would occur in the near future, primarily due to the quickening pace of 
population growth in certain regions (Ontario 1987, 24). Since an area would be 
automatically removed from the county system once the Ontario Municipal Board 
approved their application for city status, the report argued that this process could have 
detrimental effects for counties: “when a municipality separates from the county, the 
county system not only loses part of its resource base, but also the ability to provide 
services on a county-wide basis….representation and accountability are similarly 
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impaired as area-wide services must then be provided by joint committees or special 
purpose bodies” (Ontario 1987, 24).  
 The report then suggests that inter-local agreements can be problematic. Noting 
that inter-local agreements can be “time-consuming to negotiate, can foster dispute, and 
can create confusion about accountability”, the report argues that these agreements create 
uncertainty about the county’s role as a policy-maker (Ontario 1987, 62). Furthermore, 
this causes public uncertainty about what level of government is responsible for what 
service (Ontario 1987, 65). Inter-local agreements, the report continues, do not 
necessarily provide stable administration since their terms and conditions are subject to 
periodic re-negotiation, thus detracting from a serious consideration of the county’s 
assumptions of a service (Ontario 1987, 65). Yet, despite its resistance to inter-local 
agreements, the report recommended that counties continue to be allowed to enter into 
such agreements (Ontario 1987, 66).  
 The committee recommended a future study on the impact of city-county 
separation (Ontario 1987, 24). Unapparent in their discussion of smaller municipalities, 
the committee expressed alarm over the potential rate of city separation in the future. 
Consequently, the committee proposed that separated cities should be encouraged to 
rejoin the county system and that no further separations should be allowed (Ontario 1987, 
25). Further, they suggested that the minimum population required to grant city status be 
increased above the current rate of 25,000 (Ontario 1987, 25). Additionally, given the 
number of cities that could be separated in the near future, the report also stated that, 
“consideration should be given to providing incentives for larger municipalities to stay in 
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the county system, and that disincentives be eliminated” (Ontario 1987, 25). 
Unfortunately, the committee did not state what it believed such “disincentives” were. 
 Patterns for the Future identified many of the same problems with the county 
system that both the Ontario Committee on Taxation and the Ontario Committee on the 
Municipal Act and Related Act found: rapid urbanization of the rural landscape requiring 
a re-evaluation of Ontario’s county system. Unlike previous reports, however, Patterns 
for the Future added a different sense of urgency, adding that a further repercussion of 
this rapid urbanization could be the wide-ranging separation of newly created cities.  
 The second major report of the county restructuring era, County Government in 
Ontario, resulted from a taskforce chaired by MPP Charlie Tatham. This taskforce was 
established specifically to examine three separate items identified by Patterns for the 
Future (Ontario 1988, i): 
1. Issues of representation and functions 
2. Problems related to small and separated municipalities 
3. Commissioning of separate investigations into each county 
County Government in Ontario begins by discussing how Ontario’s demographics and 
economy have shifted since the creation of the county system in 1849. Importantly, this 
discussion signals a further departure from the original impetus for the creation of 
Ontario’s counties and indicates that much of the institutional logic that created the 
province’s regional governments remained very much still intact: 
The face of Ontario has changed significantly since the introduction of county 
government through the Baldwin Act of 1849. While substantial alterations have 
been made to the structure and functions of other local governments in Ontario 
since that time, the county system remains much the same today as it was 140 
years ago.  
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Although county governments have not experienced major reorganization, the 
society within counties has changed over the years. Ontario in the twentieth 
century has been shaped, and will continue to be shaped, by changes in settlement 
and commuter patterns, in the nature of traditionally rural areas, in the mix of 
people living in counties, and in the expectations which residents have of their 
local government. The distinction between the rural and the urban communities in 
counties is no longer as clear as it once was. This change has placed new 
requirements and demands on a government system designed for a primarily 
agricultural society 
 
The part of the province currently covered by county governments is distinct from 
the more urban areas of regional municipalities and from the less densely 
populated districts in the north. The county form of government must remain 
specially suited to the communities, which combine urban and rural interests, 
traditional stable communities and new growth areas. However, counties, like all 
other governments, represent a dynamic and often increasingly demanding 
population. This constantly changing society must be recognized and 
accommodated if counties are to remain important units of government (Ontario 
1988, 1).  
  
Herein lay the task force’s challenge: although Ontario’s counties are growing, thus 
blurring the once-clear distinction between a county’s rural areas and their more urban 
portions, these areas were not growing at the same pace as the areas within the province’s 
newly created regional governments. Noting that Ontario’s counties were no longer 
primarily agricultural communities, the committee found that most of the labour force in 
the province’s counties was commuting to different areas for work, particularly in the 
Greater Toronto Area (Ontario 1988, 2). Accounting for these changes would be 
challenging, especially for disproportionately growing counties (Ontario 1988, 3) 
To address and strengthen the unique position that counties play in Ontario’s 
municipal system, County Government in Ontario made 41 recommendations. While the 
bulk of these recommendations deal with county council representation, some did address 
restructuring. Since the viability of each lower-tier municipality is one of the main 
focuses of County Government in Ontario, the report suggests that each municipality rely 
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on a population base to support itself. Thus, the report recommends that each 
municipality have a population minimum of 4,000, unless issues such as population 
density and geographic isolation warrant a smaller size (Ontario 1988, 18). The report 
also suggested that police villages be eliminated and annexed or amalgamated into the 
nearest municipality (Ontario 1998, 19). Both of these recommendations helped satisfy 
shared concerns in Patterns for the Future about small municipalities within counties. By 
eliminating small municipalities, the report hoped to solve some of the representation 
inequities in county councils during this period.  
Importantly, however, the largest structural recommendations in County 
Government in Ontario does concern separated cities with the proposal to integrate 
separated cities back into county life. The report argues that:  
The Committee feels it is crucial to the future of the county system that there be 
more integration with and coordination between the county and any separated 
municipalities located within the county. At present, there is a dissipation of 
resources, energy and creativity in disputes between separated municipalities and 
counties (and local municipalities in counties) over boundaries, negotiation and 
renegotiation of agreements and competition for new assessment. In the 
Committee’s vision of a strengthened county system, this energy would be 
redirected into cooperative efforts recognizing the shared municipal interests and, 
more importantly, the common interests of the residents and workers of these 
larger communities (Ontario 1988, 34).  
 
Despite their insistence that separated cities shall be re-integrated back into the county, 
the committee acknowledges that this may not be always possible and that the re-entry of 
a separated city may cause more harm than good (Ontario 1988, 34). While the 
committee did not specify under what conditions such a re-entry of a separated city into a 
county would be harmful, it did recommend that greater cooperation between both 
communities occur on boundary issues and the reversal of competition for assessment 
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and growth (Ontario 1988, 34). The committee also recommends that, where a separated 
city cannot be brought back into the county, a city-county liaison committee be 
established with no more than eight members and equal representation from both the 
county and the separated city (Ontario 1988, 35). Finally, the committee recommends 
that the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing not approve future separations of 
municipalities from counties (Ontario 1988, 44).  
 The third report on county governance, Toward and Ideal County, was intended to 
summarize the findings of the other two most recent reports on Ontario’s county 
system— Patterns for the Future and County Government in Ontario—and provide a list 
of principles required for strong county governance. The report, authored by then 
Minister of Municipal Affairs John Sweeney, identified the same three main problems as 
Patterns for the Future and County Government in Ontario (Ontario 1990, i):  
1. Unfair representation of municipalities on county council 
2. A proliferation of boundary disputes and inter-municipal agreements within 
counties and between counties and neighbouring separated municipalities 
3. The inability of many small municipalities to deal effectively with growth 
pressures and increasingly complex and expensive service demands 
To address these problems, Toward an Ideal County proposed sixteen principles for good 
county government.  
 The first eight principles are described as “general” in nature and outline the 
essential features of county governance, such as a clear division of responsibilities and 
accountability and accessibility mechanisms (Ontario 1990, 1). The tenth principle 
addresses local municipalities, with the recommendation that all lower-tier municipalities 
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have a minimum population of 4,000 in order to remain “viable” (Ontario 1990, 2). 
Principles eleven through fourteen address the composition of council, with the 
recommendation that county councils be no larger than twenty members and that no 
single municipality be able to constitute a majority of the votes on council (Ontario 1990, 
3).  
Although the bulk of these recommendations address the concerns in Patterns for 
the Future and County Government in Ontario about small municipalities and inequity on 
county councils, the final two principles focus on the issue of separated cities. Toward 
and Ideal County recommended the integration of separated cities back into the county 
system, which, according to the report, had the following substantial benefits (Ontario 
1990, 3): 
- Removes competition for assessment through the pooling of costs and benefits 
- Eliminates the duplication of administration of certain services, thereby 
providing more effective and efficient services and fostering economies of 
scale 
- Reduces the number of special purpose bodies established for joint service 
delivery, thereby reducing the number of joint service agreements and 
improving accountability and accessibility 
- Redirects the resources, energy and creativity of the involved municipal units 
to promote the shared interests of the area 
- Creates a strong focus of local government in the area 
While many of these benefits are vaguely stated, it was clear that the province was 
looking for a way to better integrate separated cities with their original counties. 
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However, this report—like County Government in Ontario—acknowledges that this re-
integration would not always be advantageous for a county, such as when a returning city 
held so much of the area’s population that it would dominate a restructured county 
council (Ontario 1990, 4). In these instances, the report urged separated cities and 
counties to form liaison committees and joint service boards. 
 Despite being the culmination of a series of examinations into county governance, 
Toward an Ideal County is surprisingly light on its recommendation for concrete 
legislative changes. In fact, the only real commitment in the report offers is the need for 
the province to fund for county reform studies (Ontario 1990, iv). However, what the 
report does do successfully is present the province’s vision for these communities and lay 
out a path for future reforms, even though the impetus for these reforms was expected to 
come from the counties themselves.  
 Despite the amount of concern raised during the county reform era about the 
continued existence of city-county separation and the insistence that separated cities be 
re-introduced to their counties where possible, only two counties were re-organized 
during this period. Guided by the province’s new outlook on their county governments, 
the separated cities of Woodstock and Sarnia and the separated town of Ingersoll rejoined 
Oxford and Lambton counties with revised representation at the county level.   
 The re-organization of Oxford County was intended to avoid the imposition of 
regional government (Beecroft 1983, 11). Officials in the county, along with the 
separated City of Woodstock and the Town of Ingersoll, were concerned that if the 
province decided to implement regional government within the region, the county’s 
external borders may be altered. This could see parts of Oxford County split and added to 
 64 
surrounding regional governments, such as the Region of Waterloo and Haldimand-
Norfolk (Beecroft 1983, 12). To avoid this situation, the county and its separated 
municipalities began studying various options to improve county governance.  
 To overcome concerns about the dominance of the urban areas on the re-
constituted county council, the Oxford County council was initially created with 20 
members and a balance of representation from both urban and rural. Woodstock received 
six members and afforded one to each other municipality. This gave the urban areas 
(Woodstock, Ingersoll and Tillsonburg) and the rural areas of the county ten members 
each (Beecroft 1983, 75).  
While Oxford County was re-organized to avoid the imposition of regional 
government, the second county to be re-organized during the county reform era—
Lambton County—was restructured to avoid a potentially devastating loss of assessment. 
From 1950 onwards, the City of Sarnia sought to annex territory from its surrounding 
neighbours, namely from the Township of Sarnia, believing that growth was necessary to 
further economic development and expansion (Montgomery 1990, 1). Lambton County 
had always resisted these efforts, mainly because they believed that loss of the Town of 
Sarnia’s assessment would be financially crippling for the sparsely populated county 
(Montgomery 1990, 81). Although Lambton County successfully resisted Sarnia’s efforts 
for nearly forty years, in the late 1980s, the dispute over annexation came to a head when 
the province forced both governments to find a resolution (Montgomery 1990, 81). In 
1989, the province formed a restructuring committee, which declared that the City of 
Sarnia should be amalgamated with the Township of Sarnia (then renamed Clearwater) to 
provide the city with more land to expand. There was, however, an additional caveat that 
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the new city should become part of the county, largely so that Lambton County would not 
be financially depleted by the loss of assessment base (Montgomery 1990, 61). By 
enhancing the county’s assessment base, Lambton County officials’ concerns finally 
eased; yet, if the county had been able to secure a more stable assessment base, it is very 
plausible that Sarnia would have been able to remain separated indefinitely.  
While the restructuring committee felt that it was important for the new city to re-
join the county, they also held concerns regarding the revised county council. To ensure 
that the city would not dominate county council—a concern also addressed by the 
province in Patterns for the Future and County Government in Ontario—the committee 
proposed that the new council be composed of 24 members comprised of five members 
from the city and nineteen from the county municipalities (Montgomery 1990, 69). To 
add additional security for the city, the committee added a provision that transferring any 
service to or from the county level required a majority of votes from the majority of 
municipalities (Montgomery 1990, 69).  
 According to Williams and Downey, the era of county reform “ended quietly” 
(1999, 166).7 This assessment is quite apt. Despite numerous calls for reform and the 
even more bold calls for restructuring contained in County Government in Ontario, very 
little came to fruition. Only ten counties requested individual studies as recommended in 
each report (Williams and Downey 1999, 166). Moreover, only a small proportion of 
                                                 
7
 Although not occurring within the county reform era, Owen Sound re-joined Grey County in 2001, as part 
of a wide-scale consolidation of municipalities within the county. The end result of this restructuring saw 
the number of municipalities in the county reduced from 27 to 9, with Owen Sound re-entering the county 
structure, largely to facilitate an expansion of its borders that would have financially impacted the county’s 
assessment base. In this sense, there are number of parallels between the re-entry of Owen Sound and that 
of Sarnia back into their counties. As of writing for this project, Owen Sound is the last separated city to re-
join its county in Ontario. For more information, please see County of Grey/Owen Sound 2000.  
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Ontario’s counties—most notably, Oxford County and Lambton County—went through 
any significant changes during this period. Despite long-standing concerns with county 
organization, especially the presence of small municipalities and separated cities, very 
little was done to solve these issues aside from recommending the consolidation of 
smaller municipalities and the stoppage of any further city separations.  
The series of reports in the 1980s and 1990s were quite effective at outlining the 
challenges that the county system faced. Despite very little institutional variation since 
the inception of counties, these reports recognize the importance of addressing the 
changing environment around and inside Ontario’s counties. Consequently, each report 
outlines three issues that were near-universal to all of the province’s counties: increasing 
populations, a shifting internal economy and labour force, and steady—if not rapid—
urbanization. These issues were creating problems for Ontario’s counties, the most 
important being inequities in representation, increasing disparities in the size of lower-tier 
municipalities and the possibility of widespread separation of newly urbanized areas of 
the province’s counties.  
Yet, despite the identification of these problems and their potential ramifications, 
very little structural adjustment was completed. There were some changes to the 
composition of council, but wide-scale consolidation of smaller municipalities within 
counties and the reintegration of separated cities did not occur. While city-county 
separation as a practice was halted, only two counties were re-organized to see their 
separated cities integrated back into their structures during this period. 
 Additionally, although each report clearly stated that the provincial government 
would prefer more integrated county structures, there was also a clear detriment to this 
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practice, particularly in the inevitable domination of the city on county council. In the 
absence of a clear plan to re-integrate the city back into the county, the province favoured 
city-county liaison committees and joint servicing and planning boards over inter-local 
agreements, believing the latter to be volatile and difficult to negotiate. The province was 
effectively searching for common bodies to guide service delivery in the absence of 
common political institutions.  
Unlike the county reform era, Ontario’s next phase of re-organization would 
result in significant changes. During the county reform era, the province largely sketched 
out a vision of how counties would be organized in the future leaving the counties 
themselves to implement their vision of an “ideal county”. Repeatedly, reports and 
committees implied that change would have to come from municipalities themselves 
rather than Queen’s Park. However, the next provincial government to address 
restructuring in Ontario would not be so patient.  
 
2.6.     The Era of Amalgamation 
 Until the election of Mike Harris as Premier in 1995, the province had never 
undergone wide-scale municipal restructuring. When Harris and his Progressive 
Conservatives were elected, there were 850 municipalities in the province; by 2000, that 
number was reduced to 444 (Siegel 2005, 129). Through a series of voluntary and non-
voluntary amalgamations, the Harris government contributed to municipal restructuring 
in both highly urbanized and rural communities across the province, including Ontario’s 
counties.  
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Harris came to power with an agenda of reducing government waste and cutting 
taxes—a program clearly stated in his election document, The Common Sense Revolution. 
While The Common Sense Revolution made some specific pledges, such as reforming 
legal aid, cutting government grants and subsidies and reducing taxes, the document is 
quite vague regarding municipal restructuring. The Progressive Conservative platform 
argued that the province had too much government: “Canadians are probably the most 
over-governed people in the world…we do not need every layer—federal, provincial, 
quasi-governmental bodies, regional, municipal and school board—that we have now” 
(Ontario Progressive Conservative Party 1994, 17). The document continues by stating 
that, “we must rationalize the regional and municipal levels to avoid the overlap and 
duplication that now exists” (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party 1994, 17). Yet, 
despite these two claims, the platform did not describe any specific action it would take 
to achieve the “rationalization” of regional and municipal government in the province. 
Rather, the Common Sense Revolution only states that, “we will sit down with 
municipalities to discuss ways of reducing government entanglement and bureaucracy 
with an eye to eliminating waste and duplication as well as unfair downloading by the 
province” (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party 1994, 17).   
 Despite these initially vague claims, the Harris government did, in fact, engage in 
a major restructuring of municipal government in Ontario. One of the Harris 
government’s major legislative tools to achieve this end was Bill 26, the Savings and 
Restructuring Act. Bill 26 described its purpose “to achieve fiscal savings and promote 
economic prosperity through public sector restructuring, streamlining and efficiency and 
to implement other aspects of the government’s economic agenda” (Ontario, 1995). 
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While the Bill’s main purpose was to find efficiencies and amend multiple existing Acts 
and provincial departments, the amendments to the Municipal Act and various other 
statutes related to municipal operations contained some of the most dramatic changes.  
According to David Siegel, the Savings and Restructuring Act contained both 
permissive and mandatory elements. Permissive, Siegel argues, in that it allowed any 
group of municipalities to devise its own voluntary restructuring proposal, yet mandatory 
in that it also permitted municipalities to ask the Minister of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing to appoint a commissioner who could impose a binding agreement (Siegel 2005, 
131). Municipalities were strongly encouraged by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing to amalgamate voluntarily (Siegel 2005, 131). Any voluntary amalgamation, 
however, required the approval of what was described as a “triple majority”—the 
majority of the affected municipalities containing the majority of the affected population 
and the approval of the county council (Siegel 2005, 131). 
More than a year after the implementation of Bill 26, very few municipalities had 
engaged in the intended government restructuring. By 1997, the Minister of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing had approved only 21 restructuring plans, reducing the number of 
municipalities by 50 (Sancton 2000, 106). Although the process seemed to be proceeding 
slowly, Andrew Sancton (2000) argues that two key developments sped up the 
restructuring process: first, the provincial government announced that it would 
amalgamate the municipalities within Metropolitan Toronto in December 1996; and, 
secondly, Chatham and all the constituent municipalities of Kent County were 
amalgamated at the order of provincially appointed commissioner Peter Meyboom 
(Sancton 2000, 106).  
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 Although these twenty-one municipalities had been considering restructuring 
proposals for close to a year after the passage of Bill 26, they had been unable to reach 
agreement (Siegel 2005, 132). When provincial commissioner Peter Meyboom was 
appointed on February 6, 1997, he held five days of meetings in Chatham and Kent and 
gave each municipality one hour to provide recommendations (Downey and Williams 
1998, 225). At the end of this series of meetings, Meyboom presented a draft report to 
local councils providing them with two options: a streamlined two-tier county system or a 
“unicity” model, which called for the complete amalgamation of all lower-tier 
municipalities and the dissolution of the county government (Downey and Williams 
1998, 225). Of the twenty-two municipalities who received the report, twenty-one 
rejected total amalgamation (Downey and Williams 1998, 225). Yet, despite the affected 
municipalities’ clear choice, Meyboom selected complete amalgamation for Chatham-
Kent.  
The amalgamation of Chatham with Kent County was significant in that it 
signaled to the rest of the municipalities in the province that there were consequences for 
not quickly pursuing voluntary restructuring. Robert J. Williams and Terrence J. Downey 
argue that numerous municipalities wanted to avoid “the Chatham-Kent experience” 
(1999, 187). Further, for many municipalities, “the strategy was to find a local solution 
among the county participants as a way to stave off being forcibly merged with a 
dominant urban municipality” (Williams and Downey 1999, 187).  
 Arriving at a similar conclusion, Andrew Sancton argued that the fear of forced 
restructuring provoked municipalities find suitable partners for amalgamation. He 
suggests:  
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From April 1997 onward, Chatham-Kent became the horrible example that no one 
else wanted to follow. Counties scurried to get on with restructuring so that they 
would avoid a commissioner. For many, the main object was to devise a plan that 
would not involve becoming linked with a populous urban centre whose residents 
could dominate the local political process (2000, 108).  
 
Certainly, the “Chatham-Kent” experience provided many municipalities with the 
incentive to pursue restructuring, primarily in Ontario’s rural communities. While rural 
areas were the primary sites of restructuring, the most highly publicized amalgamations 
occurred in some of Ontario’s largest urban centres. In December 1996, the provincial 
government introduced Bill 103—the City of Toronto Act—that amalgamated all of the 
municipalities within Metropolitan Toronto (Friskin 2007, 251). The provincial 
government then turned its focus to regional governments with 1999’s Fewer Municipal 
Politicians Act, which amalgamated the regional municipalities of Hamilton-Wentworth, 
Ottawa-Carleton and Sudbury and separated the regional municipality of Haldimand-
Norfolk into two municipalities, Haldimand and Norfolk (Sancton 2000, 142).  
 The guiding rationale for the Progressive Conservative government to pursue 
restructuring was to reduce the number of politicians and municipal staff, lower taxes, 
remove levels of government and create more efficient municipal structures. The 
provincially published Guide to Municipal Restructuring sets out principles that 
municipalities should follow when pursuing restructuring, including less government, 
effective representation, and the “best value for taxpayer’s dollar” (Downey and Williams 
1998, 215).  
 While the Progressive Conservative government did proceed with a number of 
high-profile amalgamations in some of the province’s largest urban areas—such as 
Toronto, Hamilton and Ottawa—Williams and Downey (1999) argue that, in fact, much 
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of the restructuring that occurred under the Harris government took place in rural 
Ontario. For example, in counties with a separated city, there were 283 lower tier 
municipalities prior to 1995 and 131 after 2000—a 53.7 percent reduction. While 
separated cities did absorb some of these municipalities, much of this restructuring 
involved consolidating small rural municipalities. Table 2.2 illustrates these 
restructurings in each area. The total number of municipalities listed in both columns 
includes the cities and towns separated from each county. 
Table 2.3: Municipalities in Counties with Separated Cities 
County Municipalities Prior to 1995 Municipalities in 2000 
Elgin 16 8 
Essex 22 8 
Frontenac 15 5 
Hastings 30 14 
Lanark 19 9 
Leeds and Grenville 25 13 
Middlesex 22 9 
Perth 16 6 
Peterborough 20 9 
Renfrew 37 18 
Simcoe 16 16 
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 21 7 
Wellington 24 9 
Total 283 131 
 
In an examination of restructuring in four rural counties -Victoria, Dufferin, 
Wellington, and Perth - Williams and Downey found that, “the strategy was to find a 
local solution among the county participants as a way to stave off being forcibly merged 
with a dominant urban municipality” (1999, 187). As a result of this desire, much 
structural reorganization across rural Ontario was “hastily concluded” in an effort to 
avoid the experience of Chatham-Kent (Williams and Downey 1999, 187).  
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While previous sets of municipal reforms—such as the introduction of county and 
regional government—centred on re-defining the relationship between urban areas and 
their rural peripheries and addressing the challenges stemming from rapid urbanization, 
the restructuring of the 1990s primarily sought to achieve fiscal savings and reduce 
government. Despite this, the Mike Harris government dramatically reduced the number 
of lower tier municipalities in Ontario’s counties, a key recommendation of reports 
during the county reform era, while placing larger municipal governments along the 
borders of the province’s separated cities.  
 
2.7.     Summary: The Current State of Ontario’s Municipal 
Organization 
Municipal organization in Ontario has proceeded in several phases. Early 
organization saw the province separated into administrative districts before being divided 
further into smaller units that still exist today in the form of counties. When a jurisdiction 
was urbanized within these constructs, its political separation followed an institutional 
logic that suggested that cities were too important to be entrenched within the more 
narrow politics of county life. They were, in essence, a different entity that needed a 
certain amount of institutional freedom in order to provide necessary services to their 
citizens and grow progressively.  
Increased suburbanization gradually replaced this institutional logic with the idea 
that cities needed more control over their hinterland for growth, economic expansion and 
regional coordination through the development of common political institutions to guide 
these regions. Each institutional shift was accompanied by a change in the relationship 
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between our urban and rural areas. Over time, policy-makers came to view urban and 
rural areas as connected—a view that found itself intertwined in the institutional 
evolution of municipal organization in Ontario.  
In light of these organizational shifts, city-county separation seems like an 
anachronism compared to its institutional counterparts. Several reports submitted to the 
provincial government during the 1970s and 1980s identified rapid urbanization as a key 
problem within Ontario’s existing county system. As a result, two key reports—County 
Government in Ontario and Toward an Ideal County—recommended the re-integration 
of separated cities into their counties. Yet, despite these committees’ convictions that 
separated cities should rejoin county life, the government did not take action to force 
separated cities back into county structures. When restructuring orders came from 
Queen’s Park in the 1990s, Ontario’s separated cities largely fell outside their purview, 
with smaller municipalities within the county system bearing the brunt of provincially 
initiated amalgamation. Once again, the government took little action to force separated 
cities back into county structures, mainly because the Harris Progressive Conservatives 
were more interested in eliminating governments than re-balancing the relationship 
between urban and rural Ontario.  
Separated cities currently fall outside the prevailing logic of municipal 
organization in Ontario: they do not have formal institutional linkages with their 
hinterland and they do not have any formal mechanisms to provide for regional planning 
and coordination. Similar systems can be found in a number of jurisdictions in North 
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America. In the United States8, Virginia9 is the only state with a formal system of city-
county separation, but several cities, such as Baltimore (1851) and St. Louis (1876), were 
separated from their counties, while several other jurisdictions, such as San Francisco 
(1856), Denver (1902), New Orleans (1813), Philadelphia (1854), Baton Rouge (1949) 
and Nashville (1962) have become coterminous with their counties (Bain 1967, 34).10 In 
Canada, most provinces have urban centres that are separated politically from their 
surrounding rural areas. Only Quebec and British Columbia do not currently engage in 
this practice. Quebec, however, did participate in city-county separation until the 
introduction of provincial legislation in 1979 that abolished the province’s 71 upper-tier 
rural counties and replaced them with 95 municipal regional counties that re-integrated 
previously separated cities (Sancton 2011, 125). All other provinces make a distinction 
between urban and rural areas, creating institutional structures that distinguish them both 
administratively and legally.  
                                                 
8
 The power and responsibility of American counties varies significantly, with some counties–largely those 
in New England–having a very minimal functional scope and acting mostly as geographic designations. In 
other areas of the United States, counties provide a variety of services, such as courts, public utilities, 
libraries, hospitals, public health services, parks, roads and law enforcement. American counties have their 
broadest functional scope in western and southern states, where some counties also have responsibilities for 
social services, such as mental health services, welfare, and family and elder services. For more 
information see Menzel 1996; Duncombe 1977; Johnson, Ogden, Castleberry and Swanson 1972.  
9
 In the Virginia municipal system there are several different classifications for municipal corporations. 
Municipalities having less than five thousand residents are classified as towns, while municipalities having 
more than five thousand residents are classified as cities. Cities are distinguished on the basis of population 
between second-class cities (those with five to ten thousand inhabitants) and first class cities (those with 
more than ten thousand inhabitants). First class cities are independent of any county structure while second-
class cities retain some linkages to their counties, namely sharing the same circuit court and certain 
attendant officers. For more information, please see Bain, 1967.  
10
 Virginia presents a unique case, as their statewide system of city-county separation appears to have 
evolved organically and, as some have suggested, had little influence from Great Britain. Chester Bain 
(1967) argues that Virginia’s system was not imported directly from Great Britain, but evolved over time 
through state legislation. He also notes the system’s complete absence from neighbouring states, such as 
West Virginia, indicating that it is a phenomenon unique to Virginia. Author E. Lee Sheppard holds a 
similar belief, arguing in 1977 that the Virginia General Assembly had created so many individual 
distinctions between their counties and their urban areas that city-county separation was already an 
established practice by the 1800s.  
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While forms of city-county separation exist elsewhere, it is Ontario’s shift to 
regional government and new organizational thinking that makes this project interesting. 
Numerous counties in Ontario, in various states of suburbanization, still have separated 
cities in Ontario. Although the province has, since the 1950s, largely favoured the use of 
regional government, there has yet to be a study that assesses how city-county separation 
affects real world policy-making and service coordination. As described in Chapter 1, 
institutional variation continues to have an impact on the everyday lives of residents. The 
second part of this thesis focuses on identifying precisely what this impact is. What 
follows next, however, is a discussion of how existing academic literature has tended to 
view the evolution of municipal organization and the concept of regionalism.  
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Chapter 3: Regionalism – New and Old 
 
3.     Introduction 
 As cities grow, suburban communities inevitably grow around them, creating 
metropolitan regions. This growth creates difficulties in area-wide policy coordination 
and planning as these regions often have dozens of municipal governments intertwined 
with other institutions, such as school boards. Finding common ground amongst so many 
institutionally distinct actors repeatedly proves challenging.  
Determining how best to manage metropolitan areas has sparked a debate 
amongst academics, who have developed three main sets of theories: consolidation and 
reform perspectives, public choice theory and new regionalism. Each differs in how they 
view the role of government in metropolitan areas and the solutions they prescribe for the 
“metropolitan problem”. Consolidationists believe that metropolitan areas are best linked 
through institutions. They favour policy tools such as annexation and amalgamation, 
believing that the institutional fragmentation that exists within metropolitan areas is 
inherently negative and harmful. Public choice scholars take an opposing view, believing 
that the institutional fragmentation within metropolitan areas is functional. These 
jurisdictions, they believe, engage in competition, which inevitably benefits the public. 
They advocate for little, if any, institutional change in metropolitan regions.  
 While these two paradigms consumed the debate around metropolitan 
organization for decades, a new perspective emerged in the 1990s: new regionalism. 
Proponents of new regionalism emphasize the use of governance—which they describe 
as the creation of flexible networks that address regional problems through principally 
 78 
voluntary means—as opposed to government, which new regionalists see as the 
traditional, hierarchical structure of formal institutions. As such, new regionalists 
advocate for the use of voluntary linkages between jurisdictions to address the 
“metropolitan problem”. They also emphasize the inclusion of non-governmental 
actors—such as the voluntary and private sector—into regional governance, creating 
complex networks of linked functions.  
 Many scholars have attempted to place these positions onto a spectrum of 
centralization versus decentralization (Walter-Rogg 2004; Norris 2001; Bourne 1999). 
On such a spectrum, “old regionalism” strategies of centralization—including 
amalgamation and annexation—are located at one extreme, while “new regionalism” and 
public choice strategies are located at the other end of the spectrum. This creates an array 
of institutional options that variously adhere to each model. In one example, Savitch and 
Vogel (2000) address various structural and non-structural approaches and place them on 
a spectrum ranging from governance to the government. They find that consolidation and 
multi-tiered approaches are closer to the centralized, “regional government” approaches 
and identify linked functions (inter-local service agreements), complex networks 
(functional, overlapping jurisdictions) and public choice (fragmentation) as examples of 
“regional governance” (161-164).  
Figure 1.1, below, represents an example of this spectrum from governance to 
government:  
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Figure 3.1: Spectrum of different approaches to governing11 
GOVERNANCE                                                           GOVERNMENT 
Fragmented                                                                                                   Consolidation 
 
 
 
Pluralist/Public Choice                                                                                  Regionalism 
 
 
 
Within this particular conceptualization, fragmented and public choice approaches exist 
at one end of the spectrum, whereby a market determines the pattern of local 
governments and favours multiple, overlapping units over centralization. At the other end 
of the spectrum are consolidation or “old regionalism” approaches, which favours 
government re-organization as a solution to the “metropolitan problem”. New 
regionalism exists in the middle of the spectrum between these two positions. Much like 
consolidationists, new regionalists acknowledge the need for regionally coordinated 
policies and development, but similarly resist structural or institutional changes to bring 
about such coordination—a position also shared with public choice proponents. Instead, 
new regionalists opt for flexible, primarily voluntary networks that include both 
traditional governments and non-governmental actors.  
Since the introduction of the Baldwin Act in 1849, the governance of multi-
municipal regions in Ontario has found a place at different points of the spectrum 
depicted in Figure 1. During the creation of metropolitan and regional government in the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s and the wide-scale use of consolidation techniques in the 1990s, 
“government” was emphasized. This project, however, focuses on institutionally distinct 
                                                 
11
 Adopted from Nelles (2009) 
(Old) (New) 
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multi-municipal regions. A standard form of municipal organization in the province for 
many years—city-county separation—has lost ground to metropolitan and regional 
government. Despite this, counties with separated cities remain as a significant 
governance structure. While parts of the county—namely, rural areas—fall under a 
traditionally tiered government model, the urban area of the county is institutionally 
distinct. The county government regulates many of the functions of the area, except for 
the relationship with its largest and most populated jurisdiction. This emphasized the 
need for “governance” models to link institutionally distinct rural and urban.  
 
3.1.     Old Regionalism and the Reform Perspective 
 One of the traditional responses to multi-municipal fragmentation is 
consolidation. Groups of authors have viewed metropolitan areas as problematic, largely 
because the municipalities in metropolitan areas were seen as being in competition with 
each other. In this environment, policy coordination and continuity was challenging. 
Thus, to solve these issues, policy makers suggested bringing these jurisdictions together 
under a common government—whether it be a type of federation or a single government.  
Three early authors were at the forefront of this reform movement: Paul 
Studenski, Victor Jones, and Luther Gulick. All three authors identified what they 
believed was a “metropolitan problem.” To them, America’s metropolitan areas 
constituted social and economic units, but not political ones. Consequently, metropolitan 
regions required some sort of coordinating mechanism that would provide for region-
wide necessities and reverse the inequities that marked America’s metropolitan 
experience.  
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Paul Studenski argues that each municipality in a metropolitan area is, “concerned 
with its own problems and interests and is inclined to regard its neighbours with a jealous 
eye” (1930, 10). Furthermore, Studenski believes that the fragmentation inherent within 
America’s metropolitan areas is detrimental and required correction. Accordingly, he 
argues that, “proper community development means unification and coordination of 
metropolitan governments” (1930, 10).  
To solve this “metropolitan problem”, Studenski favours structural change, 
stressing that no single solution can be uniformly applied to metropolitan areas across the 
United States (1930, 388). However, Studenski suggests that a federated city model, 
whereby the municipalities within a metropolitan area are united under a single 
government devoted entirely to addressing regional issues, holds some promise. After 
examining a series of alternatives such as annexation and amalgamation, Studenski 
argues that a federated city is the only model that could, on one hand, provide the 
requisite amount of coordination between these areas, but, on the other hand, provide 
municipalities with the local autonomy they expected and refused to cede (1930, 389).  
 Writing in 1942, Victor Jones identifies structural problems within America’s 
metropolitan regions. In Metropolitan Government, Jones describes how America’s urban 
areas are politically fragmented between multiple municipalities, counties, school 
districts and special purpose bodies (1942, xix). To him, this represents a fundamental 
structural flaw: “Under the present system of local government there is no metropolitan 
coverage of essential functions and services…it is difficult and often impossible for the 
community to control its social and economic life” (Jones 1942, xx). 
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Much of this fragmentation, Jones argues, results from rapid population growth in 
the suburban areas that surround central cities (1942, 3). Since suburban areas outpace 
urban cores in terms of population growth, they eventually surround central cities and 
draw population away, creating fragmentation. This, Jones argues, is unsustainable if not 
chaotic: “co-ordination of policy and budgeting and popular control are difficult, if not 
impossible, when governmental power and responsibility are chopped up and the 
segments distributed to a larger number of agencies and authorities within the same area” 
(1942, 335).  
Consequently, Jones favours three potential models: a reorganized city-county, a 
consolidated city-county and a federated city model. Jones suggests that these three 
models would result in a “giant municipality” that could provide servicing and planning 
for an entire metropolitan area (1942, 154). Annexation and amalgamation, Jones argues, 
“arouses too much opposition”, while city-county separation is “more of a disintegrative 
than an integrative device” (1942, 154).  
In The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas, Gulick identifies many of the 
same problems with metropolitan areas in 1962 as Jones did in 1942. Gulick argues that 
the root of many of America’s most pressing social problems at the time—poor 
education, poverty, high unemployment and crime—result from rapid urbanization in 
counties (1962, 9). This problem is difficult to solve, Gulick suggests, because structural 
solutions such as annexation and amalgamation were nearly impossible because of home 
rule and boundary guarantees (1962, 50). Instead, he argues that each “extension“ of the 
government should be employed to correct the “metropolitan problem” (1962, 163). To 
this end, Gulick agrees that local coordination is necessary. While large counties could 
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help coordinate policy across metropolitan areas, a federated city model should be put 
into place to help those counties that are not (1962, 165).  
Jones, Gulick and Studenski were some of the earliest American scholars to 
advocate for large-scale consolidation and structural reform in metropolitan areas. To 
solve the “metropolitan problem”, all three argued that all municipalities—urban and 
suburban—should be brought into common political structures. Yet, while their solutions 
found some popularity, they were also, at times, challenged. Thus, while they remain 
three of the most prominent reform proponents, others—most notably David Rusk—have 
more recently advocated for consolidation and reform within metropolitan areas.  
In a series of books, Rusk (1999; 2003) argues that central cities and their suburbs 
need to be viewed as single units. To account for growth, cities must be “elastic”. Unlike 
Jones, Gulick and Studenski who view the “metropolitan problem” as multifaceted, Rusk 
focuses on racial and economic segregation. Consequently, Rusk advocates for the 
creation of metropolitan governments. For small and medium-sized metropolitan areas, 
Rusk recommends the expansion of the central city through “aggressive” annexation 
policies, city-county consolidation, or by simultaneously empowering county 
governments and weakening municipal governments (2003, 135). For larger metropolitan 
areas, Rusk notes, consolidation tools such as annexation do not work. Instead, Rusk 
advocates for greater regional cooperation, inclusionary zoning, regional land use and 
transportation planning and tax sharing throughout the metropolitan area (2003, 135).  
To authors such as Jones, Gulick, Studenski and Rusk, the creation of common 
political institutions is the only way to achieve policy coordination and continuity in 
metropolitan areas. Since institutional fragmentation was the root cause of the 
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metropolitan disconnect, they believed that ending this fragmentation would inevitably 
end the problems that plagued metropolitan areas. These authors did not look favourably 
upon policy tools such as inter-local agreements, dismissing them as “stop-gap” 
measures. Structural reform, they argue, is necessary.  
Similar ideas led to the creation of regional government in Ontario and put the 
existing system of city-county separation into question. While provincial policy makers 
in Ontario were less concerned about ending economic and social segregation than Rusk, 
they nevertheless shared the belief that common political institutions were the only way 
to extend the economic benefits of urban life to rural areas while providing central cities 
with control over immediate surrounding areas.  
  
3.2.     Public Choice and Fragmentation 
Until the 1970s, the reform argument advanced by scholars like Jones, Gulick and 
Studenski dominated discussion about metropolitan governance. However, an economics-
based approach soon rivaled this dominance. Beginning in the 1970s, another group of 
theorists argued that metropolitan areas were not the problem. Rather than viewing 
metropolitan regions as dominated by feuding, parochial interests, public choice scholars 
viewed them as functional (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961; Bish 1971; Bish and 
Ostrom 1974). Consequently, they suggest that these small local governments join a 
governmental marketplace in which a variety of bodies—including the volunteer sector 
and other special-purpose bodies such as school or public health boards—share 
responsibility on both large and small scales (Atkins, Dewitt and Thangavelu, 1999).  
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 The public choice perspective rejects the notion that institutional consolidation is 
an answer to metropolitan problems. Instead, public choice theorists see institutional 
fragmentation as beneficial for effective and efficient service delivery. Two of the earliest 
proponents of this view were Robert Bish and Vincent Ostrom, whose 1973 book 
Understanding Urban Government makes a strong argument in favour of the public 
choice perspective. Bish and Ostrom insist that rather than being more efficient, big city 
governments are actually inefficient, unresponsive and cumbersome (1973, 5). They 
argue in favour of a governmental system of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions, which 
they contend will take advantage of diverse economies of scale for different public 
services. They further argue that competition is beneficial for a metropolitan region: 
constrained competition between multiple localities operating in different public service 
industries creates relatively efficient and responsive systems of government (1973, 6).  
For Bish and Ostrom, metropolitan areas are akin to the private marketplace in 
which monopolistic providers are unhelpful and unwelcome (1973, 17). Multiple sources 
and multiple jurisdictions create competition leaving the citizen to act as a consumer and 
select the tax and services ratio that best suits them (Bish and Ostrom 1973, 20). 
Furthermore, Bish and Ostrom argue that there is not enough evidence to support the 
arguments of reform scholars such as Jones, Gulick or Studenski (1973, 91). Thus, 
because the public choice approach focuses on diversity of both individual preferences 
and the nature of public goods and services, it recommends no single institutional 
structure for urban government.  
Many years after Bish and Ostrom’s work, Ronald Oakerson (1999) continues the 
case for a public choice approach to local government. Instead of regarding metropolitan 
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areas as fragmented systems in need of organization and integration, Oakerson argues 
that it is more productive to view urban areas as local public economies, which he 
operationalizes as a set of relationships between the providers and producers of public 
goods and services (1999, 3).  
As a rational choice based theory, public choice assumes that individuals are 
aware of the choices they have before them. This choice represents a simple dichotomy 
of voice versus exit: individuals can choose to vote or simply leave (voting with their 
feet) to a jurisdiction that better represents their favoured tax/services ratio. Similarly, 
Tiebout (1956) argues that the “consumer-voter” could select a community to live in that 
best reflects his or her desire for public good provisions. More governing units would 
inevitably result in more variation in public goods, thereby providing more choice for 
individuals. Although the proponents of public choice do, overall, emphasize “exit” over 
“voice” as a strategy for citizen-consumers, smaller governing units have demonstrated 
some increase in citizen representation and participation. A variety of participatory 
means, such as public meetings, hearings, elections and direct contact with officials, 
make government more accessible for individuals in smaller institutional settings (Bish 
2001).  
 Public choice theory relies on a series of theoretical and empirical tenets. 
Theoretically, the public choice perspective relies heavily upon rational choice ideals and 
has the following qualities: 
1. Individual behaviour should constitute the basic unit of analysis 
2. Individuals are properly motivated by rationality and self-interest 
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3. Individuals adopt maximizing strategies to realize their private and public 
goals 
4. The level of information a person has pertaining to a decision varies 
considerably from complete certainty to uncertainty 
Additionally, public choice theory assumes that citizens and government are rational and, 
as such, the framework takes on following qualities when it is utilized: 
1. A variety of local governments is more responsive than one, large government 
2. Citizens can “vote with their feet” 
3. Services can be achieved through a variety of government and private vendors 
to achieve economies of scale 
4. The multiple number of governments and private companies providing 
services facilitates service delivery competition 
5. Multiple governments allow for more citizens to participate in public affairs 
6. The frequency of interaction between governments constitute a system of 
metropolitan governance that can successfully respond to metropolitan wide 
services and policy challenges. 
Consequently, public choice theorists view metropolitan areas very differently than 
reformers. To reformers, fragmented metropolitan areas are marked by chaos; however, 
for the public choice group, they are efficient. Similarly, reformers view citizens in 
fragmented metropolitan areas as caught in the middle of feuding, parochial city councils 
and administrations, while public choice theorists view citizens as best positioned to 
exercise choice. Although the contrasts continue, the public choice theorists provide a 
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rationale for metropolitan area that imposes a semblance of order upon a system 
previously believed to be chaotic.  
  
3.3.     New Regionalism: Governance Versus Government 
 The consolidationist and public choice perspectives rest at opposite ends of the 
institutional spectrum. While one advocates for institutional change to bring coordination 
to metropolitan areas, the other advocates against institutional change and favours a 
governmental marketplace that increases citizen choice. In the 1990s, a middle ground 
emerged between these two positions. Referred to as “the new regionalism”, this 
paradigm argues that effective metropolitan governance does not necessarily require 
consolidation. Instead, effective governance can be achieved through cooperative 
arrangements between governing units.  
 Over the past twenty years, new regionalist authors contend that cities have 
undergone tremendous changes and experienced patterns of activity that transcend 
political boundaries (Salet, Thornley and Kruegels 2003; Savitch and Vogel 1996; Vogel 
and Harrington 2003). Since population growth has gradually shifted from central cities 
to their surrounding suburbs, new regionalist authors cite corresponding issues such as 
urban sprawl, declining cities, growth concerns, and economic competition for the 
increased need of regional cooperation (Savith and Vogel 2000). Consequently, an 
integrated approach is necessary to address regional issues that transcend local 
boundaries. Moreover, the rise of globalization enhances the need for city-regions to be 
more cohesive and competitive (Kresl, 1992).  
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 Frisken and Norris (2001) argue that new regionalists attempt to advance three 
main goals:  
1. Establish principally voluntary methods of promoting local government 
cooperation in metropolitan regions;  
2. Address the negative externalities resulting from fragmented 
governmental structures; and  
3. Provide fiscal and other forms of relief to impoverished central cities so 
that they can contribute more effectively to the economies of their regions.  
To accomplish these goals, new regionalists place more emphasis on governance than 
government. For new regionalists, government entails relying on formal institutional 
structures to address policy problems (Phares 2009, xi). In contrast, governance addresses 
metropolitan issues with a variety of means other than formal metropolitan structures 
(Phares 2009, xi). Broadly defined, the new regionalists view governance as the inclusion 
of non-political actors in the policy process, typically through networks as opposed to 
hierarchies (Norris, 2001). Savitch and Vogel describe the distinction between 
government and governance as follows:  
…whereas government is vertical and firmly institutionalized, governance is 
horizontal and flexible. Whereas government is formal and directed from above, 
governance is informal and self-regulating. Whereas higher level government (eg. 
states) connects to localities through demarcated procedures, lower level 
governance (eg. inter-local agreements) is looser and less confined by boundaries. 
Government reemphasizes the centralizing features of regionalism, whereas 
governance stresses the decentralizing virtues of local cooperation (2000, 161-
162).  
 
Thus, new regionalists believe that a variety of voluntary means which include both 
governmental and non-governmental private actors can effectively coordinate 
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metropolitan areas (Norris, Phares and Zimmerman 2009, 12). Through collaborative 
networks, these actors can link a region.  
 The new regionalist paradigm emphasizes easily reached, voluntary means of 
cooperation. Table 3.1, below, provides a summary of the tools utilized to provide 
coordination within metropolitan areas: 
Table 3.1: Regional Governance Approaches – Walker’s Classification12 
Approach Summary Description 
Easiest  
   Informal Cooperation Collaborative and reciprocal actions 
between two local governments 
   Interlocal Service Agreements Voluntary but formal agreements between 
two or more local governments 
   Joint Powers Agreements Agreements between two or more local 
governments for joint planning, financing, 
and delivery of a service 
   Exterritorial Powers Allows a city to exercise some regulatory 
authority outside of its boundary in rapidly 
developing un-incorporated areas 
   Regional Councils/Councils of   
   Government 
Local councils that rely mostly on 
voluntary efforts and move to regional 
agenda-definer and conflict-resolver roles 
   Federally Encouraged Single-Purpose 
   Regional Bodies 
Single-purpose regional bodies tied to 
federal funds 
   State Planning and Development Districts Established by states in the 1960s and early 
1970s to bring order to chaotic creation of 
federal special purpose regional programs 
   Contracting (private) Service contracts with private providers 
Middling  
   Local Special Districts Provides a single service of multiple 
related services on a multijurisdictional 
basis 
   Transfers of Functions Shifting or responsibility for provision of a 
service from one jurisdiction to another 
   Annexation Bringing an unincorporated area into an 
incorporated jurisdiction 
   Regional Special Districts Region-wide districts providing services 
such as mass transit or sewage disposal 
                                                 
12
 Adapted from Walker (1987) 
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   Metro Multipurpose District  
 
A regional district providing multiple 
functions  
   Reformed Urban County Establishment of a charter county 
Hardest  
   One-Tier Consolidation Consolidation of city and County  
   Two-Tier Restructuring  Division of functions between the local and 
regional 
   Three-Tier Restructuring  Agencies at multiple levels of government 
that absorb, consolidate or restructure new 
and/or existing roles and responsibilities 
 
New regionalists advocate for the utilization of the tools listed in the “easiest” category, 
which are generally voluntary and flexible means. Of particular interest to this study are 
these types of cooperative mechanisms. The more structurally challenging mechanisms, 
such as those listed in the “hardest” and “middling” categories, would involve more 
“government”—the use of formal institutions to create policy—rather than “governance”. 
Despite the relative flexibility of the new regionalist approach, the paradigm does 
have its critics. The majority of these criticisms focus on the unlikelihood of cooperation 
among governing units (Frisken and Norris 2001; Norris 2001). To critics, new 
regionalists underestimate the nature of metropolitan politics. They argue that inter-
jurisdictional conflict is rife within these areas and, as such, expecting voluntary 
cooperation between municipalities is wishful thinking. Cooperation, they note, achieves 
the same result as government (Norris, Phares and Zimmerman 2009, 12). As cooperation 
between governments is challenging on a variety of issues, government can be the tool to 
accomplish ends unreachable through voluntary means (Norris, Phares and Zimmerman 
2009, 12). Additionally, they note that until there is a clear appetite for cooperation 
among the electorate and a clear incentive structure for local politicians, cooperation may 
be impossible on all but a handful of issues (Gainsborough 2001).  
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An examination of the Canadian context reveals similarly disheartening results for 
new regionalists. Exploring the validity of the new regionalist paradigm, Frisken (2001) 
examines Toronto and finds that the provincial government—not metropolitan or 
municipal government—was responsible for initiating or implementing most of the 
policies that helped to shape the region during the second half of the 20th century. These 
policies tended to be driven by provincial agendas that often had little to do with 
regionalist arguments and objectives. These findings lead Frisken to conclude that senior 
governments, even those with undisputed authority, have political and financial agendas 
that may not coincide with the tenets of regionalism (2001, 538). Sancton (2001) argues 
that while new regionalists could learn from the performance of Canadian regional 
institutions, their findings would not necessarily support new regionalist assumptions 
about the ability of regional structures to end city-suburban conflicts, contribute to 
regional economic development, or improve faltering urban cores.  
The new regionalists view flexible, cooperative networks as the key to better 
integrating metropolitan areas. They favour primarily voluntary means of bringing policy 
continuity to areas that generally contain multiple, occasionally competing jurisdictions 
and look to both governmental and non-governmental actors to participate in the complex 
networks that facilitate governance within the metropolitan areas. Consequently, the 
Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework represents an attempt to bridge the gap 
between the expectations of new regionalist scholars and governance reality. By 
providing variables that both positively and negatively affect the prospects of voluntary 
cooperation between jurisdictions, the Institutional Collective Action framework offers a 
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road map for cooperation that can demonstrate how different municipalities can work 
together if certain conditions are present.  
 
3.4.     The Mechanics of Regionalism: Institutional Collective Action 
American local government literature has used the Institutional Collective Action 
(ICA) framework—introduced by Feiock (2004, 6) as a “second generation” rational 
choice explanation for voluntary cooperation—extensively to explain cooperation, 
competition and policy variation within metropolitan areas.13 As a rational-actor 
approach, the ICA framework ignores cultural or normative variables that may also affect 
cooperation. Instead, the framework is concerned with identifying factors that could 
tangibly affect the nature of cooperation between two (or more) municipalities.  
The ICA framework has two main influences. The first is the pioneering work of 
Mancur Olson, who links the prospects of collective action with both perceived and 
realized benefits. According to Olson and subsequent researchers, if the conditions are 
right, cooperation can be achieved. Achieving balance between group and individual 
needs and wants is the challenge of collective action. The second influence is the ideas of 
new regionalists since the ICA framework emphasizes governance over government. To 
ICA scholars, governance encompasses more than city or county governments, but also 
                                                 
13
 Ostrom (2005) argues that rational choices schools of thought can be divided into first- and second-
generation models. She contends that first generation theories are based on “rational egoist assumptions”, 
such as the assumptions that individuals have perfect information, consistent preferences regarding 
outcomes and seek to maximize material benefit (2005, 100). Second generation models, on the other hand, 
acknowledge the role that contextual factors, such as differing institutional structures and regional 
networks, play in shaping the incentives structures of agents. As such, the assumptions of perfect 
information, consistent preferences and the maximization of material benefit are relaxed and the idea of 
cost-benefit pay-off structures are examined within the institutional context of these areas (Vanberg 2002; 
Feiock 2007) 
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voluntary, non-for-profit, private organizations and intergovernmental linkages (Feiock, 
2004). According to the new regionalists, cooperative agreements can link metropolitan 
regions, creating policy and servicing coherence throughout a region. In many respects, 
the ICA framework functions as the mechanics behind new regionalist ideas.  
Cooperation results when two or more actors believe that the end result of 
cooperation is beneficial. Thus, cooperation is the most flexible alternative to formal 
institutional reform, as it allows local governments to decide which regional issues 
should be addressed collectively (Nelles 2009, 22). Additionally, cooperation is attractive 
to local governments because it allows partnerships to be formed generally without the 
intervention of senior levels of government. Hulst and van Montfort argue that local 
cooperation leaves the policy domains of local government intact and does not typically 
result in a permanent transfer or loss of local policy capacity, which they contend 
prevents local democracy from being “hollowed out” (2007, 8). Most municipalities 
practice some form of intercommunal cooperation.14 When the benefit is clear or 
unreachable alone, cooperation is likely.   
Individuals join groups for a number of reasons, but chief among their 
motivations include: 1) the desire to receive benefits they could not otherwise receive 
(Olson 1965); and 2) to advance common policy goals and preferences (Rothenberg 
1992). Municipalities cooperate with each other after strict cost-benefit calculations. If 
the rewards of cooperation outstrip the costs, cooperation is likely. If they do not, 
cooperation is unlikely.   
                                                 
14
 There are a variety of forms of cooperation between municipalities. The most basic being informal 
information sharing between municipal departments or municipal officials (either elected or staff) and 
ranging up to informal agreements over policy issues and formal inter-local service agreements. See also 
Hulst and van Montfort (2007).  
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In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson applies formal logic to group 
membership. Olson suggests that the purpose of all groups is the furtherance of their 
members’ common interests (1965: 5). Thus, organizations that do not serve the interests 
of their members often fail (Olson 1965: 6). Additionally, Olson argues that purely 
individual interests are usually accomplished most efficiently through individual, 
unorganized action; however, when there are a number of individuals with a common 
interest, individual action will be insufficient (1965: 7). Yet, this does not mean that 
members must surrender their individual interests when joining a collective. In fact, 
Olson states members are often expected to pursue interests independently of the group 
(1965: 8). Consequently, the cost of joining a collective is a function of the rate or level 
of returns for members, while the advantage of joining a group is determined by the cost 
and aggregate value derived from group membership (1965: 22). Simply put, an 
individual enters a collective if the benefits of membership outweigh the costs while the 
advantages that the individual enjoys will determine whether or not they continue their 
membership.  
 Olson draws a distinction between large and small groups, arguing that larger 
groups often fail to provide group benefits to members because of their size (1965: 28). 
The more members a group has, the smaller the fraction of collective goods each member 
receives. As such, larger groups are less efficient in providing group benefits than smaller 
groups. Smaller groups, however, often provide a suboptimal amount of collective 
benefits to members. However, this sub-optimality depends on the fraction of benefits 
drawn by their largest members (Olson 1965: 28). What then constitutes an optimal group 
size? Olson states that a group composed of members of an unequal size (as measured 
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through a variety of factors, such as numerical size or importance), and therefore draw an 
unequal fraction of collective goods, demonstrate a reduced tendency towards sub-
optimality (1965: 29). The breadth and depth of an organization matters: there cannot be 
too many members of disproportionate size to other members or no one will experience 
optimal benefits from the collective.  
 Dougherty summarizes Olson’s major propositions as follows (2003: 18):  
1. Free Rider Hypothesis: when actors benefit from collective goods, they are 
likely to free ride 
2. Group Size Hypothesis: larger groups are more likely to fail than smaller ones 
3. Exploitation Hypothesis: group members who receive larger benefits are more 
likely to contribute than group members who receive smaller benefits.  
4. Asymmetry Hypothesis: groups with asymmetric benefits are more likely to 
succeed than group with symmetric benefits 
5. By-Product Hypothesis: the successful provision of a collective good is often 
the by-product of selective incentives in large groups 
These principles provide the foundation of the ICA framework. Following from his 
discussion of group size, Olson lists several factors that can both enhance or limit 
cooperation between municipalities: larger groups tend to distribute collective benefits to 
group members less efficiently than smaller groups, disproportionate member size can 
limit collective action, and groups with asymmetric benefits are more likely to succeed 
than those with symmetric benefits.  
As a theoretical and conceptual tool, the ICA framework links the prospects for 
establishing cooperative agreements to transaction costs of which there are three 
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identifiable types: coordination problems resulting from information deficiencies, 
negotiation costs derived from dividing mutual gains and enforcement costs associated 
with monitoring any agreement (Maser, 1985). Consequently, cooperation between local 
governments increases when the potential benefits are high and the transaction costs of 
coordinating, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing an arrangement are low (Lubell, 
Schneider, Scholz & Mete, 2002). Additionally, five groups of core variables influence 
cooperation between local jurisdictions: social capital, group composition, geographic 
density, power asymmetry and political leadership. While some studies have tested other 
variables, such as policy control and resource scarcity (Kanareck and Baldassare 1996; 
Williams 1967), careerism (Matking and Frederickson 2009; LeRoux and Pandey 2011), 
and business activity (Johnson and Neiman 2004), the variables listed above represent the 
core factors regularly represented in ICA work.   
Social capital is a factor that positively affects cooperation (Ostrom, 1998; Gulati 
and Singh, 1998). Often, this is derived from social networks or patterns of interaction 
with others (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005). Thus, consistent interaction between localities 
is more likely to result in a positive relationship between both political actors and city 
staff (Matkin and Frederickson, 2009). The increased interaction of these groupings of 
actors familiarizes them with each other, eventually leading to the reciprocation of trust, 
making the emergence of cooperative arrangements more likely. 
The composition of any group is another important factor in reaching agreement. 
Two areas of group composition, in particular, exert particular influence over 
cooperation: group size and group homogeneity or heterogeneity. The size of the group 
determines how benefits can be distributed to members and the transaction costs 
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associated with negotiating and monitoring an agreement. Smaller groups are easier to 
form and have fewer problems associated with determining the allotment of benefits and 
monitoring agreements (Post 2004, 74). Larger groups are harder to organize, produce 
smaller benefits to members and create opportunities for some jurisdictions to free ride, 
which is why research demonstrates that the increased number of actors in any particular 
region will limit cooperation (Visser 2004). Additionally, the homogeneity of the actors 
is important in reaching a cooperative agreement. Post (2004, 84) argues that a decrease 
in the heterogeneity of the populations served by local governments entering new 
agreements is positively related to collective action. As such, a smaller group with a 
homogenous population will achieve cooperation more easily than a larger group with a 
more heterogeneous population.  
Closely associated with group size is the government’s geographic density. For 
several reasons, geographic density increases the likelihood of cooperation between local 
governments (Bickers and Stein 2004; Post 2002). For one, the relative closeness of local 
governments within an area increases the likelihood that residents of one jurisdiction may 
work in the other and vice versa. Individuals see themselves more as regional citizens and 
less isolated into one jurisdiction, increasing the pressure on politicians to similarly 
cooperate with other areas (Post 2004, 73). Secondly, a higher density of local 
governments implies greater spillover effects between jurisdictions. Consequently, 
externalities and economies of scale gradually motivate governing units to cooperate 
(Shretha and Feiock 2007).  
A differential of power is another important variable in determining whether 
governing units can reach cooperative arrangements. The degree by which partners vary 
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in their power affects the motivation of actors and ultimately determines whether or not 
the relationship is coercive (Steinacker 2004). In any situation where power asymmetry is 
great, the stronger actor may exploit the weaker and coerce them into participating in an 
agreement. Additionally, the relative position of weaker actors may make cooperation a 
virtual necessity if the stronger actor holds more resources, especially if those resources 
are relatively unattainable for the weaker actor without cooperation.  
Political leaders also have a large role in initiating and formalizing agreements. 
Where political leaders have more autonomy to make decisions—and, consequently, are 
stronger—cooperation is much easier to achieve; however, where a municipal 
government has very few autonomous areas of jurisdiction, its political leadership may be 
wary of ceding authority through cooperative arrangements (Alcantara and Nelles 2009). 
Nevertheless, research generally demonstrates that strong political leaders can overcome 
resistance to cooperation from council and various stakeholders (Post 2004). In general, 
the presence of strong political leadership in a municipality increases the chances for 
cooperation.  
Listed below, in Table 3.2, are various factors that either positively and negatively 
affect cooperation: 
Table 3.2: Factors Identified as Influencing Cooperation 
Social Capital and Interaction + 
Group Composition  
   Larger Groups - 
   Smaller Groups + 
   Group Homogeneity  + 
   Group Heterogeneity  - 
Geographic Density  
   More Local Governments + 
   Fewer Local Governments - 
Power Asymmetry  + 
Political Leadership  
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   Strong Political Leadership + 
   Weak Political Leadership - 
 
Transaction costs also affect the formation and outcome of cooperative 
agreements. Ugboro, Obeng and Talley define the transaction costs involved with inter-
local cooperation as, “the costs of extensive decision making for negotiating, operating 
and enforcing the provisions of the system” (2001, 83). As Fieock (2007) reminds us, 
cooperative arrangements are most likely to arise when the benefits are high and the 
transaction costs of negotiating, coordinating, monitoring and enforcing agreements are 
low.  
Existing research demonstrates four different and identifiable types of transaction 
costs: information and coordination costs, negotiation and division costs, enforcement 
and monitoring costs and agency costs (Feiock, 2007: 51). Coordination costs refer to the 
process of identifying opportunities for mutual gain and potential policy partners. Once a 
potential partner establishes a connection, a negotiation of formulas or procedures to 
allocate costs or benefits ensues. This can sometimes be a challenging process. As a 
result, the conditions under which the agreement was first established can change over 
the lifespan of an agreement, affecting each partner’s perceived value and possibly 
increasing the incentive for either municipality to renege. Enforcement costs derive from 
efforts to maintain and adhere to the original content of the agreement, making 
community support a key in the ICA paradigm. And, finally, agency costs arise when the 
preferences of public officials negotiating agreements depart from the preferences of the 
citizens they represent (Feiock 2002).  
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These transaction costs are not mutually exclusive, as a number of transaction 
costs problems can affect one cooperative arrangement or potential cooperative 
arrangement. Feiock (2007) outlines each category of transaction costs which is  
represented below, in Table 3.3: 
Table 3.3: Transaction Costs 
Transaction Cost Description 
Information/Coordination Costs Information on the preferences of all 
participants over possible outcomes and 
their resources must be common 
knowledge 
Negotiation/Division Costs The parties must be able to agree on a 
division of their mutual gains 
Enforcement/Monitoring Costs There can be at most low costs associated 
with monitoring and enforcing the 
agreement 
Agency Costs The bargaining agents must effectively 
represent the interests of their constituents 
 
Ultimately, in order for inter-local agreements to be of value for participating 
governments, transaction costs must be overcome. If either government cannot recognize 
a benefit to entering an agreement, they will not cooperate.  
 
3.5.     The Limits of the ICA Framework 
While the ICA framework is successful in uncovering factors that both help and 
hinder cooperation between municipalities in a number of jurisdictions, the application of 
the ICA framework for this project poses two challenges. First, the ICA framework has 
been primarily utilized in the study of large, American metropolitan areas. These areas 
are typified by urban-suburban relationships. In contrast, this project examines urban-
rural relationships. This contextual change may alter the applicability of traditional ICA 
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variables. Secondly, the difference in institutional structures between Canadian and 
American municipalities may also alter the explanatory power of the framework.  
As previously stated, researchers have used the ICA framework to test 
relationships in large American metropolitan areas. By their nature, these regions are 
typified by a large urban core surrounded by suburban municipalities. By contrast, 
separated cities and counties are areas that have an urban centre surrounded by rural 
municipalities. As a result, there is a stark difference between an urban-suburban 
relationship and an urban-rural one. Both relationships present actors with different 
interests and ideological preferences, as well as municipalities with differing amounts of 
resources and governing capacities. Due to these asymmetries, the application and testing 
of ICA variables may be challenging in regions with separated cities and counties.   
The institutional distinctiveness between American and Canadian local 
government may also hinder the easy adoption of the ICA framework for two further 
reasons. First, the size of Canadian regions with separated cities pales in comparison to 
American metropolitan regions, creating much smaller policy networks. Secondly, and 
perhaps most importantly, provincial governments in Canada exert much more influence 
over their municipalities than do state governments in the United States. This discrepancy 
may greatly impact the nature of cooperation in the cases selected for inclusion in this 
study.  
As a primarily American framework, ICA was created with several institutional 
assumptions in place, chief among them that metropolitan areas are comprised of 
municipal structures with little, if any, regional institutional linkages. This is not the case 
in Canada. While American metropolitan areas can contain hundreds, if not thousands, of 
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governing units, Canadian regions with separated cities—especially those included in this 
study—number in the dozens, if even that high. In fact, the entire universe of cases 
included in this study is only 136, a wide range of observations for a Canadian study, but 
atypical of most American metropolitan areas. In the United States, ICA scholars have 
the ability to study hundreds of agreements between institutional actors, while Canadian 
studies must adjust any particular study of regional cooperation to a much smaller 
number of observable jurisdictions.  
A second—and perhaps the more important—factor is government control and 
influence. In the United States, state governments are much less interventionist than in 
Canada, where provincial and regional governments have a wider influence over the 
activities of local governments. Nevertheless, existing American ICA literature does 
provide some information on the effect of intervention from senior levels of government. 
In the few cases in which it is addressed, ICA scholars argue that, on the one hand, 
increased regulation of local government behaviour by senior levels of government may 
negatively influence cooperation through increased expectations of central government 
intervention; however, on the other, incentives from senior levels of government may 
positively influence cooperation (Post, 2004). While some research (Morgan and 
Hirlinger 1991; Krueger and Bernick 2010) demonstrates promise in connecting state 
regulation to a decreasing likelihood of cooperation, Post (2004) argues that more 
research is necessary in order to fully assess the impact of central government influence 
and control on inter-local cooperation.  
Conversely, initial research in Canada suggests that municipalities under threat of 
intervention from senior levels of government are more amenable to reaching a 
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negotiated settlement with neighbouring municipalities (Alcantara and Nelles 2009). 
However, initial research also shows that municipalities are self-interested actors. While 
central governments may regulate some behaviour, most municipalities do not want to 
surrender policy or process control to central authorities. To reach an agreement, most 
municipalities will want to independently dictate the terms of this agreement. In spite of 
this, it remains unclear whether or not the direct threat of intervention influences 
governments to cooperate or whether the general threat of intervention is sufficient 
enough to draw cooperative results.  
Although the application of the ICA framework for this project is challenging, I 
hypothesize that the framework’s variables can overcome the changes in the institutional 
context between American metropolitan areas and Ontario’s counties with separated 
cities. While there are many differences between separated cities and counties and the 
areas that the ICA framework generally studies, there are also common factors will help 
this study produce tangible insights. For instance, ICA relies on processes and 
outcomes—mainly cooperative agreements—that are similar in Canada. The attitudinal 
inputs that the ICA framework utilizes are also similar in Canada. And, finally, the 
common link between the two nations are cooperation and several other ICA variables, 
such as leadership, that defy institutional context.  
 
 
 
3.6.     Summary 
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 Examining the different theoretical approaches to metropolitan governance is 
important for a number of reasons. While American metropolitan regions are much 
different than the multi-municipal separated cities and counties found in Ontario, they 
nevertheless do share some similarities, such as the lack of institutional linkages between 
central cities and their suburban and rural peripheries. This system, as described in 
Chapter 2, was intentionally designed this way to allow both areas to develop 
independently without imposing on the other any of the unique challenges that rural and 
urban areas independently experience.  
 However, this arrangement has ultimately created a situation in which the rural 
and suburban municipalities surrounding the area’s urban core are subject to a degree of 
institutional regulation by the county while the central city remains institutionally free 
from its surrounding jurisdictions. Since policy coordination and development must come 
from the use of informal and formal governance agreement, the ICA framework provides 
factors that both positively and negatively influence cooperation within these regions. In 
the following chapters, this study will examine four policy areas—planning, boundary 
expansion, social service delivery and the creation of formal agreements—through an 
ICA lens to provide an in-depth examination of the relationship between separated cities 
and counties.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Border Issues and Expansion 
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4.     Introduction 
In the past twenty years, nearly every separated city or town in Ontario has 
undergone some form of boundary extension, whether through annexation15 or 
amalgamation.16 The ICA framework views border expansion as another method of 
facilitating service delivery through a wide geographic area. Annexation, amalgamation 
and even the use of special districts are all alternative methods of cooperation (Carr 2005, 
235). Flexible boundaries facilitate cooperation as municipalities seek optimal 
institutional arrangements for service delivery and policy creation (Feiock and Carr 
2001). Research demonstrates that boundary expansion may reduce more ad hoc forms of 
cooperation—including signed informal or formal agreements—mainly because 
expansion secures a permanent market for the production or provision of public goods 
and reduces the need of selling excess capacity (Mullin 2007).  
 The ICA framework is grounded in rational choice perspectives, which is to say 
that it generally ignores cultural or societal variables. Boundary expansion is a delicate 
endeavour; thus, in many cases, smaller municipalities are reluctant to relinquish territory 
and its corresponding assessment base. Moreover, boundary expansion can result in very 
public disagreements that may require provincial intervention. These types of conflicts 
                                                 
15
 The notable exceptions are Brockville, Prescott, St. Mary’s and Orillia, whose borders remained fixed 
during this time period.  
16
 The only current separated city in Ontario created through amalgamation is the City of Quinte West, 
which was created in 1998 through the consolidation of the separated city of Trenton, the village of 
Frankford and the townships of Sidney and Murray. Although the province was beginning to phase out 
city-county separation in the late 1980s (as discussed in Chapter 2), Quinte West was created separately 
from Hastings County mainly because its largest component, the City of Trenton, was already separated 
from the county. While Hastings County initially objected to the separate creation of Quinte West, 
representatives from each municipality undergoing consolidation agreed that the new city should not be 
part of the county’s structure. Having a strong desire to see consolidation occur across the province, the 
government of Ontario relented and allowed Quinte West to be created as a separated city.  
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can harm the relationship between both municipalities if they are not handled carefully. 
Due to this reaction, municipalities do not seek boundary expansion to facilitate service 
extension; rather, municipalities seek alternative means to achieve servicing in an effort 
to avoid boundary expansion. Consequently, the ICA framework suggests that boundary 
expansion can harm the relationship between two municipalities and lead to less 
cooperation.  
This chapter reviews three case studies in order to explore how boundary 
expansion has been used across the province and what effect these border adjustments 
have had on cooperation in each area. Specifically, I will analyze the most recent 
boundary expansions in Guelph, London and Barrie.  
 
4.1.     Boundary Expansion in Regional Government 
  In Ontario’s counties with a separated city, there were 283 lower tier 
municipalities prior to 1995 and 131 after 2000—a 53.7 percent reduction. Much of this 
results from the province’s push towards amalgamation, as discussed in chapter 2. 
However, during this period there were also 115 individual boundary expansions in 
Ontario’s counties with a separated town or city.17 By comparison, only 8 boundary 
changes occurred in Ontario’s regional government during the same time period. Many of 
these changes include the wholesale consolidation of the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth, 
                                                 
17
 I obtained this information from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing’s Municipal 
Restructuring Activity Summary Table.  
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Metropolitan Toronto, the Region of Ottawa-Carleton, and Sudbury Region and the 
separation of the Region of Haldimand-Norfolk.18  
 Aside from these larger conversions of regional governments into single-tier 
municipalities, there have been very few boundary changes in Ontario’s regional 
governments from 1995 onwards:  
- Region of Peel and Halton Region: In January of 2010, Mississauga and the 
Region of Peel agreed to an annexation plan with the Town of Milton and 
Halton region that saw close to 1,000 acres in the “Ninth Line” community 
transferred from Milton to Mississauga so that the city’s borders adjoined 
Highway 407 (City of Mississauga 2009). Mississauga and Peel paid 
$3,290,000 in compensation to Milton and Halton in exchange for the land 
(City of Mississauga 2009). 
- Region of Waterloo: On September 1, 2008, the province approved a very 
minor annexation of 29 hectares from North Dumfries to the City of 
Cambridge in order to bring consistent zoning to a proposed housing 
development (Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2008).  
- York Region: In July of 2001, a minor annexation of half an acre was 
approved that transferred land slated for a subdivision in the Town of Aurora 
to the City of Richmond Hill to ensure consistent zoning for the proposed 
project (Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2001).  
                                                 
18
 Some authors, such as Williams and Downey (1999), argue that much of the restructuring during this 
period occurred in Ontario’s rural areas, where smaller towns and villages were consolidated to eliminate 
what politicians perceived as inefficiencies. This may partially explain the large differences in the number 
of boundary changes between county and regional government in the province.  
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Each of these annexations was relatively minor, with the largest transfer occurring 
between Mississauga and Milton. This particular annexation was challenging primarily 
because it involved transferring land from one regional government to another. The two 
other annexations were also very minor and involved land transfers that were already 
enclosed within the same regional government. In comparison to Cambridge and 
Richmond Hill, North Dumfries and Aurora are more rural municipalities. In both cases, 
it was sensible from a zoning perspective to make the development projects within each 
municipality consistent.  
This prompts an important question: why have so few boundary expansions 
occurred in Ontario’s regional governments? Upper tier government assumes the 
responsibility for regional planning matters and transportation. As Fyfe (1975) argues, 
regional government is designed to provide urban centres with more control over their 
immediate hinterland. In regional governments, urban areas are able to express their 
opinions about the development that occurs around them, mainly through their 
participation on regional councils.  
This is not the case in areas with separated cities and counties. Since there are no 
institutional ties linking a separated city to its county, there is no connection between the 
growth that occurs within the city’s boundaries and the growth that occurs outside its 
borders. Any development in the county falls outside of the city’s borders and, 
consequently, remains inaccessible to the city in terms of assessment. The county 
provides no regional planning to ensure that there is an equitable division of costs for the 
maintenance of roads or infrastructure. This explains why separated municipalities tend 
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to be more proactive in ensuring that they control new development and potential 
employment lands.  
 
4.2.     Boundary Expansion in London 
 London grew slowly through a number of annexations early in its history. 
Following incorporation, London underwent 15 major boundary changes, with the first 
coming in 1885. Further major annexations followed in 1897, 1912, 1950, 1954 and 
1960. In 1979, London again saw the need to expand. Very little, however, was done to 
enlarge the city’s borders and meet these needs until 1988. Citing a lack of available 
industrial land, the city informed the province that it wanted to annex 4,339 hectares of 
land from London Township and 2,792 hectares from Westminister (Sancton 1998, 166). 
In January 1988, the city formally approved an annexation by-law, although the extent of 
the land in question was not disclosed (Sancton 1998, 167).  
In a statement to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, the City of London argued 
that rapid growth was occurring in Westminister and London Township. City officials 
noted that Westminister had “aggressively” moved to develop Lambeth and its 
surrounding area to accommodate 7,000 to 8,500 more residents over the next ten to 
fifteen years (City of London 1988, 2-2). They continued by arguing that the same 
activity was occurring north of its borders in London Township, but that this growth was 
constrained by a lack of water supply and sewage disposal (London 1988, 2-2). East of 
the city, London officials noted their concern about development in West Nissouri and 
North Dorchester townships, areas mostly to the south of the London airport (City of 
London 1988, 2-2).  
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 In 1989, the province appointed a “fact finder” to investigate the proposed 
annexation and report back. Published in April 1990, the report recommended the 
appointment of a negotiating team that would include representatives from the City of 
London, Westminister, the Township of London, West Nissouri, North Dorchester, 
Delaware and the County of Middlesex (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
1990, 80).  
 While the recommendations of the “fact finding” report were fairly 
straightforward, it nevertheless reached a number of interesting conclusions. Chief among 
them was that Westminister would have no additional debt capacity for future projects 
after the construction of a new sanitary sewer system. Specifically, the report argued that, 
“an annexation of the Town of Westminister and the Township of London would threaten 
the viability of the County of Middlesex” (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
1990, iii). Secondly, the “fact finder” noted the presence of 11 different inter-local 
agreements between the City of London, its immediate neighbours and the county for a 
variety of service areas including water servicing and treatment to Westminister, London 
Township and Delaware Township (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 1990, 
78).  
 After a lengthy negotiation and arbitration process, the province passed the 
London-Middlesex Act, effective January 1, 1993, allowing the City of London to finally 
acquire portions of land from the Town of Westminster and the Townships of Delaware, 
London, West Nissouri and North Dorchester (Ontario 1992, 1). The Town of 
Westminster was dissolved, with the majority of its territory transferred to the City of 
London and the remaining parts transferred to the Townships of Delaware and North 
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Dorchester (Ontario 1992, 1). Portions of the Township of London were to be annexed to 
the Township of West Nissouri, while the Village of Belmont received portions of both 
North Dorchester and the Town of Westminister (Ontario 1992, 1).  
 Interestingly, it was concern about development occurring on its periphery that 
spurred London’s most recent border extension. The province intervened and legislated a 
conclusion, leaving many in the county to believe that the government was more 
interested in urban expansion than rural preservation (McCool 1992). In this instance, 
however, the province was adhering to the plan originally developed when London was 
first separated from Middlesex County: urban development would be largely contained 
within city borders, while the county’s lower-tiers remained rural. By allowing London to 
extend its borders into the suburbanizing areas in the county, the province was ensuring 
that the institution of city-county separation would continue in the London area. While 
the county did not insist on changing this system, some county lower-tier municipalities 
were no longer comfortable remaining rural. Consequently, some county lower-tier 
municipalities want to embrace development and expand their assessment base, an aspect 
of London development that I will explore further in the following chapter.  
  
4.3.     Boundary Expansion in Barrie 
 Since 1954, Barrie’s borders have been changed nine times through annexation of 
lands from neighbouring townships in order to accommodate the city’s rapid growth 
(Birnbaum, Nicolet and Taylor 2004, 19). Over the past decade, Barrie’s population has 
increased by over 65 percent, leading municipal officials to seek new land for 
commercial and residential expansion. As a result of these growth pressures, Barrie 
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recently pursued a large annexation of territory to its south, causing tension with its 
neighbours and within the county.  
In 2002, city planners informed Barrie city council that the city was quickly 
running out of employment land and required additional land to sustain internal 
employment (Personal Interview – June 14, 2012). Since city planners had previously 
encouraged a policy of density to avoid further suburban expansion within the city’s 
boundaries, they argued that this should continue for residential housing and development 
although additional industrial land was necessary (Personal Interview – June 1, 2012).19 
Expansion offered the best opportunity to fulfill this future growth.  
The city commissioned the Greater Barrie Local Government Review, which 
ultimately called for Barrie and its neighbouring community of Innisfil to form a single 
city separate from the county (Birnbaum, Nicolet and Taylor 2004, 19). The report also 
looked at more realistic proposals, arguing that annexation was inevitable and the 
“moratorium lands” established in the wake of Barrie and Innisfil’s 1981 annexation 
provided the best opportunity for Barrie’s expansion (Meridian Planning Consultants 
2002, 4). Innisfil, predictably, rejected this proposal in a report released in response to 
Barrie’s commission later in 2002 (Innisfil 2002, ii). Deflecting Barrie’s advances, the 
report recommended that Barrie pursue densification in its planning and concluded that, 
“the City of Barrie needs to look at opportunities for managing growth within its current 
boundaries before it looks outwards” (Innisfil 2002, ii).  
                                                 
19
 A report by Meridian Planning Consultants, commissioned by Barrie in 2001, echoed the predictions of 
city planners. The report argues that, “The City of Barrie will continue to be the major centre of population 
and economic growth in the region…it lacks a sufficient land base to meet growth requirements in the short 
terms”. It continued by arguing that, “combining the city’s additional land need for both residential and 
employment uses, a minimum of 750 hectares of land beyond the current boundaries is required to meet 
growth needs to 2021” (Meridian Planning Consultants 2002, 4).  
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In 2008, the City of Barrie introduced a proposal to annex 518 hectares of 
industrial land in Innisfil. Illustrated below is the land proposed for annexation:  
Image 4.1: Boundaries of Barrie-Innisfil Boundary Adjustment 
 
(Source: City of Barrie) 
With a 2008 population of 180,000, Barrie wished to accommodate a population of 
220,000 in order to make upgrades to its sewage treatment plant more affordable (Watt 
2008a). In exchange for the land, Barrie proposed to extend servicing to approximately 
188 hectares of the Innisfil Heights community (Watt 2008a). Innisfil initially rejected 
the proposal, with Mayor Brian Jackson arguing that, “we found it not acceptable for the 
following reasons: the development charges would result in us having a development 
charge 50 per cent higher than Barrie, which would make us uncompetitive; there was an 
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imbalance in the exchange of lands, with Barrie receiving twice as much land as it would 
service; there was no commitment when we could have the additional 188 hectares 
serviced” (Watt 2008a). Although Alan Wells, the provincial development facilitator, 
attempted to resolve this impasse, talks soon broke down (Watt 2008b).  
 When Simcoe County released a revised growth plan that envisioned industrial 
growth along the Highway 400 corridor south of Barrie, the city criticized it for 
misplacing regional priorities (Watt 2008c). Barrie councilor Barry Ward argued that, 
“the plan encumbers the City of Barrie’s ability to achieve the expectations set out for it 
as an urban growth centre” (Watt 2008c). The plan envisioned 228,000 more area 
residents over the next 25 years, of which Barrie would receive only 10,000 (Watt 
2008c). The majority of this population growth would occur along Highway 400 outside 
of the city, in growing population centres such as Alliston where an expanded Honda 
plant was expected to increase the population and create economic nodes along provincial 
highways in Bradford West Gwillimbury and Innisfil (Watt 2008c). Barrie argued that 
these projections were unsupported by current growth trends and that population growth 
should be directed towards the city itself, where density could be better achieved and 
public transportation more easily provided.  
 While the county’s growth projections intensified Barrie’s desire to annex 
industrial land in Innisfil, a report by the bond-rating agency Standard and Poor’s added 
additional urgency to their expansion plans. In the summer of 2008, Standard and Poor’s 
released a report arguing that Barrie’s economic future was directly linked to its ability to 
expand (Watt 2008d).  
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During this 2006 debate, the province released a growth report under the title 
Places to Grow, a plan intended to better control the development in the Greater Golden 
Horseshoe (Ontario 2009, 1). Finding rapid rates of development in the Simcoe area, the 
province decided to examine the region’s growth trends in more depth to better 
accommodate future development. Simcoe County was, according to the report, under 
“intense development pressures,” (Ontario 2009, 1).   
Places to Grow is an expansive plan, of which Simcoe is only one part. Left 
unchecked, the report suggests that growth in the Simcoe region could increase the 
population to over one million people by 2031 (Ontario 2009, 5). Utilizing proper 
planning practices, the report projects a healthy estimate of 667,000 inhabitants and an 
employment forecast of 254,000 jobs (Ontario 2009, 5). To achieve these development 
goals, the province focused on the creation of “urban nodes” in the five largest 
communities in the Simcoe area: Barrie, Orillia, Collingwood, Alliston and Bradford 
West Gwillimbury (Ontario 2009, 9). By directing growth to these areas and encouraging 
density, the province hoped to avoid unrestrained growth and sprawl into the more rural 
parts of the county.    
Of the portion of the report focused on the Simcoe area, much of it was centred on 
Barrie. Specifically, the report argues that Barrie had the greatest opportunity to bring 
density to the area, noting that, “Barrie will be recognized as the anchor node of the 
Simcoe area, and will continue to function as the primary location for new population and 
employment growth and regional services…Barrie will also have the strongest focus in 
the Simcoe area on intensification and higher density development, and should achieve 
transit and pedestrian-friendly urban form in all of its communities” (Ontario 2009, 9). 
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To reach its growth targets, the plan required the city to achieve or exceed a downtown 
density of one hundred and fifty combined residents and jobs per hectare, a greenfield 
density of fifty combined residents and jobs per hectare, and intensification of at least 40 
percent of annual development inside the existing built-up area (Ontario 2009, 9). To 
match these goals, the report noted, Barrie would require “a sufficient supply of land to 
accommodate future growth”—a notion that undoubtedly did not sit well with opponents 
of Barrie’s proposed annexation in Innisfil (Ontario 2009, 9).  
The other areas designated as “urban nodes” were not afforded the same amount 
of attention, although the report did note that they were part of a “hierarchy of 
settlement” within the area. As such, these areas were prioritized for growth over other, 
more rural communities, which the province wanted to remain available for farmland and 
agricultural production (Ontario 2009, 10). The report’s final priority was the 
development of land along the Highway 400 corridor for manufacturing, another key 
aspect of Barrie’s internal growth plans (Ontario 2009, 18). 
 In February 2009, Barrie’s Member of the Provincial Parliament (MPP), Aileen 
Carroll, wrote a letter to her cabinet colleague, Jim Watson, the Minister of Municipal 
Affairs, arguing that it was time for the province to intervene and complete the 
annexation process. In her letter, Carroll states that, “the viability of Barrie’s future as an 
urban growth designate in Central Ontario is at play…with the importance of Barrie’s 
future growth at stake, and with the option of a local solution completely exhausted, I 
urge the Province to intervene to resolve this matter” (Watt 2009a).  
Innisfil and county politicians negatively received Carroll’s letter. Following a 
joint meeting hosted by Municipal Affairs Minister Jim Watson, the county came to 
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support Innisfil’s position that an annexation was unnecessary (Watt 2009b). Believing 
that the province was supporting Barrie’s position, Innisfil refused to resume discussions. 
Innisfil mayor Brian Jackson confirmed this sentiment, arguing that, “Barrie has gotten 
the ear of the province…we’re trying to do the same thing, but it’s troublesome” (Watt 
2009b). County warden Tony Guergis also echoed Jackson’s feelings regarding Carroll’s 
letter, stating that, “Aileen Carroll’s message is clearly not respective [sic] of the fact that 
the province asked us to work together – and Barrie did not” (Ward 2009c). Guergis also 
felt that Barrie’s criticism of the county’s growth plan was unnecessary, arguing that 
Barrie had been invited to provide input into the plan’s creation but chose not to 
participate, creating the impression that the city was uninterested in actively cooperating 
with its neighbouring municipalities and the county (Ward 2009c). Guergis continued by 
arguing that, “this is about a bad political decision – rewarding the only municipality that 
does not co-operate with its neighbours” (Ward 2009c).  
After waiting one year to discuss the proposed annexation with provincial 
officials, Innisfil mayor Brian Jackson got an opportunity to meet with Municipal Affairs 
Minister Jim Watson in February of 2009 (Vanderlinde 2009a). Jackson’s main goal was 
to convince Watson that the current agreement did not mutually benefit both 
communities, declaring, “I’m not about to sell out my municipality…this needs to be a 
win-win situation” (Vanderlinde 2009a). Jackson also stated his belief that Barrie was 
waiting for the province to unilaterally change the city’s boundaries, to the detriment of 
Innisfil, and that Carroll, along with other Barrie politicians, did not want to find a local 
solution (Vanderlinde 2009a). Jackson publicly proposed an alternative agreement that 
would see one acre of its employment zone in Innisfil Heights on the Highway 400 
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corridor serviced by Barrie for every acre that it gave the city through boundary 
adjustment (Vanderlinde 2009a). 
During their meeting, Watson stated that the province wanted to see a resolution 
within a timely manner and would not allow the situation to drag on for another year. 
Moreover, if both sides were unable to reach a compromise, the province would “do it for 
them” (Vanderlinde 2009b). Watson reiterated his desire to see a local solution to the 
boundary dispute in a March 5th letter addressed to Barrie mayor Dave Aspden, Innisfil 
mayor Brian Jackson and Simcoe County warden Tony Guergis (Watt 2009d). Within 
this letter, Watson stated that, “based on our discussions, I believe we all share the view 
that there is a need to address this issue in a timely manner and that a resolution is 
required to allow all parties to move ahead with important planning, investment and 
governance decisions” (Watt 2009d).  
Despite Watson’s insistence in finding a local solution to the boundary dispute, 
Barrie continued to lobby the provincial government to solve the disagreement (Watt 
2009e). In response, Simcoe County council passed a resolution urging the province not 
to “reward” Barrie for refusing to work with its neighbours and plan for growth (Watt 
2009e). Innisfil summarily passed two resolutions criticizing the proposed boundary 
changes (Watt 2009e). In response to the two resolutions, Innisfil mayor Brian Jackson 
stated that, “it’s time we stand up…taking a significant portion of lands away would 
cripple the town for future development” (Watt 2009e). County warden Tony Guergis 
was equally pointed in his comments, stating that, “the message Barrie is sending out is 
that they know better…that’s really scary” (Watt 2009f).  
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Innisfil began a public relations campaign in May 2009 to persuade Barrie to re-
enter discussions (Watt 2009g). Naming their efforts the “Fair Growth” campaign, 
Innisfil officials contracted a Toronto public relations firm to design radio, print and web 
advertisements publicizing their position in the dispute (Watt 2009g). Their first radio 
advertisement had a clear message, asking: “What are the politicians in Barrie up to? Did 
you know they want to double their population and take thousands of acres from Innisfil 
to do it?” (Watt 2009g). As a result of the campaign, Barrie councilors received hundreds 
of angry emails from county and city residents (Watt 2009h).  
On May 28th, the Fair Growth campaign culminated with a demonstration at 
Queen’s Park. The campaign bussed more than two hundred demonstrators to the 
provincial legislature while representatives from the town and county held a press 
conference. County warden Tony Guergis argued that, “we’re asking the province to 
insist Barrie come back to the table and bring forward realistic expectations as to where 
growth will go…we’re asking for a local solution” (Hain 2009).  
Barrie MPP Aileen Carroll was critical of the demonstration and press conference, 
arguing that the impasse and the “antics” of Simcoe County politicians were costing the 
area jobs and slowing its economic progress (Watt 2009i). Carroll again called on her 
provincial colleagues to impose a solution while denouncing the Fair Growth campaign, 
arguing that, “they’re deliberately and wildly inflating numbers to position themselves 
politically for an inevitable outcome – the province finding a remedy…it’s regrettable it’s 
come to this” (Watt 2009i).  
On June 3rd, the MPP for York-Simcoe, Julia Munro, introduced a petition calling 
on the government to allow a local solution to emerge (Hansard, June 3, 2009). Munro, 
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whose riding covers Innisfil and large parts of southern Simcoe County, argued that, “a 
locally negotiated solution that fairly distributes population and employment growth 
ensures everyone wins” (Munro: Hansard, June 3, 2009).  
On June 4th, the province eventually proposed a solution that awarded Barrie 
nearly 2,300 hectares of land, enlarging its land base by approximately 30 percent 
(Vanderlinde 2009c). While introducing the Barrie-Innisfil Boundary Adjustment Act, 
Jim Watson argued that, “all local options have failed and this government is prepared to 
act, and to act decisively, because this issue has dragged on for too long” (Watson: 
Hansard, June 4, 2009). In a later debate, Watson re-iterated the need for the province to 
act immediately: 
This has been going on since 1981: almost 30 years of bickering back and forth. 
The time to act is now because there was clearly a polarized position between 
Innisfil and Barrie. Simcoe was not able to resolve it; the province was not able to 
resolve it. We actually brought in the provincial facilitator to help, and he was not 
able to resolve it….so this bill has not been rushed. In fact, if anything, previous 
governments should have dealt with this sooner. We’re taking a leadership role. 
We’re moving on it after 30 years. Enough is enough. Let’s get back to economic 
development, smart growth, good planning and creating the jobs of tomorrow for 
the people of Barrie, Innisfil and all of Simcoe County (Watson: Hansard, 
September 23, 2009).  
 
On December 8th, the provincial legislature approved the Barrie-Innisfil Boundary 
Adjustment Act.20 Importantly, the decision did not provide Barrie with all of the land that 
its officials had initially requested, an aspect that Innisfil mayor Brian Jackson credited to 
the town’s Fair Growth campaign: “I think the campaign has been effective…it sent a 
clear message to the province, a clear view of what we expected” (Vanderlinde 2009c). 
                                                 
20
 The Act passed with 59 members–mainly Liberals–in favour, and 27 members–mainly opposition party 
members–opposed.  
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While Barrie was awarded a significant amount of land from Innisfil, it did not receive 
the Innisfil Heights area—which the province recognized as a clear growth area for 
Innisfil, designating it an enterprise growth zone—a victory in the eyes of Innisfil and 
county politicians (Vanderlinde 2009c). The land that Barrie was awarded was primarily 
rural and located around the Highway 400 corridor south of the city, affecting 
approximately three hundred residents (Vanderlinde 2009c). Ironically, one of the three 
hundred residents affected by the boundary change was Innisfil mayor Brian Jackson, an 
ardent critic of the annexation proposal. Commenting to the press, Jackson expressed that 
he was “sad” that he would be a Barrie resident at the beginning of the new year, when 
the Act took effect (Vanderlinde 2009c).  
In December of 2009, county councilors passed two resolutions that effectively 
ended the dispute and attempted to reconcile its relationship with Barrie (Watt 2009j). 
Despite the long process, both groups ultimately decided to attempt repairing their 
relationship. Their efforts resulted in the creation of a growth nodes committee, which 
included not only county growth nodes of Bradford, Alliston and Collingwood, but also 
Barrie and Orillia. This committee was intended to communicate and coordinate growth 
goals and strategies in an effort to avoid the same type of confusion and hostility that had 
resulted from the divergent growth strategies of the county and Barrie two years earlier 
(Watt 2009j). County politicians were mostly willing to put the dispute behind them, with 
Tiny Township mayor Peggy Breckenridge blaming the province for dividing both 
communities: “it’s the province that pitted us against each other…it’s the province that 
pitted us against the City of Barrie” (Watt 2009j). 
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Much like London, Barrie officials were concerned about development; namely, 
the City’s supply of good quality industrial land and its ability to create jobs within its 
boundaries in the future. However, unlike London, the land Barrie officials sought was 
from a municipality that was no longer rural. Although the municipalities around Barrie 
were primarily rural with agriculturally focused economies when Barrie initially 
separated from Simcoe County, these municipalities—including Innisfil—had gradually 
become suburban. Due to its location south of the county, residents slowly migrated to 
these areas with the intention of commuting during the week to areas within the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA) for work. No longer was there a clear distinction between urban 
Barrie and its neighbouring rural communities.  
When the province intervened to bring a resolution to the dispute, it did so in a 
very different environment than in London. While the province used similar logic to 
approve an urban boundary expansion—namely the promotion of an urban economy and 
its development—it also explored the promotion of several other urban nodes throughout 
the county with its Places to Grow legislation. Although Barrie was established as an 
“anchor node”, the remainder of the county was not designated as being solely rural. In 
fact, certain parts of the county were being allowed—and, in some cases, even 
encouraged—to become more suburban. Currently, Innisfil is now larger in terms of 
population than the county’s other separated city, Orillia. Two other southern Simcoe 
municipalities—Bradford West Gwillimbury and New Tecumseth—are also slowly 
rivaling Orillia’s population figure.  
The rapid rate of suburbanization in Simcoe County is blurring the distinction 
between the criteria that once led to city-county separation. Certain areas within the 
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county have become suburban communities, with many in the south now key destinations 
for commuters in the Greater Toronto Area. The province helped facilitate this expansion 
and even encouraged certain areas to grow rapidly through their Places to Grow 
legislation. This is largely why the boundary dispute between Barrie and Innisfil 
intensified so quickly, since both had designs to develop and further attract industry and 
residents. Innisfil is no longer content to be rural and the ambitions of both communities 
now conflict, resulting in a very public, drawn out dispute over land primed for future 
industrial and commercial expansion.  
 
4.4.     Boundary Expansion in Guelph 
 Guelph’s rapid growth has been the impetus for several boundary extensions 
throughout its history. The city experienced two early boundary expansions in 1840 and 
1854, respectively. Its borders remained largely unchanged until a series of annexations 
began in the 1950s, with expansions following in 1952, 1959, 1966, 1968 and 1971. 
During the 1970s, Guelph and Wellington found themselves drawn into the province-
wide shift towards regional government, mainly because of the growth of four new 
regional governments on their borders—Peel, Halton, Hamilton-Wentworth and 
Waterloo. Officials from Guelph and Wellington began to believe that they might find 
themselves within a regional government when the Waterloo Area Local Government 
Review, chaired by Stewart Fyfe, did not preclude an examination of the boundaries of 
the former County of Waterloo, which previously included Guelph and Wellington 
(Ontario 1970, 22). However, Fyfe’s report stated that there was little interest in 
undertaking regional reform in the Guelph-Wellington area (Ontario 1970, 21).  
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After this experience, the county and city created the Wellington-Guelph Area 
Study Committee to review existing institutions within the region. Submitted in January 
1971, the report offered five alternative structures for the county ranging from the status 
quo to the creation of a new single tier county which incorporated Guelph into its 
structure (Williams and Downey 1999, 179). The final proposal called for the 
establishment of a regional government (Williams and Downey 1999, 179). However, 
after provincial pressures “cooled out”, no action was ultimately taken (Williams and 
Downey 1999, 179).  
In 1990, Wellington County initiated an examination into their governance 
structure. The interim report, released in 1990, laid out two options for restructuring: 1) a 
partnership model and 2) ending the separation of the City of Guelph from the county 
(County of Wellington 1990, 28). The first option, a partnership model, would see the 
creation of a joint management board, with equal representation from both Guelph and 
the county, that would oversee the delivery of a number of services (County of 
Wellington 1990, 28). The report, however, did not specify which services would be 
under the purview of the joint services board. The second option, re-integrating Guelph 
back into the county system, was ultimately determined to be untenable because Guelph 
would not agree to reduce its possible representation on a reconstituted county council 
(County of Wellington 1991, 64).  
While there were no significant changes to the county structure that emerged in 
the wake of the county’s final report, the City of Guelph again engaged in boundary 
expansion to facilitate future population growth. The rationale for the expansion centered 
on water supply, specifically the Arkell Springs Water Supply Area located within 
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Puslinch Township (Proctor and Redfern Group 1988a, 1). Since the Arkell Springs 
supplied between 30 and 70 percent of the city’s daily water needs, Guelph officials 
sought to “protect” the supply source by bringing the area into the city’s boundaries 
(Proctor and Redfern Group 1988a, 1). Guelph dramatically expanded its boundaries in 
three large annexations in 1990, 1991 and 1993 after the completion of several studies.  
 The need to annex this water source was highly dependent on projected growth 
figures for Guelph. In one report, the consulting firm Proctor and Redfern Group 
estimated that the city’s population would reach 112,000 residents by 2011, a sharp 
increase from the 85,000 that then resided in the city (Proctor and Redfern Group 1988a, 
4). The report argued that Guelph was growing at a quicker pace than the rest of the 
province (Proctor and Redfern Group 1988b, 1).  
 The Proctor and Redfern report concluded that Guelph had adequate residential 
land for population growth until 2011, but needed an expanded supply of industrial land. 
The report argued that density was key to the city’s residential growth, stating that, 
“historic evidence suggests that not all additional housing units are built upon the vacant 
land inventory…Guelph, like most of Ontario’s cities, has many more potential 
apartment sites than market demand warrants “ (Proctor and Redfern 1988b, 17). 
Although the report suggested that downzoning certain lands may be required to 
accommodate future residential demand, the greater concern was the lack of industrial 
land that was available within the city’s limits (Proctor and Redfern 1988b, 20). Thus, the 
report concluded that Guelph would require a maximum of 964 additional acres of 
industrial land to meet growth demands by 2011 (Proctor and Redfern 1988b, 21).  
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 While the report began as an examination of the city’s water needs, it quickly 
became dominated by Guelph’s need to absorb more industrial land. In fact, the report 
even took a near alarmist tone towards the situation, arguing that, “while the market and 
flexibility arguments for the additional lands suitable for residential use are oriented 
towards potential future needs, the industrial land market has an immediate need for 
additional lands…the additional land is necessary for Guelph to maintain a competitive 
position” (Proctor and Redfern 1988b, 27). If Guelph did not secure new industrial land, 
the report concluded that it would be unable to remain “in the industrial lands business” 
(Proctor and Redfern 1988b, 28).   
 The report determined that Guelph required an immediate additional 600 acres of 
land to meet industrial requirements (Proctor and Redfern 1989, 10). County officials 
wanted assurance that there were no such lands available within the city already, arguing 
that even by re-developing and re-zoning current lands, the city would still be short of the 
required amount of land (Proctor and Redfern 1989, 10). The report found that suitable 
lands for Guelph’s expansion existed to the south of the city and along its north and 
northwest boundaries (Proctor and Redfern 1989, 10). After examining several 
possibilities, the report concluded that a parcel of land to the south of the city—adjacent 
to the Hanlon Parkway—offered the best chance for the city’s industrial expansion, with 
a second set of lands to the west—in the Hanlon Business Park—offering the next best 
solution (Proctor and Redfern 1989, 22). In the short-term, the report concluded that it 
might be desirable for the city to annex lands adjacent to its Northwest Industrial Park for 
immediate expansion (Proctor and Redfern 1989, 22).  
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 A report prepared by Wellington County planning staff in response to Proctor and 
Redfern, largely agreed with the position that Guelph required additional lands to expand. 
The report reassured Guelph that the county “intends to ensure that urban areas have 
adequate lands to support growth for the next 20 to 25 years” (Cousins 1990, 1). 
Wellington was willing to provide the city with the lands it needed to expand, but had 
concerns about the viability of the county and its municipalities in the future. The county 
wanted to see Guelph take on a more “compact urban form” in its future planning and 
“discourage a land use pattern on [its] fringe” (Cousins 1990, 2).  
 The Wellington report argued that Guelph required 1,400 to 1,500 additional 
acres of industrial land to expand until 2016 (Cousins 1990, 6). However, the county 
recommended that Guelph receive as much as 3,000 acres so that it had the necessary 
“flexibility” to allow for more rapid growth (Cousins 1990, 7). As the county explained, 
“flexibility” was behind its decision to recommend a larger than required annexation 
area:  
Projections are only our “best guess” at what the future will bring. If growth is 
slower than predicted, the urban areas will have a surplus of land at the end of the 
planning period, which it can simply use in the future. If growth is more rapid 
than predicted, the urban area will have a shortfall of land before the end of the 
planning period. This will cause the annexation process to be opened up at an 
earlier date than expected. One method of providing flexibility for the City of 
Guelph would be to provide more land than is needed for 125,000 people and try 
to accommodate, to as great an extent as possible, the high population forecast of 
140,000 people (Cousins 1990, 6-7).  
 
Since the county wanted to remain rural, its concern with the annexation process lay 
primarily in the preservation of quality farmland. Consequently, the report recommended 
that the area south of Guelph be annexed over the areas to the north and west of the city 
since these lands were poorer agriculturally, as compared to the north and west areas 
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(Cousins 1990, 9). Additionally, areas to the south were closer to Highway 401 and the 
Hanlon Parkway, which Wellington County felt were more “attractive to both business 
and resident[s] who commute to work in the Toronto area” (Cousins 1990, 9).  
While the report found lands to the south more desirable, it also argued that 
annexing lands in this area would have a negative impact on the community of Puslinch. 
The areas that the city wanted to annex—primarily for access to the Arkell Springs and 
for industrial expansion—represented 64% of Puslinch’s commercial and industrial tax 
base, which in turn represented 10% of the county’s tax base (Cousins 1990, 10). 
Additionally, the proposed area also contained the town office, a fire hall, a community 
centre, a sportsfield, a library, the town roads garage and a county roads garage—all of 
which were recently constructed (Cousins 1990, 10). County officials worried expanding 
into this area would sever Puslinch’s connection to these facilities.  
Consequently, the report concluded that while areas to the east and west were not 
favoured for annexation because of their value as prime agricultural lands, expanding to 
the south would have a “devastating effect” on the viability of Puslinch as a community 
and would “weaken” the county (Cousins 1990, 10). Furthermore, there was no plan for 
expansion past 2016 and further annexation of rural land was undesirable (Cousins 1990, 
11). Since the Wellington County official plan discouraged development along the city’s 
boundaries in the hope of creating viable rural communities, the report recommended the 
creation of a cooperative planning mechanism within the area to ensure the increased 
density of Guelph and protection of rural communities well into the future (Cousins 1990, 
11).   
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Ultimately, Guelph annexed 4,420 acres from the county (County of Wellington 
1994, 1). 742 acres came from Guelph Township, while the bulk—3,678 acres—came 
from Puslinch (County of Wellington 1994, 1). The annexation greatly expanded the 
city’s southern and northern borders, providing additional lands for industrial expansion 
well into the future.  
 Guelph’s most recent annexation was significantly different than in London and 
Barrie. To provide the city with enough room to grow well into the future, Guelph 
negotiated with the county. Although the county was unenthusiastic about losing land and 
held concerns about the continued health of Puslinch, they recognized the need for the 
city to grow. The county also wanted to remain rural, believing that the sustainability of 
their communities relied upon the maintenance of their rural culture. Therefore, directing 
urban growth towards Guelph was in their best interest. Unlike the communities 
surrounding London and Barrie, their lower-tier municipalities held no aspirations to 
become suburban enclaves adjoining their larger urban neighbour, which facilitated a 
smoother annexation and adhered to the original logic of city-county separation.    
 
4.4.     Impact on Cooperation 
 London, Barrie and Guelph made an effort to annex additional land out of shared 
concerns regarding development outside of their borders and the future availability of 
commercial and industrial land. Allowing this potential development to occur outside of 
their borders was a prospect each city refused to accept. Since Barrie and London’s 
counties opposed expansion, the provincial government was forced to intervene. In both 
cases, the province largely sided with the cities and boundary changes did occur. 
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Guelph’s situation, however, was much different. The county worked alongside the city 
to identify potential land for Guelph’s expansion while maintaining the integrity of the 
county’s rural character.   
Once annexation was complete in London, attention turned to organizing the 
details of the new municipal structure. This involved staffing change and transfers of 
assets and debts. Within this environment, London officials interviewed for this project 
indicated that there was some lingering tension (Personal Interview – February 6, 2012). 
Nevertheless, officials on both sides eventually began accepting what had happened and 
moved on from the annexation, with one London official stating that “it started very 
quickly….we had to sit down and work things through” (Personal Interview – February 
6, 2012).  
In both areas, there were few direct efforts by either side to repair the relationship. 
Instead, respondents indicated that this happened over time, as both sides worked through 
the processes of annexation. Joint meetings and discussions, however, acted as a “release 
valve” for lingering tension (Personal Interview – February 6, 2012). Nevertheless, these 
tensions eventually receded with one Middlesex County politician noting that as 
politicians changed—through election and retirement—the ordeal was not as fresh in 
people’s minds and stopped hanging over city and county politics (Personal Interview – 
March 2, 2012).  
Similarly, tensions eventually subsided in the Barrie-Simcoe region as they did in 
London and Middlesex County. Respondents in Barrie and Simcoe indicate that there is 
very little lingering animosity regarding the dispute and that the relationship has largely 
returned to where it was before the annexation fight began. Once again, Simcoe and 
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Barrie respondents feel that this is largely because of the amount of new politicians in 
leadership positions within both areas. In the county, fifteen new county councilors were 
elected during the 2010 election. The mayor of Barrie lost his bid for re-election, as did 
county warden Tony Guergis, who did not return to his post as mayor of Springwater. 
With a new mayor of Barrie in place along with a new county warden, the dispute was 
largely put aside, as many of the strong personalities involved did not return to office. 
The Mayor of the City of Barrie agreed that this dual change in leadership was valuable, 
noting that “when there was a change in leadership here in Barrie and a change of 
leadership in the county the attitudes changed with the people and I think that’s improved 
things…the attitude is much more collegial and supportive than it has in the past” 
(Personal Interview – June 14, 2012).  
A change in staff also occurred in both Barrie and Innisfil, a second contributing 
factor in putting aside the dispute. Many senior Innisfil officials left the town’s 
employment when the dispute concluded and Barrie’s CAO retired shortly after the 
introduction of the Barrie-Innisfil Boundary Adjustment Act.21 The change in staff and 
politicians enabled the two communities to receive a fresh start after the dispute.  
Former Innisfil mayor Brian Jackson, who fought adamantly against any 
boundary expansion into his town but nevertheless became a Barrie resident himself once 
the new boundaries were set, campaigned and won a seat on Barrie city council for the 
reconstituted Ward 9 constituency that was formerly Innisfil land.22 In press reports, 
                                                 
21
 While it is unknown why many Innisfil staff left, Barrie’s CAO was scheduled to retire and his departure 
was unrelated to the city’s role in the boundary dispute.  
22
 The Barrie-Innisfil Boundary Adjustment Act included a clause that current Innisfil politicians who were 
Barrie residents after the annexation were allowed to run in Innisfil during the 2010 election, despite not 
residing in the municipality. While two Innisfil councilors did take this step and ran for a spot on Innisfil 
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Jackson argued that, “I consider (the annexation) history…it’s time to move forward for 
the betterment of both municipalities” (Simon 2010). Councilors from Barrie report that 
Jackson’s presence is appreciated; moreover, as a former mayor, he brings a unique 
perspective to council (Personal Interview – June 1, 2012).  
Barrie mayor Jeff Lehman also increased his efforts to reach out to the county on 
a regular basis. Following his inauguration, Barrie’s mayor appeared before Innisfil’s 
council to argue that the two communities shared much in common and put the incident 
behind them (Personal Interview – June 14, 2012). Early in his term, Barrie’s mayor also 
called the newly elected county warden and placed himself on the Human Services 
Committee, a committee previously lacking Barrie representation (Personal Interview – 
June 14, 2012).23 Many county councilors appreciate Lehman’s gestures, believing that 
he is sincere in wanting to promote cooperation between both sides (Personal Interview – 
May 30, 2012; Personal Interview – May 31, 2012).  
Thus, the dispute seems to be over, with both the county and Barrie in general 
agreement that Barrie has the land it needs to expand well into the future. The mayors of 
neighbouring municipalities, such as Oro-Medonte and Springwater, report that where 
they once felt a threat of annexation from Barrie, the boundary expansion into Innisfil has 
allowed them to “breathe a little easier” (Personal Interview – June 1, 2012). Nearly three 
years after the dispute, both city and county respondents report that they are moving on 
with other priorities.  
                                                                                                                                                 
council despite now being Barrie residents, Jackson did not. He justified his decision to run in Barrie in the 
local Innisfil press: “The province made the decision for me when they annexed my home to the city…we 
live there and I work in the city; I thought it was appropriate to run in that particular ward”. For more 
information, see Simon, 2010.  
23
 More information on the Human Services Committee, the significance of Lehman’s gesture and the 
Consolidated Municipal Service Manager program in Ontario is provided in Chapter 6. 
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The annexation process in Guelph and Wellington took a different path than the 
border expansions in London and Barrie. By including the county throughout the process, 
Guelph’s expansion caused very little tension with the county. However, Guelph 
continues to raise a number of concerns about development along its borders, causing the 
county—particularly the county’s lower-tier municipalities near the city’s borders—some 
apprehension. It is believed that Guelph officials are planning another round of boundary 
expansions, which respondents from the county intend to challenge.  
With the region’s borders relatively set and designed to allow growth where 
necessary, few border conflicts have emerged between Guelph and Wellington County 
over the past decade. However, respondents report that Guelph officials have been very 
cautious about the type of development that occurs immediately outside the city’s border. 
Two recent planning issues have pitted the City of Guelph against neighbouring Puslinch 
at the Ontario Municipal Board. In the summer of 2010, the Ontario Municipal Board 
(OMB) heard a case from Guelph regarding the severance of a residential lot. While 
Wellington County, Puslinch and the Grand River Conservation Authority supported the 
application of the landowner, Guelph officials objected, arguing that the proposed 
severance did not constitute good land use planning (Ontario Municipal Board 2010[a]).24 
The second case involves the relocation of an automobile dealer from southern Guelph to 
Puslinch on a location on Brock Road, only 2.5 kilometres from the border between the 
two communities (Ontario Municipal Board 2010[b]). Once again, Guelph officials 
argued that the development constituted poor planning (Ontario Municipal Board 
                                                 
24
 For more information on the case, please see OMB Case Number PL100035.  
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2010[b]).25 Puslinch officials argued that Guelph’s repeated objections to development 
within its borders “doesn’t build strong relationships” (Personal Interview – April 16, 
2012). In both cases, the OMB ruled that Puslinch and the county were adhering to good 
planning principles. 
For the most part, Puslinch officials contend that Guelph politicians do not object 
to development well inside the township’s borders, but development on or near Guelph’s 
boundaries causes city officials to take notice (Personal Interview – April 13, 2012). 
Officials believe that Guelph wants to control the type of development that occurs in the 
area because it has plans to annex this area in the future (Personal Interview – April 13, 
2012). Guelph officials admit that they do see this development as somewhat problematic 
since Guelph would like to see development occur within its borders. Consequently, 
outlying development poses a challenge to the city’s long-term goals. While only a 
handful of OMB challenges have resulted from these concern, one former Guelph 
councilor argues that any future development close to the city is “a conflict in the 
waiting” (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012).  
The boundary expansions in London, Guelph and Barrie have all had lingering 
effects. In some cases, these border changes created a negative effect on the relationship 
between the city and the county; in others, this process left very few scars. In all cases, 
however, the way that the city addressed and worked through the proposed expansion 
helped set the tone of the post-consolidation relationship between the city and the county.  
As the ICA framework suggests, leadership and social capital are key variables in 
fostering strong relationships. Yet, as this analysis of boundary expansion demonstrates, 
                                                 
25
 For more information on the case, please see OMB Case Number PL091041. 
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there are mixed results for both of these variables. While Barrie’s officials made direct 
efforts to repair their relationship with the county, London took the opposite approach 
and let the relationship heal over time. Conversely, Guelph had to make very little effort 
to repair its relationship because its approach toward expansion included the county and 
left few lingering tensions. Thus, although each city used vastly different approaches, 
they nevertheless yielded very similar results: ultimately, the relationship was restored. 
As such, ICA literature on leadership and social capital appears unhelpful in this instance.  
Whether an effort to restore a relationship after annexation occurs or not, relations 
generally tend to stabilize. Respondents argue that this is because most of those involved 
in the expansion on both sides—politicians and staff—generally tend to re-locate or avoid 
seeking re-election. As these key players no longer have a prominent role, new officials 
come into place with little knowledge—or, more precisely, few emotions—of the 
annexation which enables the relationship to return to normal.  
 
4.5.     Conclusion  
 Institutional Collective Action scholars view boundary change as another avenue 
in ensuring service delivery through metropolitan areas. Annexation, amalgamation and 
even the use of special districts can facilitate the delivery of certain services throughout a 
wide geographic area (Carr 2005, 235). Flexible boundaries, then, constitute another form 
of cooperation whereby municipalities seek optimal institutional arrangements for service 
delivery and policy creation (Feiock and Carr 2001). Some research suggests that 
boundary expansion may reduce more ad hoc forms of cooperation, including the signing 
of informal or formal agreements, mainly because expansion secures a permanent market 
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for the production or provision of public goods and reduces the need of selling excess 
capacity (Mullin 2007).  
 The impetus for boundary expansion in each of the case studies described above 
was not service delivery to other communities. Rather, London, Guelph and Barrie 
sought additional lands for their own development. As such, the ICA framework is 
unhelpful in this instance. Moreover, as previously discussed, boundary expansion can  
reduce cooperation. Although this is consistent with ICA research into border changes, 
cooperation decreased in some of the above case studies for different reasons than the 
ICA framework posits. Instead of reducing the need for cooperation by creating 
permanent internal markets for goods, boundary expansion can sour the relationship 
between a county and its separated city because the development goals of each 
community fundamentally clash.26   
Urban municipalities will always be concerned about development and expansion, 
which incites them to attempt controlling growth outside of their borders. Further, since 
growth results in a loss of assessment, there is a strong desire to ensure that new 
development occurs within city boundaries so that it can be taxed for the benefit of local 
residents. Regional government provides central cities with some level of control over the 
development occurring around them although separated cities have no control over the 
growth occurring outside of their borders. In London, Guelph and Barrie, officials from 
                                                 
26
 Some ICA research has considered this aspect, but since it has been primarily concentrated in economic 
development, it is not entirely analogous. What is interesting about existing literature is how municipalities 
perceive competition. Johnson and Neiman (2004) find that as the number of municipalities within a 
metropolitan area increases, so too does the perception of competition. Municipalities within these areas 
hold the belief that their neighbours are attempting to gain economic development opportunities at their 
expense. The authors suggest that a great deal of consolidation is necessary to contain these competitive 
pressures. These same pressures could be at play with urban growth within separated cities and counties, 
although more research is necessary to establish a clear link. 
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each city sought to extend their municipal boundaries in an effort to control the growth 
occurring outside of their borders and to provide their cities with enough land for future 
industrial and commercial expansion.  
 In London and Barrie, the desire for expansion resulted in public feuds that 
caused tension between the city and the county. In both instances, the province needed to 
intervene. However, this intervention also ensured the preservation of city-county 
separation. By allowing several rounds of progressive outward expansion, the province 
was ensuring that separated cities remained primarily urban, while their surrounding 
neighbours remained primarily rural, thereby maintaining the balance in these areas that 
was envisioned in the Baldwin Act. 
Officials from each city took different approaches to overcome the resulting 
tensions from their annexations. Barrie politicians made efforts to reach out to the county 
to repair their relationship while officials in London did not. In both cases, the 
relationship returned to normal, but, arguably, this process took longer in London. 
Nevertheless, respondents note that boundary expansion did not seriously harm any 
efforts to form cooperative agreements immediately afterwards.  
For the most part, county respondents understand the desire of central cities to 
expand and control their assessment base—which explains why Wellington County was 
so eager to help facilitate Guelph’s expansion—and county municipalities are generally 
content to remain rural. Boundary expansion in Guelph and Wellington proceeded as 
intended under the city-county separation model imported to the province: the county 
wanted to remain rural, the city wanted to remain urban and both sides were willing to 
make concessions to maintain this relationship.  
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This did not occur in London and Barrie. The communities around both cities 
were expanding, attracting new residents and business. London officials saw the growth 
around the city as a threat to their development plans, while Barrie councilors feared that 
any further development around the city’s borders would leave it without any new lands 
for employment. Officials from both municipalities wanted to ensure that growth 
occurred within their borders, rather than outside of it, because they did not want newly 
suburbanizing communities to rival them.   
Expansion disputes tend to occur when the ambition of the central city impacts 
the ambition of certain neighbouring municipalities. Innisfil officials, for example, had 
designs to expand and develop industrially. Officials from municipalities around London 
harboured the same desire and continued to explore scenarios to achieve this growth. By 
agreeing to the demands of central cities for additional land, these municipalities 
jeopardized their own plans for expansion and development. As such, the amicability of 
annexations depends on the degree of development in the county. Regional government 
became a priority for the provincial government when the rural areas around cities 
became increasingly urbanized because the province saw them as a way of regulating and 
directing this growth.    
 Regional planning was an important component of the province’s scheme to 
implement regional governments across the province. Since central cities wanted more 
control over their neighbouring suburban municipalities, developing a central planning 
authority constituted one step towards that goal. The types of long, drawn-out boundary 
extension disputes detailed above likely could have been avoided if central cities had the 
opportunity to provide some input in the development occurring outside of their 
 140 
immediate borders. In the next chapter, I explore three planning arrangements in St. 
Thomas-Elgin County, London-Middlesex and Simcoe County. The planning experience 
of these three areas is vastly different than municipalities included in regional 
governments and each took a dissimilar path. London has no regional planning 
institutions, which has led to disputes between the city and its rapidly growing 
neighbouring towns; St. Thomas participates in a joint-planning board with its closest 
lower-tier neighbour in the county; and, finally, the provincial government has capped 
and regulated the growth in Simcoe County.  
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Chapter 5 – Planning 
 
5.     Introduction 
 As explained in the previous chapter, development outside of urban areas can lead 
to boundary expansion and, in certain cases, increased tension between affected 
municipalities. In counties with a separated city, there are no institutional linkages 
between both areas, which can lead to a desire from urban areas to control development 
and ensure that it is within their borders. Conflict can result when the county and the 
city’s desire for growth and expansion clash. This tension stems from the lack of 
common political institutions: development in urban areas does not directly benefit the 
county, while development in the county does not necessarily benefit urban areas.  
 Regional government creates linkages between rural and urban areas previously 
unseen in counties with separated cities. This creates mutually beneficial growth and 
development plans for all areas within the region’s borders. The type of competition 
described between London, Barrie and their rapidly growing neighbours in the last 
chapter is not present in regional government which can likely be attributed to the 
presence of common planning mechanisms.   
In regional government, the upper-tier assumes responsibility of regional 
planning. During early examinations into the feasibility of regional government in 
Ontario, several reports noted that one of the main benefits of implementing a two-tier 
government was the creation of bodies with a large scope for planning functions, which 
provide more coordination between the urban and rural components of each region, 
thereby reducing competition for assessment and industry (Ontario 1965, 173). When 
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regional government became a reality in Ontario, upper-tiers were given responsibility 
for regional planning in addition to other related services, such as arterial roads, sewage 
disposal and bulk water treatment (Fyfe 1975, 362). 
 Formal regional planning does not exist in counties with separated cities. While 
both the county and the city have planning offices, there are usually no formal efforts to 
provide planning mechanisms for the entire region. While there is a connection between 
the local, lower-tier planning efforts and the county planning efforts through county 
council, the city’s planners are generally not consulted and vice versa. The lack of 
institutional connection between separated cities and counties can have a negative effect 
on planning within the region and has historically led to disputes between both sides.  
 Existing ICA studies say little about cooperative planning institutions. American 
studies of cooperative agreements find few areas of cooperation in planning (Andrew 
2008). This could very well be because planning arrangements are hard to negotiate and 
difficult to enforce. While there are certainly municipalities that benefit from the 
byproduct of growth in another municipality, municipal officials are typically narrowly 
focused on the immediate benefits to their municipality (Swanstrom 1987; Basolo and 
Hastings 2003). As such, planning can be a narrowly focused exercise. Overcoming this 
barrier can be challenging for those hoping to cooperate on planning issues.  
The ICA framework suggests that the impression that benefits are selective will 
harm the prospect for cooperation (Feiock 2007). If cooperation is not seen as being fully 
beneficial to both participants, cooperation is unlikely. Consequently, cooperation in 
planning can, at times, give the impression that growth is a selective benefit unless 
development is clearly regional in nature. Thus, the challenges in negotiating and 
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monitoring planning arrangements may ultimately prove too severe. Simply put, the 
transaction costs may be too high.  
In this chapter, I explore three planning experiences in separated cities and 
counties. First, I analyze the relationship between London and Middlesex County. There 
are no common planning mechanisms in London and Middlesex County, leading to some 
disputes over water servicing extension from the city and the placement of settlement in 
towns adjoining London. In the second, I consider a unique arrangement in Elgin County, 
where the separated city of St. Thomas has entered into a cooperative planning 
arrangement with its neighbouring lower-tier municipalities from the county. Finally, I 
review the impact of provincially imposed growth and planning documents in Simcoe 
County, where the Places to Grow plan has applied strict conditions on growth and 
development in one of Canada’s fastest growing communities.27 
 
5.1.     Growth and Change in the London Area 
For many years, London has experienced growth outside of its borders, resulting 
in a large annexation of adjoining county territory in 1993. Despite this large annexation, 
growth in the county continued. Much of this growth has occurred in the area north of 
London, in the community of Arva, which is part of Middlesex Centre. In February of 
2011, London city council received a plan calling for London to expand Arva’s access to 
the city’s sewer system in order to facilitate growth within the area (Middlesex Centre 
2011). In the 1990s, Middlesex Centre first approached London asking for access to the 
                                                 
27
 Guelph was not included in this chapter because I covered much of their recent large-scale planning 
activities with their neighbours, mainly the Arkell Spring, in the previous chapter.   
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city’s sewage treatment plant, in part because the sewage in Arva was polluting nearby 
Medway Creek (Sher 2011).  
Even though the agreement was intended to avoid environmental contamination, 
the City of London was concerned about potential growth in Arva. A 2000 amendment to 
the original agreement limited the amount of residential and commercial development 
that could be brought onto the sewer system. Specifically, the amendment mandated that 
only ten new residential units could have access to the system per year (City of London 
and Middlesex Centre 2000). Commercial access was restricted to 1,000 square metres of 
new commercial floor space in any given year, without exceeding 4,500 square metres 
over a ten-year period (City of London and Middlesex Centre 2000).  
London’s former mayor explains that these housing limits were intended to 
control growth (Personal Interview – March 8, 2012). London’s interest in extending 
servicing to Arva was limited to its desire to help solve an environmental problem with 
Medway Creek, explains the city’s former mayor (Personal Interview – March 8, 2012). 
If the environmental concern did not exist, it is very possible that the agreement would 
not exist. The former mayor of London states that, “what we really wanted to be sure 
about was what we were doing then was to deal with the environmental issue, but not an 
issue that we’d be allowing growth that they’d reap the benefits of the growth, but we 
were going to have to pay for the service” (Personal Interview – March 8, 2012). London 
was willing to help to an extent, but remained wary about future growth along its border.  
Following the correction of these early environmental concerns, the community 
no longer had enough capacity for future development. Middlesex Centre contended that 
this new proposal would facilitate growth, with Mayor Al Edmondson predicting that 
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expanded access to London’s sewer system could allow the area to grow from 550 to 
1,547 residents during the next two decades (Maloney, 2011[a]).  
 The idea of such rapid growth near London’s borders created mixed opinions on 
city council. Councilor Joni Baechler became the most ardent opponent of the plan, 
arguing that the proposal was “astonishing” (Maloney, 2011[a]). Citing an estimated $45 
million in assessment loss if the plan was approved, Baechler argued that, “from my 
perspective, being good neighbours to the tune of $45 million doesn’t make sense to me” 
(Maloney, 2011[a]). Baechler found allies in the opposition to Arva’s proposal. Jim 
Kennedy of the London Development Institute argued that Arva’s development is, “in 
direct competition with lots in the city” and that, “London should look after London’s 
growth” (Sher 2011). 
Offering an opposing view, Councilor Joe Swan described the deal as 
“innovative”, arguing that Arva would get sewage extension from somewhere and that by 
expanding service from London, the city would receive a portion of the community’s 
expanded tax base (Maloney 2011[a]). Doug Weldon, a prominent developer who wanted 
to build 122 single-family homes and 66 townhomes in the expanding Arva area, 
supported Swan (Sher 2011). Weldon viewed the opposition to Arva’s proposal as short 
sighted, arguing that annexation was inevitable and that, “in the fullness of time, Arva 
will become a north end village in London” (Sher 2011). In the end, Swan and Weldon’s 
position lost out, with council voting against expanding sewer service to Arva.28 
Middlesex Centre mayor Al Edmondson expressed his disappointment with the decision, 
                                                 
28
 Council voted against the motion 8 to 6, with Councilors Polhill, Swan, Orser, Van Meerbergen, Brown 
and White voting for and Councilors Armstrong, Baechler, Branscombe, Brown, Hubert, Henderson, Usher 
and Bryant voting against. The vote was taken on an August 29, 2011 meeting of council. 
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insinuating that the community would find ways to achieve future growth, with or 
without London’s cooperation (Maloney and Van Brenk 2011).  
The councilors who supported the motion believed that Middlesex Centre had a 
right to grow and just as much of a right to an assessment base as the City of London. Not 
expanding servicing to Arva would severely impede this right. More importantly, this 
group of councilors believed that it was important to be a good neighbour and allow them 
expanded access to servicing. Not following through with their request, they believed, 
sent the wrong signal to Middlesex Centre and the county; namely, that city officials 
were self-interested and unconcerned about the county’s prosperity.  
One councilor who voted against the motion to expand servicing argued that, 
“people would pay less tax in this area because they don’t have all of the amenities that 
we have and in turn we would continue to see tax increases in the decline in assessment 
growth and it would go to Middlesex Centre” (Personal Interview – March 5, 2012). For 
councilors opposed to the expansion, the decision was financial in nature—they wanted 
any new residential development to occur within the city’s boundaries, rather than on its 
exterior where new homebuyers could benefit from lower tax rates and still utilize city 
amenities. 
Councilors from Middlesex Centre contend that Arva will get expanded servicing 
at some point (Personal Interview – March 7, 2012). Nevertheless, they remain unclear 
about where such servicing will come from. Some councilors speculate that developers 
will eventually fund the infrastructure necessary to expand sewer and waste water 
servicing into the Arva area, with some discussion about a developer building a sewage 
plant within the community already occurring. This step, they admit, would give London 
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officials some concern if it came to fruition since this would inevitably increase the size 
of the community, realizing the fears of London municipal councilors. Middlesex Centre 
politicians indicate that they do plan to approach London city council again at some point 
in the future to ask them to reverse their decision (Personal Interview – March 7, 2012).  
Some London councilors believe that if Arva gets too large, annexation is a viable 
option to protect the city’s assessment base. According to a councilor present during the 
August 29, 2011, council meeting that discussed the expansion of servicing to Arva, 
some councilors brought up the issue of annexation.29 One councilor noted that, “the 
table is completely set for that annexation discussion”, noting that the city will begin a 
discussion about bringing Arva into the city’s borders if it grows past a certain level 
(Personal Interview – March 13, 2012).  
This discussion of annexing Arva is not new. In fact, the issue was previously 
addressed at a February 28, 2011, city council meeting. Prior to the meeting, Councilor 
Sandy White discussed the possibility of annexing Arva in an interview with the London 
Free Press, arguing that, “we need to talk about this…people are concerned that we 
(would be) giving away our assessment base—so let’s look at annexation” (Maloney 
2001[b]).30 London city councilors continue to discuss the issue of Arva’s annexation, 
with many expressing their belief that the expansion of the city boundaries northwards is 
inevitable. 
                                                 
29
 The issue of annexation is not found in the minutes for the August 29, 2011. The minutes, however, are 
not a complete transcript of the meeting and video footage of the meeting unavailable.   
30
 While Councilor White did indicate publicly that she intended to introduce a motion to the same effect at 
Council, the minutes of Council meetings around this period do not show the motion being introduced. 
Officials from the City of London Clerk’s Department have confirmed that the motion was not introduced 
at a committee meeting either.  
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In the wake of London’s decision not to expand servicing to Arva, Middlesex 
Centre altered its official growth plan for growth with a 2011 revision. This plan  
projected 20 percent growth in Ilderton, just north of London, and Komoka-Kilworth, 
which lies on the city’s western edge. A map of the settlement areas within Middlsex 
Centre is provided below. London is to the south of the municipality, the growing 
communities of Arva and Ilderton along its northern border and Komoka and Kilworth to 
the city’s west.   
Image 5.1: Settlement Areas Within Middlesex Centre 
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Middlesex Centre’s original official plan, published in 2010, classified Ilderton 
and Komoka-Kilworth as “urban settlement areas” and designated Arva and Delaware 
“community settlement areas” (Middlesex Centre 2010, 28). In addition, the plan 
designated seven other communities—Ballymote, Birr, Bryanstone, Denfield, Lobo, 
Melrose and Poplar Hill-Coldstream—as hamlets (Middlesex Centre 2010, 28). As the 
official plan explained, only Ilderton, Komoka-Kilworth and Arva are generally serviced 
with municipal water and sewage (Middlesex Centre 2010, 28). Furthermore, the official 
plan noted that only the urban settlement areas—Ilderton and Komoka-Kilworth—either 
provide or have the potential to provide full municipal services (Middlesex Centre 2010, 
29). Because of their ability to provide full servicing, the plan argues that growth would 
primarily come from these areas: “all new proposed development shall be fully serviced 
by municipal water and sewage disposal systems…urban settlement areas are expected to 
have the highest concentration and intensity of land uses, and will be the focus for future 
growth by accommodating a significant portion of expected growth” (Middlesex Centre 
2010, 29).  
Despite Arva’s only partial access to the sewer and water services through 
previous contracting with London, the official plan did not designate the community an 
“urban settlement area”. During the interview process, a Middlesex Centre politician 
explained that this was deliberate: “we would like to keep Arva the size it is…we want to 
make it a special place and keep it a quaint village” (Personal Interview – February 15, 
2012). Middlesex Centre has consistently expressed this opinion and solidified it in their 
official plan, which is why they were baffled by the debate about growth that ensued on 
London city council. Councilors on both sides of the debate—both those in favour of 
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expanding servicing, such as Joe Swan, and those against expanding servicing, such as 
Joni Beachler—worked from the assumption that Middlesex Centre intended for Arva to 
grow.  
Thus, despite Middlesex Centre’s contention that they wanted Arva to remain 
small in comparison to other municipal communities, London politicians expressed their 
belief that this was untenable. One councilor who voted against the motion to extend 
servicing noted that, “there was no question in my mind that Arva would grow very fast 
because who wouldn’t want to live on the doorstep of the City of London and pay taxes 
to someone else at a lower rate and have the full amenities that the city offers?” (Personal 
Interview – March 5, 2012). A Middlesex Centre politician places the blame for this 
attitude on developers: “They don’t want 125 houses, they would like to see a whole lot 
more than this…they’d like to see development along the whole north end” (Personal 
Interview – February 15, 2012).  
County officials did not object to London’s decision, believing that London had 
every right to decide what to do with its resources and infrastructure. Further, they noted 
that Middlesex Centre did not raise the issue with county staff or politicians nor ask them 
to intervene in the matter to persuade London to reverse its decision. Middlesex County’s 
CAO and warden indicated that even if they were asked to intervene on Middlesex 
Centre’s behalf, they would not, stating that it is a purely local matter between London 
and Middlesex Centre and not the responsibility of the county (Personal Interview – 
March 2, 2012). Although the issue itself was not formally brought up during county 
council meetings, councilors discussed the issue among themselves before and after 
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meetings, provoking one county councilor to note that the other councilors did not fully 
understand the situation (Personal Interview – March 8, 2012).  
In October of 2011, Middlesex Centre planners released an amendment (No. 28) 
to the municipality’s official plan that dealt solely with the Ilderton and Komoka-
Kilworth areas. The amendment essentially enlarged the urban settlement areas of 
Ilderton and Komoka-Kilworth and removed land from the settlement area boundaries in 
the communities of Arva, Kirr, Poplar Hill & Coldstream, Denfield and Melrose 
(Middlesex Centre 2011, 5). Areas in northern Arva, previously designated as residential, 
were converted back into an agricultural designation (Middlesex Centre 2011, 7). At the 
same time, the plan added new employment and residential lands to the settlement areas 
in Ilderton and Komoka-Kilworth (Middlesex Centre 2011, 7).  
The amendment states that this change in focus resulted from the failure to gain 
adequate levels of servicing necessary from the City of London (Middlesex Centre 2011, 
6). Instead, the amendment calls for the expansion of the Ilderton and Komoka 
wastewater treatment facilities, the latter of which would extend servicing to the 
Delaware area (Middlesex Centre 2011, 7). Additionally, the amended plan calls for the 
expansion of Ilderton to “accommodate both planned and future development”; however, 
the plan is unclear whether this growth is planned solely in Ilderton or would eventually 
be extended to Arva, an area in close geographical proximity to Ilderton (Middlesex 
Centre 2011, 7). In the London Free Press, Edmondson described this shift in focus from 
Arva to Komoka-Kilworth and Ilderton as logical, considering that Arva did not have 
adequate access to sewage services for future development (Van Brenk 2011).  
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 This growth projection caused London some concern, as city politicians requested 
that the town explain how it expected such a rapid rate of development in comparison to 
London (Van Brenk 2011). A staff report presented to council raised concerns about the 
revised growth estimates in Ilderton and Komoka-Kilworth and how they may impact 
London’s assessment growth, concluding that:   
Planning Staff support the intent of this policy to direct urban growth to areas 
where full municipal services are to be provided, however, the extent of new 
urban growth contemplated for both Komoka-Kilworth will result in significant 
opportunities for new residential development close to the City’s boundaries. 
While the Official Plan Review also identifies new lands for employment 
purposes, it is anticipated that many of the future employment opportunities for 
residents of the Municipality will be in London. This will continue to put pressure 
on the City’s transportation system, as well as potential pressure on the “soft 
services” such as libraries and community recreation facilities in London that may 
be used by residents of these areas outside the City…These concerns warrant 
further discussion between City and Municipality Staff (City of London, 2011).  
 
Following this staff recommendation, city council voted almost unanimously to send 
Middlesex Centre a letter requesting clarification about the growth estimates.31 This 
letter, dated August 30, 2011, and addressed to Middlesex Centre CAO Michelle Smibert, 
was simply a copy of a resolution passed at council during its August 29 and 30 sessions. 
Predictably, Middlesex Centre politicians received this request negatively, including 
Councilor Frank Berze, who noted in the London Free Press that, “if I showed up in the 
city of London and told them what to do, they would tell me where to go and how to get 
there” (Van Brenk 2011).  
The letter essentially states that London had concerns about the revised growth 
projections in both Komoka-Kilworth and Ilderton areas, although the it does not state 
                                                 
31
 The vote passed 13 to 1 at the August 29, 2011 City Council meeting, with only Councilor Usher voting 
against the motion. 
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why.32 County staff interviewed for this project agree that the letter did not clearly state 
London’s motivations for questioning the city’s growth projections (Personal Interview – 
March 2, 2012). Although the letter requests council to direct their planning staff to meet 
with Middlesex Centre’s planning staff, it did not formally request the town to establish a 
meeting time or place. The letter ends by stating that London intends to advise the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing about the city’s concerns.  
London planning staff had previously spoken at a public meeting held by 
Middlesex Centre as part of the public consultation phase of the town’s new official plan. 
At the meeting, John Fleming, London’s Director of Planning, stated that the city had 
concerns regarding Middlesex Centre’s projections for growth. Middlesex Centre 
politicians requested that Mr. Fleming thank London city council for their concern and 
relay that Middlesex Centre had their own planning staff whose judgment they trusted. 
Further, since London has no jurisdiction in their municipality, Middlesex Centre 
councilors asked Mr. Fleming to remind London city council that they did not owe them 
an explanation of their growth projections (Personal Interview – March 8, 2012). 
London councilors interviewed for this project indicated that the growth in 
Komoka-Kilworth was more worrisome from the city’s perspective than the growth in 
Ilderton. They attributed this to the proximity of Komoka-Kilworth and their fear that 
residents working in the city may migrate to this area believing that they remained close 
enough to the city to continue utilizing city services and facilities.  
                                                 
32
 While the formal letter to Middlesex Centre did not state why London was concerned about the 
increased growth projections, Middlesex Centre officials interviewed for this project stated their belief that 
the city’s concerns centered around losing assessment base to another municipality. Much of this was 
outlined in the staff report (quoted above), which is publicly available through the City of London’s 
website. This information would have been available to Middlesex Centre officials as well, even though it 
was not directly listed in formal correspondence between both municipalities.  
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One county councilor noted that the issue was not discussed at any county council 
meetings, indicating that the senior county staff and warden primarily handed this issue. 
County staff noted their concern about the letter; while the county did not have a problem 
with London’s decision not to expand servicing to Arva, they felt that London’s letter 
was unnecessarily antagonistic. Believing the letter to be “offside”, county staff noted 
that they would try to establish a meeting with city planners to explain their position 
(Personal Interview – March 2, 2012). Although the county would like to hold a meeting 
with London and Middlesex Centre officials to discuss the issue, they are waiting until 
London’s new CAO is in place.33  
Middlesex Centre politicians agree, with one official commenting that London, 
“overstepped their boundaries” by sending the letter (Personal Interview – February 15, 
2012). They continued, however, saying that “we can’t get too upset about it, but we’re 
still going to go ahead” (Personal Interview – February 15, 2012). Another Middlesex 
Centre official described London’s stance as, “myopic” and stated that council was 
“taken a back” by London’s position (Personal Interview – March 5, 2012). London’s 
letter seems to have genuinely surprised Middlesex Centre staff and politicians, 
especially considering that London traditionally minimizes contact with the municipality. 
The London Free Press attempted to draw parallels to the growth in Middlesex 
Centre with the growth of Lambeth and Glanworth —then called “parasitic” by London 
politicians – prior to the 1993 annexation (Van Brenk 2011). Middlesex Centre mayor Al 
Edmondson, however, rebuffed these suggestions, arguing that both jurisdictions had a 
                                                 
33
 Jeff Fielding, London’s former City Manager, resigned in December 2011 to take the position of City 
Manager with the City of Burlington. In May 2012, the city announced the hiring of Art Zuidema as the 
new City Manager after a lengthy search process. Interviews for this project were completed before 
Zuidema’s hiring.  
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good working relationship and that growth in Middlesex Centre was beneficial to London 
(Van Brenk 2011). “I don’t see the problem”, commented Edmondson in the London 
Free Press (Van Brenk 2011).  
While Middlesex Centre politicians seem unconcerned about the possibility of 
annexation, other politicians throughout the county believe that Middlesex Centre may be 
unintentionally inviting London to expand its boundaries into their territory. Those who 
have been involved in county politics for many decades see a number of parallels 
between the growth in Komoka-Kilworth and Arva with the growth in Byron that 
prompted London to expand its borders in the 1960s (Personal Interview – March 16, 
2012). These politicians suggest that if the area comes under review, the province will 
inevitably determine that urban areas should be under London’s purview, an argument 
consistent with the original aims of city-county separation. One county politician noted 
that, “if you keep expanding the urban area around London it’s just going to naturally 
lead to an attempt by the city to move its boundary out” (Personal Interview – March 16, 
2012).  
Generally, Middlesex County politicians tend to believe that while annexation 
may not be imminent, it is certainly inevitable if areas such as Arva and Komoka-
Kilworth continue to expand. Thus far, Middlesex County politicians have discussed 
annexation only informally. The issue has not been raised in county council nor do 
county staff seem concerned about the possibility of London’s expanding its boundaries 
into county territory. Informally, however, Middlesex Centre officials have been 
receiving some advice from some Middlesex County politicians. One county politician 
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notes that, “it would be wise for them to put the brakes on their urban development, but 
its probably too late to do that now” (Personal Interview – March 16, 2012).   
 A second Middlesex Centre official similarly expressed their belief that London 
does not want to see growth along its borders, adding that, “I think they’ve kind of sat up 
and taken notice of our growth strategies…I think they’re kind of looking over the fence 
now and saying ‘oh oh, what’s going on over there?’” (Personal Interview – February 21, 
2012). Another official suggests that the municipality’s lower property tax rates are 
attractive to younger families hoping to receive a break from higher London property tax 
rates (Personal Interview – February 21, 2012).34  
 Thus, the concerns from London officials about this growth may be justified. 
Amendment 28 of Middlesex Centre’s official plan calls for the construction of more 
compact housing units in the Komoka-Kilworth area. Specifically, the new residential 
designations in the amendment call for 60 percent low density residential (single homes, 
semi-detached homes) and 40 percent medium density residential (townhouses) 
(Middlesex Centre 2011, 14). During the interview process, I confirmed with municipal 
officials from Middlesex Centre that this was intended to attract younger families to the 
areas, whom they hoped would migrate from the city in order to buy their first home and 
take advantage of lower property taxes and home values (Personal Interview – February 
15, 2012). Building up the Komoka-Kilworth areas, then, would not only provide 
                                                 
34
 The total residential property tax rate for London is 1.4%, while it is 1.1% in Middlesex Centre. A 2012 
London Free Press demonstrated that the property tax on an average London bungalow is $3,079 and 
$2,556 in Middlesex Centre. However, the London Free Press also found that the per capita assessment for 
Middlesex Centre is $142,300, much higher than the $84,000 for London. The average per capita 
assessment for Ontario is $122,000. For more information, please see DeBono 2012.  
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housing, but also a community setting close to London that takes advantage of the city’s 
amenities, such as its shopping centres and entertainment features.35 
Much of this anxiety about growth comes from recent disparities in population 
growth rates between London and some of its surrounding communities. Table 5.1, 
below, demonstrates this growth disparity using population figures from both the 2006 
and 2011 census for London and Middlesex County:  
Table 5.1: Comparative Population Figures for London and Middlesex County 
Community 2006 Population 2011 Population Difference 
Adelaide Metcalfe 3,135 3,028 -3.4% 
Lucan Biddulph 4,187 4,338 3.6% 
Middlesex Centre 15,589 16,487 5.8% 
North Middlesex  6,740 6,658 -1.2% 
Southwest Middlesex 5,890 5,860 -0.5 
Strathroy Caradoc  19,959 20,978 5.1% 
Thames Centre 13,085 13,000 -0.6 
Newbury 439 447 1.8% 
London 352,395 366,151 3.9% 
(Source: Statistics Canada) 
Population data from Statistics Canada show a steady increase in London’s population, 
with the city experiencing a growth rate of 3.9 percent between 2006 and 2011. This is 
below the provincial growth rate of 5.7 percent, but fairly consistent with comparable 
municipalities with similar employment and resident bases, such as Hamilton, which 
experienced a 3.1 percent growth rate during the same period.  
The data also show a variety of growth rates amongst the lower-tier municipalities 
in the county. Some municipalities, such as Southwest Middlesex, Adelaide Metcalfe and 
                                                 
35
 Middlesex County planners recently estimated the driving times from many communities within 
Middlesex Centre to the city centre of London. Komoka-Kilwort, only 20.3 kilometers away from the city 
core of London has an estimated drive time of 24 minutes, which proves ideal for commuting for work or 
coming into the city for shopping or entertainment. Other drive times for communities in Middlesex Centre 
are as follows: Arva: 8.8 kms, 14 minutes; Ballymote: 11.6 kms, 17 minutes; Birr: 17.3 kms, 21 minutes; 
Bryanston: 18.5 kms, 22 minutes; Delaware: 20.4 kms, 29 minutes; Denfield: 28.2 kms, 30 minutes; 
Ilderton: 28.2 kms, 30 minutes; Lobo: 14.3 kms, 22 minutes; Melrose: 17.9 kms, 25 minutes; and Poplarhill 
Coldsteam: 25.7 kms, 32 minutes.  
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North Middlesex—communities on the peripheries of the county—experienced negative 
growth rates. Other municipalities within the county—namely Strathroy Caradoc, 
Middlesex Centre and Lucan Biddulph—experienced growth rates greater than London. 
Two of these municipalities—Middlesex Centre and Lucan Biddulph—are situated north 
of the city, with Middlesex Centre directly on London’s border and Lucan Biddulph on 
Middlesex Centre’s northern border. This sort of rapid growth, however, is not a new 
phenomenon. Between 2001 and 2006, the population of Middlesex Centre increased by 
9.5 percent, while London’s population only grew by 4.7 percent. Although both 
communities have since slowed in growth, Middlesex Centre’s population has 
consistently grown at a faster rate than London for over a decade, which perhaps justifies 
London’s unprecedented interest in the community.  
London’s growth concerns, however, do not seem to affect outlying communities, 
such as Strathroy Caradoc, that are also experiencing rapid growth. In fact, London has 
neither spoken with officials in communities like Strathroy Caradoc nor expressed 
concern about their growth rates. Accordingly, officials from Strathroy Caradoc believe 
that London is concerned only about growth occurring along its borders, suggesting that 
London does not view outlying growth as a grave concern (Personal Interview – March 
21, 2012).  
Much like the process that led to London’s last annexation in 1993, rapid growth 
on the city’s periphery is once again occurring. Furthermore, officials from communities 
such as Middlesex Centre have not been shy about their own respective ambitions either. 
These communities hope to create an alternative to city living for residents in the region 
by developing infrastructure that will draw London residents to their communities. 
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Finding the situation untenable, London officials have, thus far, denied the requests 
Middlesex Centre’s council for expanded access to their resources. London’s planning 
staff openly question the town’s planning decisions and have offered assistance in 
creating a planning document that is more inline with the city’s view of the region. When 
Middlesex Centre politicians rebuffed these overtures, some city councilors openly 
mused about annexing the Arva area so as to include any future development in the 
region within their borders.  
 Furthermore, officials from communities around London are no longer content to 
remain rural. Some, such as Middlesex Centre, are actively pursuing development and are 
openly presenting themselves as a suburban alternative to the city. This contravenes 
much of the rationale behind city-county separation, which specifically envisions the city 
as urban and its surrounding area as rural. Although regional government perhaps 
represents one way of managing growth in rapidly urbanizing counties—a process in 
which once rural areas have become suburban enclaves—London has largely avoided this 
situation throughout its history through regular rounds of annexation, creating a situation 
wherein the city is geographically dominant within the county’s borders. This expansion 
is perhaps one reason why London and Middlesex County avoided being converted into a 
regional government in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Sancton 1998, 163).  
 In the absence of regional planning mechanisms, London has attempted to control 
expansion around its borders by restricting the expansion of its water and sewer 
infrastructure. City officials argue that if areas such as Arva do not have access to the 
City’s water system, they will be able to restrict development along its border. 
Unfortunately for London, politicians in Middlesex Centre have recently pledged to find 
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alternative sources to facilitate municipality’s expansion, which has made London’s 
strategy appear temporary and perhaps flawed. Without any formal control over planning 
outside of their borders, London officials are left with few alternatives if they hope to 
direct growth within the City’s boundaries.  
 
5.2.     The Central Planning Board in Elgin-St. Thomas 
 A unique planning arrangement exists between the separated city of St. Thomas 
and its surrounding lower-tier municipalities in Elgin County.36 Despite its separated 
status, St. Thomas has been included in joint planning functions with the county for 
nearly fifty years. Unlike other separated cities, St. Thomas has some degree of control 
over development outside of its borders. The city’s planning staff, then, takes into 
account the demand on the city for servicing and growth, along with the demands on 
adjoining communities. Decisions over land use planning are made by a joint board with 
representation from each municipality, established to administer planning activities. The 
board’s municipal membership has been relatively stable since its inception, but recently 
one of the three partner municipalities has removed itself from the arrangement, making 
it impossible for the board to plan for the whole area.  
 Joint planning boards have existed in Elgin County since the 1960s. Despite St. 
Thomas being a separated city since 1881, it has always been included in the county’s 
joint planning exercises. In 1966, the “Elgin County Planning Area” was established, 
                                                 
36
 Elgin-St. Thomas was included as a case study in the preliminary stages of this research project. 
However, as this thesis progressed, I did not select it as a final case study. Primary interviews were 
conducted with 14 officials—politicians and staff—from St. Thomas, Elgin County and the county’s lower-
tier municipalities in April and May of 2011.  
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with St. Thomas included as a “subsidiary planning area” (Central Elgin Planning Board 
2007). In 1969, the arrangement changed and the county was divided into three separate 
planning areas: west, central and east (Central Elgin Planning Board 2007). The City of 
St. Thomas was included in the Central Elgin Planning Board, along with the Villages of 
Port Stanley and Belmont, and the Townships of Yarmouth and Southwold (Central Elgin 
Planning Board 2007). Under the Planning Act, the Board was established as an 
incorporated body with decision-making responsibility for planning matters (Central 
Elgin Planning Board 2007). Its five constituent members were jointly responsible for its 
funding.  
 A new Planning Act introduced in 1983 dissolved all of the joint and subsidiary 
planning boards and areas across the province, calling instead for local councils to be 
directly responsible for planning matters (Central Elgin Planning Board 2007). The five 
members of the Central Elgin Planning Board wished to continue their arrangement and 
therefore entered into an inter-local agreement that formed the Central Elgin Planning 
Advisory Committee (CEPAC) (Central Elgin Planning Board 2007). Planning staff 
became employees of the City of St. Thomas with the understanding that they would 
comply with the vision of the CEPAC, which composed representatives from each of the 
member municipalities (Central Elgin Planning Board 2007). In accordance with the new 
Planning Act, participation in the CEPAC was voluntary (Central Elgin Planning Board 
2007).  
 In the 1990s, the province embarked on a program of wide-scale amalgamation. 
Elgin County was not immune from this consolidation and saw its 16 municipalities 
consolidated into eight. When Yarmouth, Belmont and Port Stanley were amalgamated to 
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form the new town of Central Elgin, the new municipality decided to continue its 
planning relationship with the remaining three municipalities (Personal Interview – May 
4, 2011). As a result, the new central planning area included St. Thomas, Southwold and 
the newly amalgamated town of Central Elgin (Central Elgin Planning Board 2007). 
Traditionally, the funding for CEPAC has been based upon population and actual value 
assessment. Each municipality’s contribution is based 50 percent on their population and 
50 percent on their actual value assessment (Central Elgin Planning Board 2007). 
 The CEPAC is unique in Ontario and, by most accounts, been relatively 
successful. In the long history of the joint planning board, staff recall only one major 
planning dispute that required the intervention of the Ontario Municipal Board (Personal 
Interview – May 4, 2011). This dispute centered around the construction of the Elgin 
Mall, a case in which rival developers could not agree about the new mall’s placement; 
one developer wanted to place the mall in St. Thomas, while another wanted to place it in 
nearby Yarmouth (Personal Interview – May 4, 2011).37 For the funding for CEPAC, 
each municipality’s contribution is based 50% on their population and 50% on their 
actual value assessment (Central Elgin Planning Board 2007) 
In 2006, Southwold gave notice that it would no longer participate in CEPAC. 
Planning staff indicate that this decision was given without explanation, surprising many 
in the organization at the township’s decision (Personal Interview – May 4, 2011). 
Southwold was an original member of the planning collective and previously agreed to 
continue to maintain a voluntary agreement with CEPAC after changes to the Planning 
Act in 1983 and following the amalgamation of 1998 that changed the group’s 
                                                 
37
 In the end, only one site—the one in St. Thomas—had full access to services, which led to the eventual 
approval of the mall’s location in St. Thomas.  
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composition from 5 to 3 members. The timing of their departure provoked many CEPAC 
officials to question Southwold’s motivations (Personal Interview – May 4, 2011).  
Southwold politicians who participated in interviews for this project claim that the 
township was not receiving a “fair shake” from the planning arrangement (Primary 
Interview – April 22, 2011). They contend that in spite of the fact that the township was 
spending approximately $80,000 a year on the arrangement and that the planners were 
focused on development in St. Thomas and Central Elgin to the exclusion of Southwold, 
the smallest partner in the arrangement (Primary Interview – April 22, 2011).38 One 
Southwold councilor argued that, “we thought the planners were looking more at St. 
Thomas and Central Elgin for development and we weren’t getting our share of that and 
development is what you need to grow, so we thought we would go on our own and see 
how we would do on our own” (Primary Interview – April 22, 2011). In short, Southwold 
politicians did not believe that it was beneficial to continue the relationship.  
Southwold originally contributed towards the city’s economic development 
efforts, just as Central Elgin did, but St. Thomas’ economic development officer reports 
that Southwold removed itself from this arrangement (Primary Interview – May 4, 2011). 
Much like the former, officials report that Southwold neglected to offer a formal 
explanation as to why they were opting to leave the arrangement (Primary Interview – 
May 4, 2011). Nevertheless, since their contributions were comparably minimal—in this 
                                                 
38
 Records from the planning department indicate that Southwold was responsible for a contribution of 
$54,822.56 for 2007. For more information, please see Central Elgin Planning Board, 2007.  
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case, their contribution was $6,400—and officials note that this did not significantly 
impact St. Thomas’ economic development efforts (Primary Interview – May 4, 2011).39  
ICA scholars would be unsurprised by Southwold’s departure from the planning 
collective. Coordination in areas such as planning or economic development require 
relatively homogenous populations to avoid coordination problems, such as dividing 
mutual gains that result from development (Indergaard 1998; Foster 2001). 
Municipalities form cooperative relationships when the costs and risks of doing so are 
low. However, in the case of planning and economic development, it is generally too 
difficult to divide mutual gains and evenly distribute benefits amongst members 
(Hawkins and Andrew 2011). The transaction costs for building these types of 
relationships is too high to form and—as demonstrated by Southwold’s exit from the 
planning cooperative—often too high to sustain.  
Although Southwold is, geographically, roughly the same size as Central Elgin, it 
does not have a similar population to either St. Thomas or Central Elgin. Central Elgin 
also has a number of urban settlement areas, such as Port Stanley. Conversely, 
respondents from Central Elgin feel that the planning collective does adequately direct 
growth and development towards their communities, mainly because Central Elgin’s 
heavy focus on tourism in the south end of the municipality largely avoids conflict with 
St. Thomas’ stated development goals. Since Southwold often views itself as a junior 
                                                 
39
 Many of these joint ventures between St. Thomas and its neighbours seem to be in danger of collapsing. 
Not only has Southwold removed itself from the planning board and joint economic development 
initiatives, but St. Thomas itself has also approved a plan that would sever its financial relationship with the 
Elgin County tourism board. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that St. Thomas requires a tourism 
focus geared towards the city rather than the more rural county. For more information see Lypaczewski 
2013.  Ending many of these arrangements could signal that the disparities in size between St. Thomas and 
its neighbours are becoming too vast for meaningful cooperation.  
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partner in many agreements, cooperating with the larger municipalities of St. Thomas and 
Central Elgin is often challenging. Thus, believing that their participation with the 
planning cooperative put them at a disadvantage, Southwold officials want to redress the 
balance of power. While it is currently unclear whether or not Southwold will eventually 
return to the planning collective, what is clear is that that participatory groups such as 
these struggle to continue with members of such uneven population and assessment size. 
In the wake of Southwold’s withdrawal from CEPAC, Central Elgin and St. 
Thomas created a new inter-local agreement that would re-create a planning authority.40 
The new agreement kept most of the same provisions from previous CEPAC 
arrangements, including the funding formula that saw Central Elgin and St. Thomas 
contribute proportionately to the net expenses of the new Central Elgin Planning Office 
based 50 percent on population and 50 percent on actual value (Central Elgin 2011). The 
agreement is set to expire on December 31, 2015.  
 The presence of a joint-planning board is perhaps one of the main reasons why 
boundary expansion has been so easily accomplished for St. Thomas. Respondents from 
both the city and county report that their relationship has been successful because both 
Elgin County and their lower-tier municipalities around the city have been able to give 
“each other room to breathe” and permit boundary changes that allow the city to grow 
(Personal Interview – April 14, 2012). The city has been able to accomplish several 
mutually beneficial land-for-servicing arrangements, the most recent of which occurred 
in 2010.  
                                                 
40
 This agreement, was passed by both councils in December of 2011, but did not commence until January 
1, 2012, which fell outside of the parameters of this study. As such, it is not included in the list of 
agreements in Appendix C and is not included for analysis in Chapter 7.  
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 Thus, while the CEPAC has successfully managed growth in and around St. 
Thomas, it has also experienced steep challenges, the largest of which being Southwold’s 
departure. The ICA framework is helpful in explaining this departure since, as previously 
discussed, the impression that planning arrangements only distribute selective benefits 
may make some potential participants wary about cooperating. Some ICA research 
suggests that rural municipalities are disadvantaged in dividing mutual gains with larger, 
more urban municipalities (Warner 2006).  
These factors may well play a role in the St. Thomas area. The planning collective 
worked for many years because officials from the areas outside of St. Thomas were 
content for their municipalities to remain rural. Urban development was largely directed 
towards the city and small tourist communities along Lake Erie. Much of Central Elgin 
and Southwold remained rural through this process, thereby adhering to the original logic 
behind city-county separation. However, Southwold’s view of this relationship gradually 
changed. Too much development was directed towards St. Thomas, ignoring 
Southwold’s new council and administration’s aspirations to see the community grow. In 
this case, common planning institutions between separated cities and their neighbouring 
rural areas seem feasible only when both rural and urban areas harbour similar objectives 
to remain rural and urban.  
 
5.3.     The Impact of Provincial Growth Initiatives in Simcoe County 
Few counties in Ontario have received more attention from the province over the 
past decade than Simcoe. Aside from its direct involvement in the Barrie-Innisfil 
boundary dispute, the province has taken a keen interest in the region’s growth. Rapid 
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growth—mainly in the county’s south—has caused the province to believe that 
unrestrained suburban expansion will inevitably occur unless strict growth restrictions are 
placed upon the region. These restrictions have been met with mixed responses and in the 
process, created new inter-governmental dynamics throughout the region.  
Ontario’s Places to Grow Act is the most recent example of provincial 
involvement in the region. The process, initiated in 2006, identified rapid growth rates in 
Simcoe County and created policies to re-direct growth to certain areas of the county in 
an effort to avoid unsustainable growth (Ontario 2009, 1). The first report on the Simcoe 
sub-area of the Greater Golden Horseshoe argued that, if left unchecked, Simcoe could 
have a population of over 1 million people by 2031 (Ontario 2009, 5). However, with 
proper planning practices in place, the province estimates that 667,000 inhabitants and an 
employment forecast of 254,000 jobs is a healthy estimate (Ontario 2009, 5).  
To achieve these development goals, the province wants to focus on the creation 
of “urban nodes” in the five largest communities in the Simcoe area: Barrie, Orillia, 
Collingwood, Alliston and Bradford West Gwillimbury (Ontario 2009, 9). The Towns of 
Midland and Penetanguishene were later added as additional growth nodes in a 2012 
revision of the Places to Grow plan (Ontario 2012, 65). By directing growth to these 
areas and encouraging density, the province hopes to avoid unrestrained growth and 
sprawl into the more rural parts of the county. A map of the county identifying these 
growth nodes is shown below:  
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Image 5.2: Places to Grow Map 
 
(Source: Places to Grow, Province of Ontario) 
 
The identification of growth nodes within the county creates both challenges and 
opportunities for Simcoe municipalities. Areas not identified as growth nodes now find it 
challenging to live within the confines of the legislation because they have been offered 
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such a limited framework within which to grow. Much of the projected growth in the 
county must adhere to existing water and sewage servicing—areas referred to as 
“settlement boundaries”—which limit the amount of growth that more rural areas can 
establish. Table 5.2, below, lists the population distribution figures for the region: 
Table 5.2: Summary of Population Distribution Under Places to Grow Plan 
Community 2011 Population 2031 Projections Percent Change 
Barrie 135,711 210,000 54.71% 
Orillia 30,586 41,000 34.48% 
Adjala-Tosorontio 10,603 13,000 22.60% 
Bradford West 
Gwillimbury 
28,077 50,500 79.86% 
Clearview 13,734 19,700 43.44% 
Collingwood 19,241 33,400 73.58% 
Essa 18,505 21,500 16.18% 
Innisfil 33,079 56,000 69.29% 
Midland 16,572 22,500 35.71% 
New Tecumseth 30,234 56,000 85.22% 
Oro-Medonte 20,078 27,000 34.47% 
Penetanguishene 9,111 11,000 20.73% 
Ramara 9,275 13,000 40.16% 
Severn 12,377 17,000 37.35% 
Springwater 18,223 24,000 31.63% 
Tay 9,736 11,400 17.09% 
Tiny 11,232 12,500 11.28% 
Wasaga Beach 17,537 27,500 56.81% 
Total 443,911 667,000 50.25% 
 
The plan specifies that some areas—such as those areas with growth nodes like New 
Tecumseth and Bradford West Gwillimbury—will intentionally grow at a rapid rate, 
while other areas—primarily in the north—will grow at a greatly reduced rate. Tiny is 
one example of a municipality expected to grow at a much-reduced rate, forecasted to 
grow only 11.28 percent over 30 years. Nevertheless, many view these figures as both 
unrealistic and unsustainable from a financial point of view.  
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Many of the areas labeled as slower growth areas argue that the province has been 
inconsistent in the way that it has allocated growth. On one hand, the overall population 
figure of 667,000 is described as a final number; yet, on the other hand, the province has 
informed areas not identified as growth nodes that they will be able to grow beyond their 
allotted population distributions as long as growth remains in designated settlement areas, 
causing confusion about which restrictions affect which municipalities, according to one 
mayor from a county lower-tier municipality (Personal Interview – May 31, 2012). 
Areas not identified as growth nodes believe they are being purposely 
disadvantaged through the Places to Grow legislation. Some county officials question 
how their municipalities will be able to have a suitable assessment base if they are 
prohibited from growing (Personal Interview – May 31, 2012). One mayor from a rural 
Simcoe municipality commented that, “unless I can grow in a well planned out manner, 
I’m never ever going to be cost effective, I’m never going to be able to recover the cost 
of the infrastructure I’ve had to place in the ground because the province has said I 
needed to do it” (Personal Interview – May 31, 2012).  
County officials and representatives from areas slated to grow have been sensitive 
to this aspect and worked to find a solution. One mayor from a southern municipality in 
the county, argued that, “when the province says you can only grow to 667,000, including 
Barrie and Orillia, who gets that population [will lead] to an inevitable dispute” (Personal 
Interview – May 31, 2012). Another lower-tier official agreed, noting that, “it’s hard to 
satisfy so many people…of the 16 municipalities, some of them are very happy with the 
way things are going, many aren’t and they [the province] are saying that only so many 
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people can come up and grow, so it makes some competition to get those numbers” 
(Personal Interview –June 8, 2012).  
County politicians contend that if all of the official plans from the county’s lower 
tiers were looked at collectively, their population figures would add up to 707,000 
people. However, since the province was unwilling to adjust the Places to Grow plan to 
this figure, each area was forced to fight over future population distribution. Many 
municipal officials in the county argue that the Places to Grow legislation creates 
winners and losers; consequently, slower growing municipalities will be forced into 
financial strain because of the province’s restrictions (Personal Interview – May 31, 
2012). Furthermore, other officials express doubt that they will be able to maintain their 
assessment base, creating a “financial burden” for their taxpayers. County officials note 
that this decision led to “a lot of grief and anxiety” within the county (Personal Interview 
– May 31, 2012).  
The county was not highly involved in the process that ultimately created the 
Places to Grow plan. In fact, county respondents note that despite the county having 
some responsibility over planning functions, much of the consultation was conducted 
directly with their lower-tier municipalities with little input from the county itself 
(Personal Interview – June 8, 2012). There was also very little input from the county’s 
MPPs, who report that much of the government’s action on this initiative was unilateral 
(Personal Interview – June 15, 2012).  
However, the Places to Grow plan did create alliances among areas intended to 
grow more heavily. Municipalities established as urban growth nodes have come together 
to hold regular meetings discussing common issues. The mayor of one growth node 
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municipality noted that during their initial meeting, the urban nodes agreed to invite the 
county warden to be part of the group since the county felt isolated from the group and 
hoped to be a part of it (Personal Interviews – May 30, 2012). Barrie and Orillia, 
however, initially expressed concerned about including the county in the group, although 
they eventually relented under the provision that the county warden “did not control the 
group” (Personal Interview – May 30, 2012). Nevertheless, officials from these rapidly 
growing areas indicate that they have more in common with each other than more rural 
areas of the county (Personal Interview – May 31, 2012). One mayor from this group 
stated that these new designations as a growth nodes have also increased the interaction 
between these areas and the separated cities of Barrie and Orillia (Personal Interview – 
May 30, 2012). 
The identification of the county’s growth nodes and the creation of the growth 
nodes group have increased cooperation among these communities. When Alcona—a 
community within Innisfil—was added as a growth node to the Places to Grow plan, 
Barrie officials contend that they began discussions with the town to extend municipal 
transit service to the area to help facilitate its objectives under the provincial plan 
(Personal Interview – June 14, 2012). Additionally, Barrie officials note that they are 
beginning to discuss the extension of utility services to the Collingwood area (Personal 
Interview – June 14, 2012).41 Many of these areas identified as growth nodes are not 
natural partners for cooperation—particularly Barrie and Collingwood, which are 
                                                 
41
 The discussion of extending utilities primarily centred on PowerStream servicing Collingwood. 
PowerStream is the second largest municipally owned electricity distribution company in the province and 
is jointly owned by Barrie, Markham and Vaughan. PowerStream already provides electricity to other 
Simcoe communities, such as Alliston, Beeton, Bradford West Gwillimbury, Penetanguishene and 
Tottenham 
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geographically distant—but have been brought together because of their common 
identification as sites of growth and development.  
In this sense, the formal classifications as “growth nodes” may have helped 
facilitate discussion. The ICA framework is adept at studying these types of relationships, 
as the municipalities involved have common servicing needs related to the pressure of 
growth, such as transportation. Where the ICA framework encounters barriers in the 
study of cooperation seems to be in urban-rural relationships, where there are no natural 
servicing relationships.42   
Much of the report’s attention centred on Barrie which the province viewed as the 
greatest opportunity to bring density to the area, referring to the city as the region’s 
“anchor node” (Ontario 2009, 9). Consequently, most of the growth within the region is 
slated for Barrie, which does create some tension between Barrie and the county areas 
slated for more moderate growth. Furthermore, some county officials believe that Barrie 
has received undue attention from the province and been prioritized above other 
communities within the county (Personal Interview – May 31, 2012).  
In general, municipalities slated to grow under the Places to Grow plan generally 
like the legislation, while municipalities not intended to grow generally dislike the plan. 
Areas such as Barrie, Orillia, Bradford West Gwillimbury, New Tecumseth, Innisfil, 
Collingwood, Penetanguishene and Midland will generally benefit from this growth 
because they have the necessary infrastructure in place and have previously planned for 
high levels of growth and development. These areas appreciate the newfound legislative 
                                                 
42
 During the boundary dispute between Innisfil and Barrie, the county was surprised to see many of the 
growth node communities aligning themselves with Barrie. Respondents from these communities indicated 
that they did not believe that the boundary dispute should alter their relationship with Barrie. They also 
believed that their work as growth node communities trumped their loyalty to the county.  
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authority behind their ambitions. However, more rural areas not identified as growth 
areas are generally resentful of the legislation, believing that they have been put in an 
unfair position by having their growth, and thus their assessment base, capped well into 
the future. Even though officials from slower growth areas have clearly stated their desire 
to remain rural and avoid large-scale housing or industrial development, they resent 
having to plan within the province’s vision for their municipalities. 
The provincial initiative has also created a new layer of inter-governmental 
relations within the region: urban and rural, rather than county and city. Communities 
identified as growth nodes have more reason to cooperate with each other than the more 
rural areas of the county because they have aligned interests that are nearly absent at the 
county level. They vote together at county council, generally to the detriment of the 
north, and have established independent growth nodes groups to discuss their newly 
elevated role within the region and in the eyes of the province.  
By introducing Places to Grow, the province created a number of urban and 
suburban areas around Simcoe County. Its overall objective was to direct growth towards 
urban areas—with the goal of curbing sprawl—which was the original purpose of 
separating cities from their counties: to maintain the distinction between urban and rural 
areas. However, directing growth towards the county’s two separated cites, Barrie and 
Orillia, has become increasingly challenging since the Simcoe region is one of the fastest 
growing in the province. In fact, between 2001 and 2006, Barrie held the distinction of 
the fastest growing municipality in the entire country. Within this type of environment, 
growth cannot be neatly contained within the borders of the county’s separated cities. 
However, the Places to Grow legislation entrenched and legitimized Simcoe County’s 
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rapidly growing suburban areas. As such, the province has moved away from the logic 
behind city-county separation and moved towards the same type of thinking that created 
regional government: managing growth throughout the area rather than solely confining it 
to urban areas.  
 
5.4.     Conclusion 
 Regional government was created, in part, to provide central cities with more 
control and more influence over their immediate hinterland. In regional government, the 
upper-tier addresses regional planning, ensuring that the urban areas of these regions 
have input into the planning decisions outside of their immediate borders. However, 
separated cities are hampered in regional planning on two fronts. First, separated cities 
lack institutional connections to their surrounding counties and generally have little say 
or influence over the development that occurs outside of their borders. Secondly, the ICA 
framework demonstrates that a perception that the benefits of cooperation will be 
unevenly distributed can hinder cooperative behaviour (Feiock 2007). Since planning is 
one area of potential cooperation where there may be such a perception of uneven 
benefits, thereby reducing the likelihood of cooperation on planning issues.  
Due to these barriers, boundary expansions and provincial involvement are 
standard responses to rapid development outside of separated cities. London, Barrie and 
Simcoe are examples of cities that followed this route. In London, development to the 
south of the city forced a large annexation in the 1990s; more recent development has 
caused some city politicians to openly question whether it is time for another round of 
boundary expansion to prevent similar development on the edge of its northern border. 
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Two communities in the town of Middlesex Centre have experienced strong growth over 
the past decade, a growth rate that promises to grow even larger as residents move 
outside of London’s border for more affordable housing prices and tax rates. London has 
rejected requests for water and sewage extension to these areas and sharply criticized 
Middlesex Centre’s response of redesigning its official plan in retaliation.  
The rapid growth in Barrie, Orillia and several other communities in Simcoe 
County attracted the concern of the province, which regulated land use and development 
in the region with its Places to Grow legislation. This plan identified seven communities, 
which it referred to as “growth nodes” that are slated for rapid growth over the next 
several decades. This plan to restrict growth in some areas of the county came under 
criticism from smaller communities that demanded less stringent regulation of their 
community development. This plan also created some new divisions between areas 
identified as growth nodes and those that are not. 
St. Thomas took a different approach to growth. For nearly fifty years, the city 
has been part of a planning collective that includes their lower-tier neighbours in the 
county. Several changes have affected this joint planning board over time, but none more 
than Southwold’s withdrawal, the most rural member of the planning board. Southwold 
politicians expressed their belief that they were no longer receiving a “fair shake” from 
the planning board, with all development being directed towards St. Thomas and its fast 
growing neighbour to the east, Central Elgin. They left the planning board in the hope of 
achieving their own development goals. These types of joint planning boards are rare, 
with the St. Thomas-Central Elgin agreement being the last in Ontario. They are similarly 
rare in American metropolitan areas (Andrew 2008). ICA scholars argue that this is 
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because they are hard to negotiate and even harder to enforce, creating a situation where 
it makes little sense for municipalities to enter into such agreements because the 
transactions costs are simply too high. Based on Southwold’s withdrawal from such an 
arrangement, it would also seem that these transaction costs are too high to sustain this 
level of cooperation amongst members of vastly different size. The distinction between 
urban and rural is a further extenuating circumstance. No longer willing to remain as the 
rural periphery of the city, Southwold had its own ambition to develop, shirking the 
original logic of city-county separation. 
 These three case studies represented here demonstrate vastly different approaches 
to planning: London has no formal connections with its surrounding area, Simcoe County 
has relied largely on provincial regulation for regional planning and St. Thomas, in Elgin 
County, entered into a voluntary planning collective with its neighbouring lower-tiers in 
the county. Each have different experiences, but one common denominator seems to be 
the conflict between the aspirations of separated cities and their immediate neighbours. 
This is consistent with previously conducted ICA research in this area, which states that 
dividing selective benefits is challenging and poses a threat to cooperation. The 
perception that one area will win and another will lose poses steep negotiation and 
monitoring costs for municipalities thinking about participating in cooperative planning. 
Additionally, some suburban and rural communities around central cities have 
similar aspirations as the urban areas they border. These aspirations often clash. Cities 
feel that the growth experienced outside of their borders occurs largely because of their 
own growth rates, rather than a concerted effort by suburban and rural neighbours to 
attract growth.  Consequently, when suburban and rural areas want to expand their 
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assessment base and gain a sense of independence from their urban neighbours, conflict 
between the areas over growth and development seems inevitable.  
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CHAPTER 6 – CONSOLIDATED MUNICIPAL SERVICE 
MANAGERS 
 
6.     Introduction 
 The province has been willing to deeply involve itself in the affairs of its 
separated cities and counties. In the previous two chapters, I have demonstrated how the 
provincial government has repeatedly intervened to settle border disputes and regulate 
planning and land use decisions. Provincial decision-making has not been isolated to 
these two areas, however. In addition, service downloading has created significant 
divisions between certain separated cities and counties. This chapter details the effect of 
mandated cooperation upon separated cities and counties and examines how downloading 
impacts other areas of potential cooperation between both jurisdictions.  
American ICA literature provides some information on the effect of intervention 
from senior levels of government. ICA scholars argue that, in some ways, increased 
regulation of local government behaviour by senior levels of government may negatively 
influence cooperation through increased expectations of central government intervention; 
however, in other ways, incentives from senior levels of government may positively 
influence cooperation (Post, 2004). While some research (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; 
Krueger and Bernick 2010) shows promise in connecting state regulation to a decreasing 
likelihood of cooperation, Post (2004) argues that more research is necessary to fully 
assess the impact of central government influence and control on inter-local cooperation.  
In Canada, initial research suggests that municipalities under threat of 
intervention from senior levels of government will be more amenable to reaching a 
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negotiated settlement with neighbouring municipalities (Alcantara and Nelles 2009). 
However, initial research also indicates that municipalities are self-interested actors; thus, 
although central governments may regulate their behaviour, many municipalities resist 
surrendering policy or process control to central authorities. If an agreement is to be 
reached, most municipalities want to participate in the process and dictate as many terms 
of the agreement as possible. Social service downloading in Ontario provides a good 
venue to test many of these assumptions about central government regulation and 
downloading.  
The Consolidation of Municipal Services Management (CMSM) program was the 
result of provincial downloading in 1997. Implemented through the Local Service 
Realignment Act (Ontario 1998), municipalities across the province assumed increased 
responsibility for Ontario Works, child care, social housing, land ambulance and public 
health. To ensure that these services were delivered effectively and equitably, the 
province established consolidated municipal service managers and districts. In total, the 
province created 37 consolidated municipal service managers and 10 northern district 
social services administrative boards, each of which roughly aligned with previously 
existing jurisdictions.  
For many communities across the province—such as municipalities with regional 
or single-tier governments—it was clear from the onset who the CMSM would be: areas 
with an upper-tier or single tier government that would automatically assume 
responsibility for the services covered under the CMSM. However, for counties with a 
separated city, it was much less clear. Unlike other municipalities in the province, the 
government did not provide extensive guidelines for how separated cities and counties 
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would divide related costs and responsibilities. Instead, separated cities and counties were 
left to figure out their own funding and service formulas. This ambiguity led to difficult 
negotiations within each area, as municipalities struggled to find the financial resources 
to deliver CMSM services. In certain cases, separated cities and counties ended up in 
arbitration.  
This chapter aims, first, to examine the CMSM process province-wide before 
exploring how the CMSM impacted the relationship between municipalities in Guelph-
Wellington, Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe and London-Middlesex. While each region struggled 
to reach an agreement, the negotiations in Guelph and Wellington were particularly 
contentious. In fact, Guelph and Wellington found themselves in arbitration after the 
expiry of their original agreement, which, in turn, further complicated their relationship. 
This created an example that London-Middlesex and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe have sought, 
and are continuously seeking, to avoid.   
 
6.1.     The CMSM Process in Ontario 
When it first introduced the CMSM, the province allotted a significant amount of 
freedom to each region to arrange funding responsibility when multiple jurisdictions were 
involved. Additionally, the province gave municipalities flexibility in determining service 
provision, even opening the possibility for private service delivery. The implementation 
guide that the province provided to southern Ontario municipalities, simply stated that, 
“the municipal service managers will be responsible for determining, within provincial 
policies, the most effective approaches to delivering services to clients in their 
areas…some delivery functions will be carried out directly by the service system 
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manager, while others may be carried out by the service system manager and/or by non-
government providers” (Ontario 1998, 2).   
While the province offered flexibility in funding and service delivery, the 
province did prescribe a specific set of criteria for CMSM consolidation in southern 
Ontario municipalities. In regional municipalities and counties without a separated city, 
the upper-tier municipality was designated as the CMSM manager (Ontario 1998, 3). 
Counties with a population of less than 50,000—including any separated 
municipalities—would have to make arrangements to consolidate service management 
with another county or regional municipality (Ontario 1998, 3). For the third category, 
counties with one or more separated municipalities, the province provided additional 
flexibility not given to regional governments or smaller counties. For separated cities and 
counties, the province issued the following guidelines: 
In counties where there are separated cities, towns or a township, arrangements 
must be in place for either the county or one of the separated municipalities to 
manage services on behalf of the other municipalities. The same municipality will 
be the consolidated municipal services manager…The choice as to whether the 
county or one of the separated municipalities manages the services and the 
accountability arrangements among them, are to be decided locally (Ontario 1998, 
3).  
 
Thus, although the province was clear in demanding that some level of government be 
responsible for these services, but it did not specify which services nor how the funding 
arrangements within these areas ought to be established. This gave separated 
municipalities a tremendous amount of flexibility.  
 However, this flexibility caused a significant variation in service responsibility 
and funding for counties with separated towns or cities. Four main cost-sharing methods 
were utilized: actual cost, caseload, population and weighted assessment. Although there 
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is some variation in the cost-sharing methods introduced, weighted assessment is the 
most frequently used. A summary of the cost-sharing methods for each region for core 
CMSM social services is listed below, in Table 6.1: 
Table 6.1: Summary of Core CMSM Cost-Sharing43 
Region OW & Child Care Social Housing Land Ambulance 
Elgin / St. Thomas Caseload Location of Units Population 
Essex / Windsor 60% Weighted 
Assessment and 
40% Caseload 
60% Weighted 
Assessment and 
40% Caseload 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Frontenac / 
Kingston 
OW Caseload 
Admin Costs based 
on Weighted 
Assessment.  
Child Care Fee 
Subsidy and Special 
Needs based on 
Location, Wage 
Subsidy and Admin 
based on Weighted 
Assessment 
Location of Units 
and Admin Costs 
based on Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Hastings / 
Belleville, Quinte 
West 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Lanark / Smiths 
Falls 
Caseload Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Leeds and Grenville 
/ Brockville, 
Gananoque, Prescott 
50% Caseload and 
50% Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Middlesex / London Caseload Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Perth / Stratford, St. 
Mary’s 
Caseload Weighted 
Assessment 
Population 
Peterborough / 
Peterborough 
Caseload Weighted 
Assessment 
Population 
Renfrew / Pembroke OW: 80% Caseload 
and 20% Weighted 
Assessment.  
Child Care based on 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Population 
                                                 
43
 Source: Colbourne, Douglas S. Arbitration Between the Corporation of the City of Guelph and the 
Corporation of the County of Wellington. Toronto, 2010.  
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Weighted 
Assessment 
Simcoe / Barrie, 
Orillia 
OW: Caseload. 
Child Care: Based 
on Caseload where 
there is an 
Identifiable 
Recipient; otherwise 
Weighted Taxable 
Assessment.  
Child Care Admin 
based on Caseload 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Weighted 
Assessment 
Wellington / Guelph OW: Residence of 
Recipient.  
Child Care: 
Residence of 
Recipient for Fee 
Subsidy and Special 
Needs Resourcing 
and Location of 
Centre for Wage 
Subsidy. 
Prior Residence of 
Recipient  
Location of Call 
Codes 
 
 The CMSM implementation guide provides a significant amount of flexibility for 
counties with separated municipalities to determine which government is responsible for 
which services. The province indicated that it was not particularly concerned about which 
government emerged as a service manager and which government accepted responsibility 
for funding; rather, their goal was that each region had a specific framework in place. As 
previously demonstrated, the amount of flexibility gave most communities the ability to 
reach an agreement on appropriate funding formulas that best suited their local situations. 
The province did stipulate, however, that if counties with separated municipalities could 
not reach agreement, arbitration would be necessary (Ontario 1998, 5).  
The province claimed the Social Assistance Reform Act and the Services 
Improvement Act gave them the authority to designate service delivery areas and delivery 
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agents for Ontario Works, child care and social housing (Ontario 1998, 8). The 
implementation guide also notes that lower-tier municipalities would not be involved in 
these negotiations, as they would be discussed solely between the county and the 
separated municipality (Ontario 1998, 5). The arbitration process would establish one 
municipality as the service manager and create a funding schedule, after which that 
municipality would be responsible for developing its own implementation plan (Ontario 
1998, 5).  
A number of separated municipalities were unable to reach a local agreement and 
entered into the arbitration process. Each dispute centered largely on finding an 
appropriate model for cost sharing. Four counties with separated municipalities had to 
enter arbitration in order to reach a CMSM funding formula or re-negotiate an agreement: 
Windsor and Essex County, Pembroke and Renfrew County, Kingston and Frontenac 
County and, finally, Guelph and Wellington County.44 A summary of the major findings 
of each arbitration hearing is listed below, in Table. 6.2: 
Table 6.2: Comparative CMSM Arbitration Decisions45 
Parties Arbitration Decision Date 
City of Windsor, Essex 
County and Pelee Township 
OW, Child Care and Social Housing be 
apportioned between all parties based on 
a formula of 60% weighted assessment 
and 40% actual costs.  
March 9, 1999 
City of Pembroke and 
Renfrew County 
OW be apportioned between both parties 
based on a formula of 20% weighted 
assessment and 80% caseload (actual 
costs). The costs for Child Care and 
Social Housing be apportioned based on 
January 2, 
2001 
                                                 
44
 Barrie, Orillia and Simcoe County initially entered arbitration but soon after arrived at a voluntary 
arrangement. As is evidenced below, Guelph and Wellington’s arbitration had very little to do with the 
CMSM implementation itself. Guelph and Wellington are included in this table only for a comparison of 
the types of arbitration decisions delivered and the options exercised by arbitrators.  
45
 Source: Colbourne, Douglas S. Arbitration Between the Corporation of the City of Guelph and the 
Corporation of the County of Wellington. Toronto, 2010.  
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weighted assessment.  
City of Kingston and 
Frontenac County 
OW and ODSP program costs be on the 
basis of actual net program costs. OW 
and ODSP administration costs be on the 
basis of weighted assessment. The 
method for apportioning Child Care 
program costs, except the Wage Subsidy 
program, shall be on the basis of actual 
costs based on the resident location of the 
parent. Administrative costs for Child 
Care will be weighted assessment. Social 
Housing, Land Ambulance and 
Provincial Offences program costs will 
be on the basis of weighted assessment. 
July 15, 2004 
City of Guelph and 
Wellington County  
OW and ODSP be apportioned based on 
the residence of the recipient. Child Care 
be apportioned on the residence of the 
recipient for fee subsidy and special 
needs resourcing and based on the 
location of the centre for wage subsidy. 
Social Service Housing will be 
apportioned based on the prior residence 
of the tenant. Land ambulance will be 
apportioned on the bases of the location 
of call codes  
January 26, 
2010  
 
The policy areas mainly requiring arbitration were Ontario Works, Child Care and 
Social Housing. In a number of areas, land ambulance and public health were already 
apportioned. Some areas, such as Kingston and Frontenac, created initial or interim 
agreements in the wake of CMSM agreements in order to be compliant with the 
provincial legislation, but with the intention of re-negotiating a more permanent 
settlement at a later date. Furthermore, some areas were able to reach initial agreement on 
certain policy areas, but unable to agree on others. Renfrew and Pembroke, for instance, 
reached an agreement on OW and ODSP in 1997, but their inability to reach an 
agreement on Child Care and Social Housing forced them into arbitration. 
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 Given that cost sharing was at the heart of each dispute, the cities and counties’ 
respective positions brought many of the urban/rural divisions of county life to the 
surface. Below, in Table 6.3, is a summary of the assessment methods demanded by both 
the county and their accompanying separated city:  
Table 6.3: Summary of Cost Sharing Requested by Region 
Region County City 
Wellington/Guelph Actual Cost Weighted Assessment 
Frontenac/Kingston Case Load/Population Weighted Assessment 
Renfrew/Pembroke Case Load Weighted Assessment 
Essex/Windsor Actual Cost Weighted Assessment 
 
In general, the urban areas endorsed weighted assessment, while the more rural counties 
favoured either actual cost, case load or population cost sharing methods.  
In the testimony given to the arbitrators in each case, both sides explained their 
rationale for requesting their chosen cost-sharing method. The counties stated their belief 
that a disproportionate amount of people in cities used the services outlined in the 
CMSM. Social service usage, they contend, was sparse in rural areas. Furthermore, 
county officials argued that urban areas were separated from the county for a reason and 
that this uniqueness needed to be maintained, even if it involved appropriating costs for 
social services. This position was, to some degree, apparent in each arbitration case.  
Essex County viewed weighted assessment as a method of wealth redistribution 
between the county and Windsor, arguing that since both were “two separate economic 
and political decision units and it is not appropriate to redistribute wealth across them” 
(Rice 1999, 6). The county, it was maintained, was not a beneficiary of social service 
programming and that the actual cost should be utilized in order to, “avoid a windfall to 
the city and an increase in taxation in the County” (Rice 1999, 6). Similarly, Frontenac 
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County argued that it was a highly rural jurisdiction, with only 24,000 residents and no 
public water or sewer services outside of the Village of Sydenham (Rice 2004, 13). 
Furthermore, Frontenac officials argued that it had previously agreed to the absorption of 
the Township of Kingston and the Township of Pittsburgh into the City of Kingston—a 
76% loss in its assessment base—to support the desire of Frontenac municipalities to 
remain rural, thereby creating a buffer between the two areas to guard against future 
annexation (Rice 2004, 15). Seeing the two areas as sociologically similar, officials 
contended, was unreasonable since both had vastly different policy needs and demands.  
The near-unanimous position of the counties was that the bulk of those who needed 
access to the type of social services covered in the CMSM were in urban, not rural, areas. 
Since those living in the counties rarely needed access to these services, it was unfair to 
ask their taxpayers to fund such services.  
The cities disputed these claims. Windsor, for example, argued that both the city 
and the county constituted a single social and economic unit and, as such, both areas 
shared responsibility for social services (Rice 1999, 8). If the city had to bear a 
disproportionate responsibility for social services funding, Windsor argued, it would have 
to raise taxes, potentially forcing part of its population to relocate to the communities 
surrounding it, further eroding its tax base (Rice 1999, 8). Pembroke argued that it acts as 
a social service “catchment area” for a large portion of the county, provoking county 
residents in need of social services to relocate to the city in order to receive them (Allan 
2001, 2). Guelph offered a similar line of argument, stating that county residents who 
needed social services often moved to the city, largely because of the difficulty involved 
with obtaining such services in more rural areas (Colbourne 2010, 9).  
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The urban position was largely that both rural and urban areas needed to share the 
cost of service delivery. Although they conceded that most individuals requiring social 
services did reside in urban areas, they argued that rural areas still needed to contribute. 
Additionally, urban areas argued while these areas did not constitute a common political 
unit, they did constitute a common economic and social unit. Despite their formal 
separation, cities argued that the county and the city were linked in a number of ways. 
Although several testimonies tried to dispute the validity of these claims, the arbitration 
agreements favoured some degree of weighted assessment in each case, with the 
exception of the Guelph and Wellington arbitration.  
The arbitration demands in these four communities followed a predictable pattern 
and illuminated many of the divisions still present within counties with separated cities. 
Consistent with the original logic behind separating cities from their counties—that the 
two were distinct and required separate institutions—arbitration hearings presented a 
similar message: rural areas are rural and urban areas are urban. Consequently, both sides 
argued that the funding formula for social services should reflect this distinction, 
although they disagreed on what the formula should be. As a result, the argument that 
separated cities made tended to adhere very closely to the rationale for the creation of 
regional government in Ontario: although separated cities may represent a separate 
political unit, the fluidity between residents in urban and rural areas suggests that 
separated cities and their counties do constitute a single social and economic unit.  
Despite the differences in how cities and counties view their role regionally and 
as a service delivery agent, some of the arbitrators found that there was spillover on both 
sides. As a result of this fluidity between county and city residents, arbitrators found 
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linkages between rural and urban previously thought not to exist. In fact, in searching for 
services from their local governments, residents themselves no longer seem to recognize 
the formerly clear distinction between rural and urban.  
 
6.2.     The Financial Impact of the CMSM 
 The 1990s were a turbulent decade for municipal finances. This decade not only 
saw the implementation of the CMSM but, as Siegel (2009) describes, municipalities also 
experienced a decline in transfer payments, largely because of the Harris government’s 
goal to increase municipal self-reliance by reducing  dependence on provincial transfers 
(51). To offset some of this financial strain, education costs were partially uploaded by 
the province, allowing municipalities to use the tax room vacated by school boards. In the 
early 1990s, more than half of the total property tax collected went to school boards 
(Siegel 2009, 52). By 1998, school boards were no longer reliant on funding from 
property tax (Siegel 2009, 52).  
 Despite the increased taxation space given to municipalities, municipalities did 
not receive the CMSM warmly. Siegel (2009) found that costs for social services 
ballooned in the early 1990s because of poor economic conditions. When the economy 
gained strength, social assistance expenditures decreased. Because of this volatility, 
municipal officials found it hard to budget for social services, creating some resentment 
towards the province’s decision to download this policy area.  
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 The CMSM policy areas consume a significant amount of municipal budgets. 
Chart 6.1, presented below, lists 2010 municipal expenses in the province:46 
Chart 6.1: Municipal Expenses in Ontario 
 
As evidenced in the chart above, social services and public housing command nearly $9 
billion a year from municipalities, rivaled only from transportation services (which 
encompasses roads and transit), protection services (which includes fire, police and 
EMS), and environmental services (which includes water and sewage). Since social 
services consume a vast portion of municipal budgets, the province has provided a great 
                                                 
46
 Data for the chart below was gained from the Financial Information Return provided by the Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing 
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deal of transfers for social services, largely as a result of the McGuinty government’s 
commitment to upload many of the social service costs previously downloaded by the 
Harris government. Similarly, these provincial transfers have also increased over time. 
Chart 6.2, below, shows the same municipal expenses presented above, but subtracts 
provincial and federal transfers from the original cost: 
Chart 6.2: Municipal Expenses After the Federal and Provincial Transfers 
 
 
With provincial transfers included, social services and public housing account for 
approximately $4 billion, nearly half of the unadjusted expense. Originally, without 
transfers, social services and public housing accounted for 24.47 percent of municipal 
budgets. However, with the inclusion of transfers, this figure drops to 12.39 percent.  
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 Despite transfer payments heavily subsidizing social services, most officials 
interviewed for this project described their resentment in having to fund the service.  
The volatility aspect that Siegel touched upon is perhaps one component, but the primary 
factor is likely over the division in the concept of social services themselves. Many 
officials fundamentally believe that social services are “urban”, not “rural”. 
Consequently, many rural respondents believe that they do not have a responsibility to 
fund “city services”, while many urban respondents believe that the responsibility is 
mutual.  
 Many of these feelings emerged during the previously described arbitration 
process. While rural areas largely see social service delivery as an urban responsibility, 
the arbitration process itself found linkages between both areas, namely in the migration 
of social service users from separated cities to counties and vice versa. Despite the 
arbitrations’ finding that many social service users do exist in rural areas, many rural 
politicians continue to hold the belief that those utilizing social services are 
predominantly urban. 
 While the province did re-organize taxation space for municipalities with the 
introduction of the CMSM and increase subsidization through transfer payments, 
municipalities still have deep concerns about funding social services. In the following 
section, I continue examining the impact of CMSM downloading in Barrie-Orillia-
Simcoe, Guelph-Wellington and London-Middlesex. In each, the process to reach, 
maintain and re-negotiate agreements have been fraught with challenges.  
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6.3.     The CMSM Process in Guelph, London and Barrie/Orillia 
 Of the thirteen counties with a separated city, only four have entered arbitration. 
Although examining each side’s arguments during the arbitration process, along with the 
province-wide financial impact of social services delivery, has offered some insight into 
the CMSM implementation process, gaining a true sense of how the CMSM affected 
Ontario’s separated cities and counties is necessary to explore how CMSM agreements 
were developed, how both partners view social service delivery once an agreement is 
reached and the long-term effects of provincial policy downloading on cooperation. 
Below, I explore the CMSM process in Guelph-Wellington, London-Middlesex and 
Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe.  
Guelph-Wellington represents an unusual case because they previously had, for 
many years, a cost-sharing agreement of some locally delivered social services. 
Consequently, when the Local Services Realignment Act was first introduced, reaching an 
initial CMSM agreement was relatively easy. The City of Guelph, however, formally 
advised the county in February 2008 that they intended to terminate this initial agreement 
(Colbourne 2010, 2).47 Unable to reach a consensus, both parties entered arbitration in 
2010 (Colbourne 2010, 2).  
Guelph and Wellington County have a long history of cooperation on social 
services. The first agreement between the two regarding social services was first struck in 
1969. Within the agreement, the county was established as the administration and 
                                                 
47
 Despite the notice to terminate, the social services committee continued to meet. The minutes from the 
February meeting of the social services committee indicate that both parties continued to discuss matters 
relating to CMSM services. There was only one in camera session during the February meeting, but the 
minutes indicate that the this was used to discuss a land transfer issue on the city’s behalf.  
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delivery agent for general welfare services. The agreement created a six-member 
Wellington County Welfare Committee that had equal representation from the city and 
county and was responsible for setting local policy and direction (County of Wellington 
1969, 1). This agreement states that all costs for welfare services would be, “charged 
back directly to the municipality responsible” (County of Wellington 1969, 2). The city 
and county would split the administrative costs based on a percentage of the costs 
incurred for welfare distribution in each municipality during the previous year (County of 
Wellington 1969, 2).  
This arrangement continued until 1983, at which time a new agreement was 
reached. The 1983 agreement kept many of the main components of the 1969 agreement 
with only minor alterations. The Wellington County Welfare Committee remained in 
place but was enlarged to eight members, with the mayor of Guelph and the warden of 
the county now serving on the committee along with the three councilors from each area 
as specified by the 1969 agreement (County of Wellington 1983, 2). The cost-sharing 
structure remained similar, with the agreement outlining that, “costs shall be charged to 
the party in whose municipality the recipient of such social services resides” (County of 
Wellington 1983, 1).  
The 1983 agreement remained in place until 1995 when it was again re-
negotiated. In the revised agreement, the costs for assistance were now charged to the 
municipality in which the recipient resided (County of Wellington 1995, 1). 
Administration costs were charged to each municipality as a percentage of their 
contribution towards assistance for that year (County of Wellington 1995, 1). A 1998 
document entitled “Consolidation Arrangements” laid out the division of costs for the 
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services covered in the 1997 CMSM implementation arrangement. This arrangement 
utilized a number of cost sharing methods: Ontario works would be apportioned based on 
the residence of recipients, Child Care would be based on the location of each centre, 
land ambulance would be based on population and Social Housing would be funded 75 
percent by the city and 25 percent by the county (Colbourne 2010, 4).   
As per the agreement, the city and county joined together to form a social services 
committee with equal representation. The warden and mayor each sat on the committee, 
along with three representatives from their councils, equating to four representatives from 
each jurisdiction. Those chosen to sit on the social services committee in the lead up to 
the 2008 termination of the CMSM agreement and the 2010 arbitration had a number of 
personal conflicts, which some respondents suggested continued outside of the scope of 
the committee.48 One current Guelph city councilor noted that, “my recollection from the 
first meeting was that there was a problem there, people didn’t like each other, there was 
no discussion…there was obviously something that was ready to ignite” (Personal 
Interview – May 2, 2012). Additionally, Guelph’s representatives were not reporting the 
committee’s work back to council, leaving many of Guelph’s council members and staff 
unaware about the current state of social services delivery and funding, reports a county 
official (Personal Interview – April 26, 2012).  
Guelph proposed a revision of the 1998 agreement’s terms, suggesting that 
weighted assessment be used as the basis of apportioning both social services and land 
ambulance costs (Colbourne 2010, 5). Some of Guelph’s councilors and representatives 
                                                 
48
 According to minutes from the social services committee, those appointed to the committee during this 
period were County Warden Joanne Ross-Zuj, County Councilors Gord Tosh, Barb McKay and Brad 
Whitcombe, Mayor Karen Farbridge and City Councilors Bob Bell, Maggie Laidlaw and Leanne Piper. 
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on the social services committee felt that the county was not concerned about some social 
service issues that were unique to the city, such as homelessness. A current Guelph 
councilor argues that the situation came to a head when the county refused to continue 
funding to the “ChangeNow Youth Centre”, which provided services for homeless and 
at-risk young people in Guelph (Persona Interview – May 10, 2012). Guelph councilors 
interviewed for this project contend that the county refused to fund the organization 
because it was not considered to be a county problem, thereby encouraging the city’s 
belief that both jurisdictions were too divergent to agree on many social service issues 
(Personal Interview – May 10, 2012). Some councilors and staff believe the time was 
now right to “test the model” (Personal Interview – May 10, 2012).  
Nevertheless, reaching the decision to go into arbitration was long. A city 
councilor reports that in early 2008 senior city staff began requesting meetings with 
councilors prior to service committee meetings in order to direct Guelph’s councilors 
how to vote on certain items (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012). Councilors were told 
that county administrators and politicians—tasked to administer many of the services 
covered under the CMSM agreement—did not fully understand Guelph’s position on 
many CMSM funding areas and, as a result, could no longer be trusted to competently 
deliver social services to Guelph’s residents (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012).  
Some city councilors on the committee began seeking out information on voting 
matters from other sources, even going so far as to avoid city staff and request 
information directly from county staff (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012). Additionally, 
one city councilor notes that staff began directing councilors to vote against county 
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positions, with certain councilors feeling that they were not being given enough 
information to support the CAO’s position (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012).  
Eventually, Guelph’s CAO, Hans Loewig, and Lois Payne, Director of Legal 
Services, made a case for arbitration to city councilors. Both staff members argued that 
Guelph could win if they pursued legal action and receive a much more favourable 
funding arrangement that would prevent the expected financial shortfalls in upcoming 
years. Both Loewig and Payne were confident about the city’s chances in arbitration. One 
former councilor argued that, “it was presented to us as being a strong case” (Personal 
Interview – May 2, 2012), while another current councilor stated that both staff members 
were convinced that the case was a “slam dunk” and the chances of losing were, at best, 
slim (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012). In fact, a former councilor reports that city staff 
even argued that any outcome would likely be more favourable than the current funding 
arrangement, with staff commenting that, “we have nothing to lose here” (Personal 
Interview – May 2, 2012).  
When councilors questioned the city’s position, they were reassured that the city 
had both the resources to win and a track record of success. Before entering arbitration 
with Wellington County, Guelph had previously won a legal judgment in which 
SUBBOR (Super Blue Box Recycling Corporation) unsuccessfully sued the city for 
breach of contract (City of Guelph 2009).49 With the recent court victory, municipal staff 
touted the success of the city’s legal department and promised city councilors that similar 
                                                 
49
 SUBBOR, and its parent company Eastern Power Limited, originally sued the City of Guelph in 2003. 
The company launched a $32 million breach of contract motion against the city in relation to the 
construction and operation of an organic waste processing facility. In 2007, the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice dismissed SUBBOR’s claim and awarded full costs to the city. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
subsequently upheld the Superior Court’s decision. In 2009, SUBBOR and Guelph reached a settlement 
agreement in which SUBBOR agreed to pay Guelph $2.5 million in legal costs in installments.  
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success could be achieved if they took the county to arbitration (Personal Interview – 
May 2, 2012). A former Guelph councilor argued that some councilors remained 
skeptical, noting that the city’s solicitor, Lois Payne, had contracted the SUBBOR case 
out to a Toronto law firm, but intended to complete this arbitration in Guelph using only 
the city’s legal team (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012).50 Throughout much of the 
process, certain city councilors expressed feeling uninformed about the proceedings, with 
one councilor commenting that, “I thought we had little objective information on why we 
were going to arbitration” (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012).  
Once arbitration was filed, Guelph pulled its representatives from the social 
services committee, despite the fact that the agreements remained in force until the 
arbitrator’s decision.51 Guelph provided no notice prior to removing its representatives; 
rather, Guelph’s full delegation simply stopped attending.52 While there is little public 
record of Guelph’s decision-making process in removing its representatives, respondents 
provided two main arguments justifying their decision to walk away from the 
committee.53 First, councilors believed that—aside from receiving staff reports—little 
was accomplished during committee meetings (Personal Interview – May 10, 2012). 
Second, they believed that the proportion of representatives afforded to Guelph was too 
low. As the jurisdiction with the higher population and, they believed, a higher 
                                                 
50
 Respondents noted that city staff received little blame after the arbitration award was made. However, 
Guelph’s Director of Legal Services, Lois Payne, left her position soon after Guelph lost its arbitration case 
with the county. Most blamed the arbitrator for the judgment..  
51
 The last social services committee meeting that Guelph’s full delegation attended was January 13, 2010.  
52
 Ward 1 Guelph Councilor Bob Bell, a city appointee to the committee, continued to attend the March 
and April 2010 social services committee meetings, but was not recognized as a voting member. His 
presence was noted in the minutes, however. He was excluded from an in camera session at the March 17 
meeting that discussed the subject of potential litigation with the city.  
53
 Guelph’s arbitration with the county and the joint social services committee was discussed in-camera at 
the December 15 and December 21, 2009 city council meetings. 
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percentage of social services users, Guelph wanted more representation (Personal 
Interview – May 17, 2012).  
The city also disbanded the land ambulance committee, which county officials 
argue left them without information on land ambulance response or dispatch rates for 
nearly 18 months (Personal Interview – April 26, 2012).54 Much like the social services 
committee, Guelph councilors contend that the committee was not effective and dealt 
mostly with receiving staff reports (Personal Interview – May 10, 2012). City officials 
also contend that the committee was becoming too politicized and was routinely 
cancelled because there were so few agenda items, leading to the belief that land 
ambulance—as a policy area—did not require a stand-alone committee (Personal 
Interview – May 10, 2012).55 Once disbanded, the city combined the work of the land 
ambulance committee with the Emergency Services, Community Services and Operations 
Committee, without county representation.56 County representatives contend that they 
were forced to attend Guelph city council meetings as observers, merely hoping to pose 
questions to councilors about ambulance service (Personal Interview – May 10, 2012).57 
                                                 
54
 The last meeting of the Land Ambulance Committee occurred on October 9, 2009. No mention of the 
committee disbanding was mentioned in the minutes for the meeting and the next meeting was scheduled 
for October 14, 2009. Respondents indicate that the committee was informally shut down before the 
scheduled October meeting, with Guelph removing the committee’s members from the committee.  
55
 Records from the now-disbanded committee indicate that only one meeting was officially cancelled 
between 2007 and 2009. Although there are no records of minutes and agendas for seven months,,there is 
no officially documented reason why the committee did not meet that month. 
56
 In 2010, this committee was disbanded again and the work was shifted to the Corporate Administration, 
Finance and Emergency Services Committee. The first meeting of the Emergency Services, Community 
Services and Operations Committee after the Land Ambulance Committee was disbanded makes no 
mention of the former committee no longer being in operation. Guelph’s City Clerk confirms that the work 
of the Land Ambulance Committee was added to the Emergency Services, Community Services and 
Operations committee.  
57
 Officials from Erin were particularly concerned about ambulance response times to their community 
because the township did not have an ambulance station and there were unofficial reports that Guelph 
response times ranged upwards of 45 minutes. Lou Maieron, then the County of Wellington councilor for 
Erin, made a presentation to Guelph council on December 8, 2009, where he again raised the issue of 
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Conversely, city officials argue that much of the work of updating the county on the 
committee’s decisions was performed by city staff who liaised with county staff after 
each meeting (Personal Interview – May 17, 2012).  
The decision to sever committee-level ties with the county and disband the land 
ambulance committee was put forward by staff and endorsed by Guelph council, despite 
objections that dissolving the committee and shifting it to an internal city committee 
would severely limit the county’s input into how ambulance services were delivered 
within the region (Tracey 2010c). County officials note that they have, on a number of 
occasions, invited the city back to the social services committee, although they have yet 
to rejoin (Personal Interview – April 16, 2012). A number of respondents from the city 
contend that they are not prepared to return to the social services committee until there is 
a change in the committee’s composition (Personal Interview – May 17, 2012). Namely, 
they demand that they receive proportional representation determined by population size, 
which would give them with a voting majority on the committee (Personal Interview – 
May 17, 2012). Nevertheless, the county remains unwilling to adjust the committee to 
meet these representation standards.   
In the absence of city representation on the committee, Guelph has sent staff to 
certain social services committee meetings.58 County respondents note that the city staff 
who do occasionally attend rarely speak during the meeting; rather, they tend to receive 
updates and offer feedback following the conclusion of the formal meeting (Personal 
                                                                                                                                                 
response times, arguing that Erin taxpayers were not receiving adequate service for the nearly $400,000 in 
tax they are paying to Guelph EMS. Officials from Erin also met privately with the Mayor of Guelph and 
raised their concerns with the province.  
58
 Agenda minutes note that Todd Salter (Manager of Policy Planning and Urban Design) and Karen 
Kawakami (Social Services Policy and Programme Advisor) are the two Guelph employees that generally 
attend the social services committee on behalf of the city.  
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Interview – April 26, 2012). In some cases, county warden Chris White and Councilor 
Gordon Tosh, chair of the social services committee, attend city council meetings in 
order to give committee updates to the Guelph city council (City of Guelph 2011[b]).  
Once in arbitration, the county argued that actual cost be used as the basis for 
apportioning social services, while the cost of land ambulance be divided based on the 
call’s location (Colbourne 2010, 5). Ultimately, the arguments advanced by both sides 
can be reduced to a fundamental distinction between urban and rural. The city claimed 
that it acts as a hub for rural residents, both economically and socially; consequently, 
when rural residents need social services, the city provides them. Conversely, the county 
argued that sharing the costs for social services over the entire county would place a 
disproportionate burden on rural residents who do not utilize social services on the same 
scale as urban residents.  
Guelph officials based their argument around the ideological belief that the city is 
a central facet of county life. County residents, they argued, come to the city for a variety 
of reasons, including work, shopping and entertainment. Additionally, officials from the 
city argued that rural residents migrate to the city in order to receive social services. 
Planner Lynne Gough primarily advanced this argument, arguing that “many Wellington 
County residents who need social services or social housing are likely compelled to move 
to Guelph to obtain such services” (2009, 19). Guelph and the county, particularly in 
southern portions of the county, have a strong connection to each other. Furthermore, as 
the range of income levels within the county and the city demonstrate, residents requiring 
social services reside throughout all areas of the county (Gough 2009, 20).  
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The county attempted to counter this argument by demonstrating the strength of 
the county’s connections to other surrounding areas. Wellington County’s oddly shaped 
territory borders ten other counties, regional governments and single-tier municipalities 
wherein many county residents live and worked (Colbourne 2010, 14). This connection is 
particularly evident in the Waterloo Region, which, the county argued, constitutes the 
single largest destination for those seeking employment and commerce outside of the 
county, particularly for northern residents (Colbourne 2010, 14). The county also 
attempted to discredit the notion that Wellington residents moved to the city in order to 
utilize social services by arguing that this migration was negligible. In fact, the county 
noted that between 2003 and 2009, only 229 Ontario Works clients moved from 
Wellington to Guelph, while 231 clients moved from Guelph to Wellington (Colbourne 
2010, 16). 
Furthermore, the county argued that the majority of social services recipients (71 
percent) reside in Guelph, while only a minority (13 percent) reside in Wellington County 
(Colbourne 2010, 17). In addition, the majority of new immigrants and university-aged 
families—likely to have more need for social services—tend to reside in Guelph rather 
than the county (Colbourne 2010, 20). Because of this disparity, the county argued, 
moving to a cost-sharing method, such as weighted assessment, would apply an undue 
financial burden on rural residents of Wellington County. Moreover, a system of 
weighted assessment “would represent a punitive measure whereby the County of 
Wellington is required to pay for costs which occur outside of its jurisdiction and for 
which county residents receive no material benefit” (Colbourne 2010, 22). Finally, the 
county concluded by arguing that, “fairness is accomplished in that the jurisdiction that 
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consumed the services should pay for them and would not be accomplished if one is 
required to pay for costs used by the other municipality” (Colbourne 2010, 22).  
Ultimately, the arbitrator assigned to the dispute, Douglas Colbourne, ruled in 
favour of the county. Colborne dismissed Guelph’s fundamental argument that 
Wellington residents moved from the county to the city in order to access social services. 
In fact, he argued that, “the migration suggested by the City of County residents for 
social services purposes does not exist…spillovers both ways are minimal and balanced“ 
(Colbourne 2010, 34). Colbourne also found that the county’s connections to outlying 
areas, such as Waterloo and Hamilton, are as strong as the county’s connection to Guelph 
(2010, 34). Based on his findings, Colbourne sided with the county and created an 
arrangement that did not include weighted assessment. Instead, Ontario Works and 
Ontario Disability Support Programme funding would be apportioned based on the 
residence of the recipient (Colbourne 2010, 35). Similarly, Child Care fee subsidy and 
special needs resourcing would also be apportioned based on the residence of the 
recipient, while Child Care wage subsidies would be based on the location of the centre 
(Colbourne 2010, 35). Finally, Social Housing would be based on the prior residence of 
the tenant, while land ambulance would be apportioned based on the locations of the call 
code (Colbourne 2010, 35). Since Colbourne’s ruling was final, the decision had a 
negative effect on cooperation between Guelph and Wellington County.  
London and Middlesex signed their most recent CMSM agreement for social 
housing, Ontario Works and Child Care, in 2002 and their land ambulance agreement in 
2006. The city and the county also established a joint management board to monitor 
administration, with equal representation between the city and county (City of London 
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and Middlesex County 2002). The agreement called for the expenditures associated with 
Ontario Works and child care to be apportioned based on caseload, establishing 
Middlesex as the service delivery agent (City of London and Middlesex County 2002). 
Social housing costs would be apportioned based on weighted assessment (City of 
London and Middlesex County 2002). Similarly, land ambulance would also be 
apportioned based on weighted assessment (City of London and Middlesex County 
2006). The CMSM agreement for Ontario Works, child care and social housing expired 
on December 31, 2004 and was not renewed, while the land ambulance agreement 
expired on December 31, 2011.  
 Officials from London and Middlesex County have discussed how to revise the 
CMSM agreement since early 2011. Since discussions are still ongoing, neither city nor 
county officials are willing to provide details on negotiations. However, county staff 
indicate that they hope to change the funding formula under which the original CMSM 
agreement was negotiated.59 One senior county staff member states that, “there has been 
some external influences where Guelph and Wellington have had a different 
measurement of cost and there have been some arbitrated decisions around us around cost 
and so all we’re doing is looking at those other decisions and rethinking our original 
decisions—which are thirteen years old—and saying ‘does this make sense, does this 
model of financial responsibility still make sense now that we have a decade of 
experience?’” (Personal Interview – March 2, 2012). Although officials will not specify 
the exact funding aspects under contention, some suggest that they would like to see the 
                                                 
59
 I conducted interviews in London in February and March of 2012, during which time, negotiations were 
ongoing and no resolution had yet been reached.  
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agreements move away from weighted assessment, which—from the county’s 
perspective—is the most unfavorable funding arrangement.  
 However, county officials did provide one example of a service they would like to 
amend: land ambulance. County officials contend that when the original agreements were 
signed, neither the county nor the city had any data on call volume, and were thereby 
unable to determine an equitable cost sharing formula for this service (Personal Interview 
– March 2, 2012). Now with a decade of data, the county would like to reach a funding 
agreement that is more “fair” from their perspective, in which the city takes on a larger 
financial burden. County officials point to the decade long tenure of the original 
agreements as rationale for their requests to revise the agreements: times change, councils 
change and, perhaps most importantly, the populations who utilize the contested services 
also change.  
Unlike other jurisdictions, CMSM funding has not been a major point of 
contention in Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe. The original CMSM agreements were signed with 
very little disagreement and have subsequently been renewed only once, largely without 
incident. The agreements are now expired and are currently being re-negotiated. While 
Barrie and Orillia do have some criticisms of the way that current agreements are funded 
and carried out by the county—the designated service manager—neither city has any 
immediate plans to take the county to arbitration or force a resolution on the issue.  
 Those involved in the original CMSM negotiations of 1998 note that Barrie-
Orillia-Simcoe easily reached a consensus. A former county warden notes that neither 
Barrie nor Orillia had significant concerns regarding funding, and the only point of 
contention came when Barrie insisted that it be designated as the service delivery agent 
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for Ontario Works and land ambulance (Personal Interview – June 5, 2012). Although 
Barrie believed that it was best suited to deliver both services, the county objected, noting 
that it had been responsible for the delivery of these social services prior to the CMSM 
mandate and that it had the necessary staff and infrastructure in place to continue 
(Personal Interview – June 5, 2012). After several weeks of negotiation, the province 
mandated that the county remain the designated service provider.  
 Simcoe County, Barrie and Orillia signed the original agreement in 1999,  
establishing Simcoe County’s role as the region’s delivery agent. The funding for social 
assistance programs and child care would be apportioned based on case load, while the 
costs for social housing were apportioned based weighted assessment. The city and the 
county split administration costs equally on a monthly basis. To manage social service 
delivery, the agreement also created two committees: the social and children’s services 
committee and the staff liaison committee.  
 In the 2009 agreement, costs for social assistance programs—namely ODSP and 
Ontario Works—were apportioned based on a mix of actual costs and weighted 
assessment (65 percent caseload and 35 percent weighted assessment), while social 
housing, paramedic services and long-term care were apportioned based on weighted 
assessment. In addition, each jurisdiction was responsible for a share of the 
administration costs incurred by Simcoe County as the delivery agent, including the 
departmental costs of the CAO and Clerk, customer service, Human Resources, 
communications, finance, purchasing, fleet and property maintenance, interest costs and 
information technology. The agreement expired on December 31, 2010.  
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 In summary, all three regions—London-Middlesex, Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe and 
Guelph-Wellington—were initially able to negotiate agreements for CMSM services. 
However, when the terms of this agreement became untenable for Guelph, the city 
initiated a long and costly process toward arbitration. Although London-Middlesex and 
Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe have raised some concerns about the implementation of CMSM 
agreements, these regions have largely avoided arbitration because they hope to avoid the 
aftermath of Guelph’s arbitration.  
 
6.4.     The Impact on Cooperation 
Although negotiating CMSM agreements was a painful process in many 
communities, none were more contentious than in Guelph. The length, cost and 
unfavourable outcome of the arbitration process encouraged London-Middlesex and 
Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe to reach negotiated agreements shortly after the CMSM’s 
introduction. Now that these original agreements have expired, both communities have 
entered a phase of re-negotiation in attempt to arrive at more favourable terms than 
previously included in the original agreement. 
The arbitration process badly hurt relations in both Guelph and Wellington 
County. Guelph received a less than favourable outcome and, as a result, many councilors 
feel that they are now in a worse financial position because of it (Primary Interview – 
May 2, 2012). From the county’s perspective, many Wellington officials feel that the 
process violated their trust in the city. The county was required to provide the arbitrator 
with a litany of information, some of which they felt was irrelevant to the arbitration. One 
county official close to the process noted that, “it’s not a pleasant thing to go through 
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when you are being totally audited…a lot of hard feelings come out of that when 
someone wants to do a total investigative search on what you are doing” (Personal 
Interview – April 16, 2012). Some county politicians also felt that their social services 
administrative staff were unfairly attacked, targeted throughout the process and unduly 
made to defend their actions. As a result, the CMSM arbitration set the tone for the future 
relationship between both areas with one county official summed up the arbitration 
process by stating that, “no one comes through that process without any scars” (Primary 
Interview – April 16, 2012).  
Traditionally, Guelph and Wellington County have enjoyed a strong relationship. 
Officials with long histories in local politics report that both areas have traditionally had a 
positive relationship with each other, with one county official arguing that, “15 years ago 
we had one of the most enviable city county relationships in the province” (Primary 
Interview – April 26, 2012). In a report in the Guelph Mercury about the city’s 
relationship with the county, former Guelph mayor Norman Jary confirmed that the 
relationship between both municipalities was formerly quite pleasant. Serving as mayor 
from 1970 to 1985, Jary argued that the city and the council had a very strong 
relationship during this period of time: “there was a tremendous co-operative relationship 
between the city and the county back then…it wasn’t just mutual respect but a very, very 
strong friendship” (Tracey 2010[c]). Veteran county councilor Carl Hall, of Mapleton, 
agrees, telling the Guelph Mercury in a 2010 interview that, “we used to have basically 
parties back and forth…they took us to the Storm game when the arena just opened, it 
was just social” (Halfnight 2010). The CMSM arbitration process tested and eventually 
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strained this relationship, as officials from both sides gradually became distrustful of each 
other.  
The ICA framework states that social capital and interaction generally build 
strong relationships and makes cooperation easier to achieve. In Guelph, there is evidence 
of a consistent set of positive interaction; however, the introduction of the CMSM 
quickly destroyed any good will that previously existed between Guelph and Wellington 
County, causing an abrupt change in their relationship. Central government regulation 
here seems to have displaced the effect of social capital—or, at the very least, 
significantly weakened it.  
 The Guelph experience informs the tactics that London and Middlesex County 
used in their own negotiations. Middlesex County, in searching for an equitable funding 
arrangement, believe that they have a good case for changing the funding formula. In 
early May 2012, the county gave the city a May 22 deadline to agree to pay an additional 
$2.37 million a year for social housing (Sher 2012). The county also indicated to the city 
that they wanted a new formula for land ambulance service (Sher 2012). If the demands 
were not met, the county indicated that it would seek an arbitrated agreement (Sher 
2012). London mayor Joe Fontana rejected the May 22 deadline, insisting that city and 
county administrators would be able to reach a negotiated settlement (Martin 2012). 
Fontana was optimistic, commenting that, “at the end of the day we are going to come to 
an agreement…I’m confident our great relationship will continue” (Martin 2012). During 
this period, the city’s finance and administration committee also directed Fontana to 
request the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing to discontinue London’s $1 
 211 
million annual contribution to county roads—a lasting vestige of the 1993 annexation 
agreement (Martin 2012).  
County officials note that they have previously avoided arbitration and will 
continue to avoid arbitration for as long as they are able. Furthermore, the county warden 
argues that although he had the option to pursue arbitration in early 2011, he passed on 
the opportunity so as not to disrupt the county’s relationship with London (Personal 
Interview – March 2, 2012). However, while the county would prefer to reach a 
negotiated settlement, arbitration may ultimately become necessary.  
 Middlesex County officials contend that Guelph and Wellington sought out 
arbitration too quickly. Since this ultimately hurt the relationship between the city and the 
county, they hope to avoid this situation locally. Additionally, county officials argue that 
the resolution was “hard on Guelph”, hurting Guelph taxpayers because it did not create a 
balanced settlement wherein the city and the county both received an equitable funding 
formula (Personal Interview – March 2, 2012). Consequently, Middlesex County officials 
fear that an arbitrated settlement may similarly place an undue financial burden on the 
city (Personal Interview – March 2, 2012).  
Like London-Middlesex, both Barrie and Orillia have concerns about the current 
delivery and reporting of social services from the county. Some officials in Orillia believe 
county social services staff are misleading city council, resulting in inadequate reporting 
to the separated cities (Personal Interview – May 30, 2012). Specifically, Orillia officials 
state that they do not have timely access to figures regarding social services usage and 
emergency call rates, which inevitably affect the level of contribution mutually required 
of them (Personal Interview – May 20, 2012). Furthermore, both Barrie and Orillia argue 
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that they do not have enough access to information about residents in long-term care 
facilities. While the county claims that the names and addresses of long-term care 
residents is protected under privacy legislation, officials from both cities believe that this 
limits their ability to determine the location of residents, and correspondingly, the 
funding responsibility (Personal Interview - May 20, 2012). Similarly, some City of 
Barrie councilors have concerns about the placement and quality of social housing within 
the city (Primary Interview – June 1, 2012).  
 Overall, officials from both cities believe that the funding formula for social 
service delivery needs to be changed from the current case-load funding formula. 
Specifically, councilors from both areas are advocating that the formula should be 
changed to weighted assessment (Personal Interview – June 14, 2012). The primary 
source of this concern involves funding for long-term care facilities. Barrie officials 
contend that they spend more than one million dollars a year for only thirteen Barrie 
residents who reside in county long-term care facilities (Personal Interview – June 14, 
2012). City officials call this funding arrangement “goofy”, arguing that the county’s 
facilities are too far from Barrie and Orillia to attract to city residents (Personal Interview 
– June 14, 2012). Informally, officials from both Barrie and Orillia have discussed 
opening smaller long-term care homes in their own jurisdictions to avoid having the 
county continue as their service manager for long-term care (Personal Interview – May 
30, 2012).60  
                                                 
60
 Ontario’s Long Term Care Act (Bill 140), and its predecessor the Homes for the Aged and Rest Homes 
Act, mandates all single tier or multi-tier municipalities to establish and maintain a municipal home for the 
aged or to enter into an agreement with another municipality to maintain such a facility.   
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Orillia city staff also believe that the overhead costs of social services delivery are 
too high; furthermore, they contend that there are some inefficiencies with the county’s 
operations which inevitably increase the city’s contribution (Personal Interview – May 
30, 2012).61 The lack of available costing information also causes some concern amongst 
city officials, with some believing that there is a degree of mismanagement on the 
county’s part.  
 One additional concern for both Barrie and Orillia officials is the composition of 
the human services committee. The human services committee is a county committee and 
reports to Simcoe county council. Orillia is afforded three representatives on the 
committee while Barrie has four. The committee, however, has eleven members from the 
county, which effectively outnumbers the separated cities. Officials from Barrie and 
Orillia contend that the committee should use a representation by population principle, 
which would provide the separated cities, particularly Barrie, with more representatives 
(Personal Interview – May 30, 2012). In fact, some representatives on the committee 
from Orillia report that they have stopped reading the committee’s briefing notes because 
of their belief that, “they’re [the county] going to do whatever they want to do anyways” 
(Personal Interview – June 1, 2012).  
Due to this disparity, Barrie did not participate on the human services committee 
for several years. In fact, following several years in which Barrie did not appoint 
representatives at all, Barrie council has only recently resumed appointing representatives 
to the committee. Barrie officials maintain that they have consistently told the county that 
                                                 
61
 As one example, Orillia officials cite the county’s significant upgrade of its IT equipment as an overhead 
cost that it believes it should not have been responsible for.  
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they would not appoint members to the Human Services Committee because 
councilors—too engaged with their own committees—did not have time for committee 
work outside of their municipality (Personal Interview – June 8, 2012). One Barrie 
official noted that, “it just wasn’t enough of priority” to fill the city’s seats on the Human 
Services Committee (Personal Interview – June 14, 2012).62 Accordingly, county 
officials have made several attempts to bring them back to the committee, even offering 
to increase the representatives’ pay in order to financially entice members to attend 
(Personal Interview – June 8, 2012).63  
Barrie officials contend that the difficulty in attending meetings is not fiscally 
motivated but due to scheduling conflicts (Personal Interview – June 14, 2012). Barrie 
has part-time councilors, many of whom have full-time jobs. Since the county’s human 
services committee meets during daytime office hours, many Barrie councilors report that 
they are unable to attend (Personal Interview – June 14, 2012). However, Barrie’s 
representatives do acknowledge the need to ensure that they have representation on the 
committee, with one city official arguing that, “it’s actually been a bit of an issue for us. 
We have four seats and there is often only one filled…it doesn’t send a great message” 
(Personal Interview – June 14, 2012). The composition of the human services committee 
is not under dispute and, most likely, will not be changed once a new agreement is in 
place.  
                                                 
62
 Mayor Lehman has tried to ensure that Barrie’s seats on the committee have been filled during his 
tenure, even taking one of the seats himself to show the county that the city is interested in the social 
services process and their relationship.  
63
 Barrie has a policy that states that the city will not offer honorariums for committee work. One city 
official notes that even if they did, increased pay would not be enough to incentivize the committee work, 
as “the monetary incentive isn’t all that great…you have to go for the right reasons” (Personal Interview – 
June 14, 2012).  
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Encouragingly, the two cities are working together to solve many of these points 
of contention. Staff handles much of this work since both cities meet separately from the 
county to discuss strategy and compile an ideal set of changes for inclusion in the next set 
of agreements. Although the current agreements have expired, two clauses ensure that the 
terms of the agreement remain in effect until a new agreement is agreed upon. The latest 
renewal took approximately two years to complete and officials from Barrie and Orillia 
cities believe that Simcoe county is “not really anxious” to renegotiate it, particularly 
because they know the new agreement will include significant revisions (Personal 
Interview – May 30, 2012). However, Barrie and Orillia officials view these delays as 
unacceptable (Personal Interview – May 30, 2012). Nevertheless, they have not yet 
formally discussed arbitration. In fact, officials from both cities do not expect that 
arbitration will be necessary to reach a new agreement, ensuring that many of the 
tensions that rose to the surface in Guelph may be avoided here.  
  
6.5.     Conclusion 
 When confronted with the CMSM, separated cities and counties were forced to 
cooperate on an expensive, complex policy item to find an equitable solution. The 
CMSM tested the strength of the relationship between Ontario’s separated cities and 
counties. Municipalities that once enjoyed a cordial relationship—such as Guelph and 
Wellington County—now found themselves in a tense standoff over social service 
costing. Other municipalities attempted to avoid this situation through careful negotiation 
and patience with their partners.  
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 ICA research into state regulation and policy mandates are, thus far, relatively 
inconclusive. Some research (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Krueger and Bernick 2010) 
shows promise in connecting state regulation to a decreasing likelihood of cooperation. 
ICA scholars link this effect to the “unusual pressures” that municipalities feel when 
experiencing greater state regulation and policy mandates (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991, 
134). These pressures, coupled with the uncertainty of not knowing the state of future 
regulation, can harm the prospects of cooperation. Post (2004), however, argues that 
more research is necessary to fully assess the impact of central government influence and 
control on inter-local cooperation.  
 A different situation emerged in Ontario with the CMSM. Ontario municipalities 
live with constant, and complex, sets of provincial regulation. In this sense, the CMSM’s 
imposition did not create any of the uncertainty as described in American ICA literature. 
Furthermore, Canadian ICA research suggests that municipalities under threat of 
intervention from senior levels of government are more amenable to reaching a 
negotiated settlement with neighbouring municipalities (Alcantara and Nelles 2009). This 
is true of the majority of separated cities and counties in the province that did reach 
agreement on CMSM policy areas. Explaining the minority of cases that did not reach a 
negotiated agreement, however, is much more challenging.  
The CMSM created a resource scarcity between partnering municipalities. Prior 
to the CMSM agreements, separated cities and counties had few agreements requiring 
such large financial commitments. The CMSM forced separated cities and counties to 
negotiate on policy areas that neither wanted to fund, which inevitably strained their 
relationship. As one Guelph city councilor argued, “when the watering hole dries up, the 
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animals begin looking at each other” (Personal Interview – May 17, 2012). Most 
municipal partners already felt that their budgets were stretched beyond capacity; thus, 
the prospect of adding another budget line further deteriorated the situation.  
Tensions were caused not only by the overall cost of the social service delivery— 
which was and still is subject to large amounts of transfer payments from the province— 
but also because many county officials believe that social services are inherently “urban” 
in nature. Consequently, some rural officials argue that they should not be forced into 
providing funding for a service that disproportionately benefits residents of other 
communities. Downloading of social services, then, caused many of the old divisions 
about rural and urban life to re-emerge.  
Other municipalities describe the dispute between Guelph and Wellington County 
as a situation they actively wanted to avoid. Both London-Middlesex and Barrie-Orillia-
Simcoe have concerns with how social services are administered within their regions. 
Their CMSM agreements have expired and each government has made it clear that 
amendments are necessary as they begin negotiations. In both regions, arbitration has 
been discussed, but not seriously explored. Arbitration, they argue, should remain a last 
resort because of the detrimental effect it will have on their relationship with the county.   
The CMSM process also forced many regions to explore their historical 
assumptions about city-county separation, given that both counties and cities based their 
arguments on their beliefs about the differing service needs in urban and rural areas. 
Essex County saw the CMSM as a form of wealth redistribution between the county and 
the city, arguing that county residents were unlikely to utilize social services at the same 
rate as urban residents; consequently, it was unfair for the county to bear a 
 218 
disproportionate funding responsibility for a policy area that their residents were unlikely 
to use. Wellington County, on the other hand, argued that there was a two-way flow of 
social service users between the city and the county. While the final decision of how to 
allocate funding rested with the arbitrator, each region nevertheless had to examine the 
type of relationship they wanted to have with each other.  
In 2003, former Premier Dalton McGuinty pledged to upload the cost of social 
services, removing this item from municipal budgets.64 During the 2011 election, 
McGuinty re-iterated this promise and, in February 2012, he reassured municipal leaders 
that the province’s tenuous financial position would not delay the scheduled 2018 date to 
completely upload the cost of all social services  (Reilly 2012). Most of the officials 
interviewed for this project state that they hope this will eventually become a reality since 
social services funding is a large budget item and a persistent source of disagreement 
between separated cities and counties.  
Ultimately, the CMSM represents an area of mandated cooperation. The next 
chapter examines voluntary cooperation and explores the types of formal agreements that 
Ontario’s separated cities sign. Since inter-local agreements are a central component of 
the ICA framework, it is important to explore how agreements are formed before being 
able to assess the explanatory power of the paradigm.  
 
 
                                                 
64
 McGuinty has incrementally uploaded some social service costing, such as the costs for the Ontario drug 
plan and the Ontario Disability Support plan. Dalton McGuinty has pledged to upload the complete costs 
for Ontario Works, land ambulance and public health. In total, the provincial government claims that it has 
uploaded $947 million of the $1.5 billion they originally promised during the 2003 election campaign.  
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CHAPTER 7 – FORMAL AGREEMENTS 
 
7.     Introduction 
 The first chapter hypothesized that without any formal institutional ties, separated 
cities and counties must rely on alternative methods to ensure service and policy 
continuity for their residents. Inter-local agreements are the chief method municipalities 
without any clear institutional linkages utilize to achieve these ends. This chapter 
explores this proposition by conducting a province-wide review of cooperative 
agreements and examining the process used to establish inter-local agreements in 
Guelph-Wellington, London-Middlesex and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe.  
 The ICA framework primarily focuses on the creation of inter-municipal 
agreements. As such, it presents several factors that both hinder and help this type of 
cooperative activity, such as social capital, group composition, geographic density, power 
asymmetry and political leadership. Although previous chapters explored many of these 
variables, further examination of cooperative agreements between separated cities and 
counties will allow for a more thorough investigation of traditional ICA variables.   
To conduct this analysis, I gathered all of the agreements that representatives 
from separated cities and counties or lower-tiers signed between 1995 and 2011. I chose 
this time frame for a number of reasons, chiefly because the time frame is long enough to 
account for major provincial initiatives—such as amalgamation, various rounds of 
downloading and the CMSM servicing agreements—but recent enough that many of 
these agreements are still be relevant and active. Additionally, municipalities may have 
difficulty securing documents prior to 1995. 
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Unlike the last chapter, the following sections address voluntary agreements. How 
and why municipalities sign cooperative agreements is a key component of the ICA 
framework. Past studies utilizing the ICA framework view inter-local agreements as 
crucial in linking metropolitan areas since—without any institutional linkages—separated 
cities and counties need to rely on alternative measures to ensure service continuity and 
policy creation. Furthermore, since these agreements are alternatives to institutional 
consolidation and change, they are central to the ICA’s perspective on multi-municipal 
governance. Consequently, determining how these agreements are formed is central in 
being able to understand the nature of governance, more broadly, in counties with a 
separated city. This chapter explores the extent by which municipalities use inter-
municipal agreements to fill policy and service gaps.   
 
7.1.     Review of Adaptive and Restrictive Agreements 
 Municipalities sign a variety of contractual arrangements to achieve local 
cooperation, including service agreements, mutual aid, joint planning and memoranda of 
understanding. Historically, most academic research into the nature of inter-municipal 
agreements has focused on general agreement typologies (Atkins 1997; Nunn and 
Rosentraub 1997). Prior ICA research in this area has mostly tended to group agreements 
into two broad categories: adaptive and restrictive. Adaptive agreements provide broad 
discretion and flexibility for future circumstances, while restrictive agreements provide 
procedural characteristics, authority and outcome requirements that clearly state in 
advance each party’s terms to fulfill the terms of their contracts (Andrew 2008).  
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Adaptive and restrictive agreements create very different policy outcomes and 
provide clues as to the nature of the relationship between the two—or more—signatories 
prior to the signing of the agreement. An agreement is referred to as “restrictive” if it is 
based upon and closely adheres to a specified set of rules, generally rooted in provincial 
and state law and local ordinances (Andrew 2008).  These types of agreements provide 
very little room for interpretation. Additionally, restrictive agreements are challenging to 
alter because they tend to have fixed expiration dates and very clear procedures for 
termination. While lacking flexibility, restrictive agreements do provide stability over the 
life of the agreement, as both sides know what is expected of them financially and 
administratively, along with full knowledge of the penalties involved in breaking or 
deviating from the terms of the agreement. Some examples of restrictive agreements 
include contracts—such as service agreements—or lease agreements. 
 Adaptive agreements, on the other hand, are more open than restrictive ones and 
are used to provide more generalized guidelines for locally coordinated efforts. Simon 
Andrew (2008) argues that adaptive agreements are, “purposely designed to complement 
pre-existing policies as opposed to a neatly crafted joint vision to improve the overall 
welfare of the participating local governments’ constituents” (10). What adaptive 
agreements lack in stability, they make up in flexibility. These types of agreements 
usually do not include strict financial or administrative outlines and are more easily 
altered if both partners deem it necessary. They also tend to lack some of the safeguards 
traditionally found in restrictive agreements, such as termination clauses and expiration 
dates. Some examples of adaptive agreements include mutual aid agreements, 
memoranda of understanding or agreement, letters of agreement, or informal agreements.  
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 Restrictive agreements are usually utilized for policy areas that have large budgets 
or are not already provided by a municipality (Post 2004; Stein 1990). One such example 
is the delivery of social services. All of the provincial CMSM agreements are restrictive, 
largely because they carry such a high financial cost and the province requires certain 
standards. Having a more flexible agreement in place could result in one partner not 
fulfilling their financial or administrative responsibility, thereby creating service gaps for 
residents. Some further examples include water or sewer servicing or the construction of 
new capital projects, such as a recreation centres or long-term care facilities.  
Adaptive agreements are generally used to complement existing services, such as 
mutual aid agreements for fire where two communities sign an agreement to ensure full 
servicing throughout their communities, or where service gaps do not create a financial 
hardship, such as road maintenance or snow removal. In both cases, each municipality 
has the administrative infrastructure necessary to provide the service independently, but 
uses an adaptive service agreement to provide an additional layer of security or allow the 
jurisdiction to cut costs (Lynn 2005). Some additional examples of adaptive agreement 
policy areas may include staff training, library services, or cultural services.  
 Adaptive agreements, however, also come with a degree of risk; namely, these 
agreements carry a high level of behavioural uncertainty, which occurs when a supplier 
municipality is tempted to capture a larger share of aggregate gains (Shrestha 2010). 
While this risk is largely absent with restrictive agreements, adaptive agreements—which 
have more flexible terms and conditions—are nearly always at risk of being re-negotiated 
or reneged upon. That is not, however, to say that restrictive agreements are without risk 
since general environmental uncertainties, such as the unexpected breakdown of 
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technology or sudden occurrences of natural incidents affecting supply, are possibilities 
for all types of agreements (Shrestha 2010).  
Municipalities tend to adopt strategies that mitigate the inherent risk of entering 
into contractual agreements with other jurisdictions. Recent literature on the formation of 
inter-local agreements identifies two main strategies: interdependent risk spreading and 
independent risk spreading (Andrew 2010). Interdependent risk spreading involves 
sharing services with a contractual partner municipality as opposed to merely purchasing 
them, which gives municipalities more leverage and more justification to maintain the 
terms of the original agreement through reciprocity (Andrew 2010, 95). Each 
municipality then has more justification to uphold the previously agreed-upon terms. A 
second strategy involves independent risk spreading, whereby municipalities seek to 
maintain a limited number of contractual ties, generally with only a few trusted partners 
(Andrew 2010, 97). Under this strategy, municipalities have few contractual linkages.  
A third, also widely discussed, strategy involves only purchasing services or 
entering into agreements with “popular” municipalities. A supplier is deemed “popular” 
if a number of municipalities also purchase services or engage in cooperative contracting 
with them (Shrestha 2010, 123). Since “popular” municipalities rely on the strength of 
their reputation to establish new contractual agreements, ICA scholars argue that 
“popular” municipalities have more of an incentive to maintain the terms of its 
agreements. 
While this typology building has been useful in the study of inter-local 
agreements and cooperation, another group of scholars using variations of the ICA 
framework has moved beyond adaptive or restrictive categorization to test the “intensity” 
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of agreements and the subsequent effect this has on creating new cooperative 
relationships.65 Cooperative intensity is a measure of the strength of the commitment of 
the parties included a partnership (Nelles and Alcantara 2011, 323). Simply put, intensity 
is a function of the degree of authority and resources sacrificed by each party in the 
interest of integration (Nelles 2009; Perkmann 2003). Cooperative intensity also 
measures the degree of autonomy that cooperative action achieves from the partners 
themselves. This suggests that cooperative initiatives resulting in the creation of 
independent authorities will be seen as more intense than agreements established simply 
to facilitate additional lines of communication (Nelles and Alcantara 2011, 323).  
 The study of cooperative intensity focuses much of its attention on measuring 
institutional integration, broadly defined as the degree of control sacrificed by each party 
over the outcome of the partnership and the degree by which each party is bound to a 
certain course of action (Nelles and Alcantara 2011, 324). This area of study is interested 
in the extent by which cooperative agreements themselves create binding rules or sets of 
institutions that, in turn, establish the tone for cooperation. In these terms, measuring the 
intensity of agreements moves away from characterizing agreements as either adaptive or 
restrictive and attempts, instead, to place the relationship along a spectrum.   
Several factors are examined in order to study the intensity of the agreements. The 
first is timing, which measures the duration of the partnership. Agreements with limited 
time frames tend to carry lower levels of intensity than those that resulting in associations 
or joint management boards—institutions that would generally have an open-ended 
                                                 
65
 Much of this work has focused on horizontal relationships, which is applicable in studying the 
relationship between separated cities and counties. Some of the more recent research into cooperative 
intensity utilizes cross-border metropolitan areas (Sohn, Reitel and Walther 2009) and First Nation 
communities (Nelles and Alcantara 2011) as case studies. 
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duration. Essentially, imposing a limit on any partnership establishes an “escape route” 
for either partner, which may indicate a weaker commitment to cooperation (Nelles and 
Alcantara 2011, 324). For the purposes of this study, the presence of an expiration clause 
indicates a lower level of intensity than an open-ended agreement.  
A second factor is the degree to which the established partnerships are binding. 
This variable takes into account the binary nature of the adaptive and restrictive 
typologies, in that legally binding agreements are more intense than those that are non-
binding. As such, restrictive agreements are more intense than adaptive agreements. This 
is not, however, to suggest that all non-binding agreements have low levels of intensity. 
Certain factors, such as mechanisms to facilitate dispute resolutions, can increase the 
perceived level of commitment from the signatories. Nevertheless, the nature of the 
agreements themselves—as being binding or non-binding—does allow researchers to 
generally comprehend the level of risk involved in the agreements.  
Finally, institutional integration is another factor that determines the intensity of 
the agreement. The term institutional integration itself refers to the distance that 
participating actors have from the decision-making of the partnership (Nunn and 
Rosentraub 1997). The creation of new boards or institutions increases the intensity of the 
agreement precisely because it distances the original actors from the cooperative act. This 
can be measured through the creation of groups external to the agreements itself, such as 
joint boards of management.  
The study of cooperative intensity and agreement typologies allows researchers to 
begin uncovering the nature of cooperation between municipalities. Utilizing factors in 
both paradigms may explore some of the factors affecting cooperation between Ontario’s 
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separated cities and counties. While agreement typologies build binary databases—such 
as labeling agreements as being either adaptive or restrictive—cooperative intensity 
builds upon their work by creating spectrums describing the relative strength of the 
relationship. While neither approach, thus far, has been utilized in studying the 
relationship between separated cities and counties, nor the nature of mandated 
cooperation evident in the CMSM process, the variables they describe will allow this 
study to dive deeper into the assembled agreements and produce some insights into the 
relationship between separated cities and counties in Ontario.  
 
7.2.     Survey of Inter-Local Agreements 
In total, Ontario’s separated cities and counties signed 275 agreements between 
1995 and 2011. Table 7.1, below, reviews these agreements by region:  
Table 7.1: Summary of Agreements By Region 
Region Agreements 
Simcoe-Barrie-Orillia 33 
Essex-Windsor 9 
Wellington-Guelph 11 
Middlesex-London 22 
Frontenac-Kingston 14 
Peterborough-Peterborough 30 
Renfrew-Pembroke 13 
Leeds and Grenville-Prescott-Brockville-
Gananoque 
16 
Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry-Cornwall 31 
Lanark-Smith’s Falls 20 
Elgin-St. Thomas 10 
Hastings-Belleville 19 
Perth-Stratford-St. Mary’s 47 
Total 275 
 
As the table demonstrates, there is a tremendous amount of variation in each region. 
Some areas have close to 50 agreements, while others have less than 10. Some factors 
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increase the number of agreements per region, with the most obvious being the presence 
of more than one separated city. Consequently, Simcoe County, Barrie and Orillia, along 
with Perth County, Stratford and St. Mary’s—which have two relatively populous 
separated cities within the county—have the most agreements. The other county with 
multiple separated cities, Leeds and Grenville, only has 16 agreements, which is likely 
because its separated cities are of a comparably smaller size. Exploring the types of 
agreements that these regions sign, however, may better explain this regional variation. 
 Interestingly, the areas that eventually sought CMSM arbitration tend to have 
fewer agreements currently in place. Windsor and Essex have only 9 agreements, Guelph 
and Wellington only 11, Kingston and Frontenac have 14 and Pembroke and Renfrew 
only have 13 agreements in place.66 Since the arbitration process can be long and, in 
some cases, acrimonious, it is quite possible that the arbitration process harmed the 
relationship between both jurisdictions, affecting the creation of future agreements.  
Not all of the agreements within each region are signed solely between the county 
and their corresponding separated cities. In some cases, agreements include lower-tier 
municipalities within the county, are signed solely between a separated city and a lower-
tier municipality from the county or include third party groups. Below, Table 7.2 offers a 
summary of the agreement partners for each separated city67: 
Table 7.2: Total Agreements By City 
                                                 
66
 Guelph-Wellington entered arbitration after initially reaching agreement when the CMSM process was 
introduced. As this chapter will subsequently demonstrate, the CMSM arbitration in Guelph-Wellington led 
both parties to “formalize” their existing agreements and ultimately dissuading them from future 
cooperation.  
67
 It is important to note that each category is not mutually exclusive, in that an agreement can be included 
within two categories. For example, an agreement including Barrie and the town of Innisfil and Simcoe 
County would be included in both the county category and the lower-tier category. I provide this table 
primarily so that the reader has a simple overview describing which municipalities Ontario’s separated 
cities are choosing to partner with.  
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City Agreements 
Including 
County 
Agreements 
Including 
County 
Lower-Tiers 
Agreements 
Including 
Jurisdictions 
Outside 
County 
Agreements 
Including 
Third-Party 
Groups68 
Barrie 12 14 0 1 
Orillia 5 5 0 5 
Windsor 5 9 0 2 
Guelph 4 7 0 0 
Kingston 3 4 7 0 
Peterborough 29 8 0 5 
Pembroke 5 8 0 5 
Brockville 11 1 1 4 
Gananoque 6 4 0 0 
Prescott 11 0 1 4 
Cornwall 26 1 3 10 
Smith’s Falls 20 8 0 1 
St. Thomas 6 6 0 1 
Belleville 11 7 1 2 
Quinte West 6 4 1 0 
Stratford 22 17 1 8 
St. Mary’s 11 6 1 5 
 
As expected, the majority of the agreements include the county, although regional 
variation persists. This perhaps occurs because some cities have more agreements with 
county lower-tiers than the county itself. Barrie, Windsor and Guelph have made more 
agreements with county lower-tiers than the county while the remaining cities have 
generally opted to deal mainly with their counties.  
While this result was expected, of interest to this study are the number of 
agreements signed with jurisdictions outside of the county and with third-parties. Some 
separated cities, such as Kingston, have a number of agreements with areas outside of 
                                                 
68
 Third party groups include non-governmental organizations, such as the Heart and Stroke Foundation, 
and private organizations, such as development corporations. It also includes special purpose bodies as well 
as First Nations groups. Agreements are only counted in this category if the agreements specifically 
included a municipal partner. For example, an agreement would qualify if it was signed between a city, 
county and a third party, but not if it was directly signed with a third party group.  
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their counties geographic boundaries, perhaps because Kingston’s own borders reach 
both sides of the borders of the very linear Frontenac County. Conversely, many of the 
other separated cities are immediately surrounded by their counties, limiting their need to 
sign agreements with outside jurisdictions.  
Some cities have also signed agreements with a number of third-party groups. 
Some of these cities, such as Barrie and Orillia, have largely signed these agreements 
with First Nations groups, while others, such as Cornwall, have sought out agreements 
with social service groups. Accordingly, the agreements surveyed for this study include a 
variety of third party groups. Nevertheless, who municipalities choose to partner with 
offers only one perspective; thus, it remains important to understand what types of 
agreements are being signed in addition to the content of those agreements.    
In total, the number of actors involved in each agreement remains relatively small. 
The average number of participants for each agreement is 3.23, meaning that most 
municipalities prefer to form agreements with fewer, rather than more, actors. This is 
unsurprising and consistent with previous research, which suggests that smaller groups 
are easier to monitor and distribute relative losses or gains, thereby reducing transaction 
costs. Simply put, smaller groups are easier to manage than large ones, which is why 
many separated cities opt to keep their policy networks small.  
Although the vast majority of the agreements that municipalities use are contracts, 
there is variation in the types of agreements available to them (Miller 1981; Atkins 1997; 
Nunn and Rosentraub 1997). They range on a scale from flexible, such as informal 
agreements and memoranda of understanding, to inflexible, which includes contractual 
service agreements. Informal agreements and memoranda of understanding greatly 
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reduce the transaction costs involved in writing and implementing an agreement, 
particularly when compared to inter-municipal service agreements which are relatively 
easy to modify should unforeseen circumstances arise—although they do, albeit, create 
less security in municipalities’ adjudication rights by opening up financial terms for 
possible interpretation (Andrew 2008). Mutual aid agreements are only operative when 
certain conditions are met, generally emergencies or inclement weather, providing some 
financial flexibility but remain generally restrictive with respect to length and termination 
(Andrew 2008). More inflexible agreements provide more security for participating 
municipalities, but are challenging to revise since dispute often lead to costly legal 
challenges.    
 Below, in Table 7.3, lists the types of agreements signed between 1995 and 2011 
in each county in Ontario with a separated city:  
Table 7.3: Summary of Agreement Types by Region 
Region Contract MOU Mutual Aid 
Simcoe-Barrie-
Orillia 
14 17 2 
Essex-Windsor 8 0 1 
Wellington-Guelph 10 0 0 
Middlesex-London 15 2 5 
Frontenac-Kingston 15 0 0 
Peterborough-
Peterborough 
22 7 1 
Renfrew-Pembroke 9 4 1 
Leeds and 
Grenville-
Brockville-
Gananoque-Prescott 
10 6 0 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry-
Cornwall 
28 3 0 
Lanark-Smith’s 
Falls 
16 0 4 
Elgin-St. Thomas 9 0 1 
Hastings-Belleville 16 2 0 
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Perth-Stratford-St. 
Mary’s 
34 11 2 
Total 206 52 17 
 
As the preceding table demonstrates, of all the agreements in place in Ontario’s separated 
cities, more than 75 percent are contracts. Although this indicates that the majority of the 
agreements in Ontario’s separated cities are restrictive, it does explain why so many 
municipalities utilize restrictive agreements.  
ICA research offers one hypothesis. Research in American metropolitan regions 
suggests that municipalities use a mix of adaptive and restrictive agreements depending 
on their policy needs (Andrew 2010). Consequently, this implies that a high level of 
restrictive agreements may indicate that a region has a low level of trust in its partners. 
Simply put, if cooperation is necessary but the two partners have developed an adequate 
level of trust, it is a better strategy to employ restrictive agreements that protect against 
any undue risk associated with the termination or alteration of the agreement. Some ICA 
research theorizes that a high level of restrictive agreements also indicates that that a 
small network structure may be in place (Andrew 2010, 98). For the purposes of this 
study, that could mean a smaller county system that has a separated city.  
Ultimately, neither explanation is entirely convincing since both small and large 
networks primarily use restrictive agreements. Thus, a better explanation may be that the 
type of restrictions and degree of provincial oversight prompts Ontario municipalities to 
use more restrictive agreements. Furthermore, restrictive agreements are primarily used 
for contractual relationships involving large financial costs, which certainly would 
include social services funding and infrastructure development. Since many Ontario 
municipalities engage in these types of policy relationships, there is obviously some use 
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in restrictive agreements. To fully examine this trend, this chapter will further explore 
these agreements’ characteristics.  
Below, in Chart 7.1, is a list of the policy areas included in the agreements 
between Ontario’s separated cities and counties.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 7.1: Agreements By Policy Area69 
                                                 
69
 Most of the categories included in the list are self-explanatory, although some may require elaboration: 
“Emergency Services” encompasses all areas of emergency planning or delivery, such as fire protection, 
dispatch or reporting; “Roads and Transportation” includes road construction, maintenance, snow removal 
and the provision of public transportation services; “Culture” encompasses all museum or archival services; 
“Waste” includes all landfill services, collection, and maintenance or recycling programming; and, finally, 
“Administrative” includes all items relating to staffing or other uncategorized maintenance, such as 
information technology maintenance and sharing.  
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This table demonstrates that the majority of agreements concern emergency services, 
which is consistent with American literature on inter-local cooperation (Andrew 2008). 
Emergency services are one policy area where geographical coverage is vital in 
maintaining public safety, which is why some municipalities feel the need to enter into 
agreements with neighbouring jurisdictions to ensure service continuity and protection.  
The majority of the emergency services agreements included in this study involve 
fire protection, mostly in the form of mutual aid or fee for service agreements. Generally, 
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separated cities contract fire services to smaller jurisdictions near their borders. 
Consequently, these agreements tend to involve emergency dispatch or reporting, in 
which county officials negotiate an agreement on behalf of their lower tiers counterparts. 
This is unsurprising, considering that municipalities in Ontario are mandated under the 
Fire Protection and Prevention Act (Ontario 1997) to maintain fire protection and 
education services throughout their territory.  
CMSM agreements also account for a great deal of agreements. Although each 
jurisdiction typically has only one or two active CMSM agreements, some jurisdictions 
elect to have one agreement for core social services, such as Ontario Works or social 
housing, and another for land ambulance. In these cases, each jurisdiction may have 
multiple CMSM agreements to cover the full range of policy responsibility under the 
Local Services Realignment Act. 
Emergency services and CMSM agreements represent the two largest areas of 
cooperation between separated cities and counties. In total, CMSM and emergency 
services account for 173 of the 275 agreements that exist between Ontario’s separated 
cities and counties. However, are these really cooperative agreements? Since the Local 
Services Realignment mandated municipalities to deliver social services, this forced 
municipalities to work together and reach an agreement over how to deliver these 
services. Municipalities faced a similar position with respect to fire services, in that they 
are provincially mandated to provide coverage across their jurisdiction. Quite often this 
responsibility requires the establishment of mutual aid agreements with adjoining 
municipalities if the territory is large enough to warrant it.  
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When the CMSM and emergency services agreements are removed, few truly 
cooperative agreements exist between Ontario’s separated cities and counties. Although 
American ICA studies would suggest that Ontario’s separated cities and counties would 
be forced to rely heavily on inter-municipal agreements for service continuity and policy 
creation, in fact, this does not seem to be the case. American ICA studies typically 
uncover hundreds, if not thousands, of agreements within metropolitan areas. For 
example, in a study of inter-local fiscal cooperation, Shrestha (2005) found 6,080 
agreements in 38 large American cities. Additionally, Wood’s study of the Kansas City 
metropolitan area found 1,638 different agreements (2005). Thurmaier similarly located 
nearly 12,000 agreements between 1965 and 2004 in Iowa (2005). Meanwhile, LeRoux 
and Carr (2007) discovered 445 agreements in Michigan for roads alone, while Andrew 
Simon (2008) found 390 agreements just for public safety in the state of Florida.  
In relation to their American counterparts, Ontario’s separated cities and counties 
have signed, by comparison, a minimal amount of agreements with very little consistency 
across policy areas. After removing the CMSM and emergency services agreements, the 
next highest totals of agreements concern waste, water and sewage and administrative 
functions. This difference in the number of agreements between American metropolitan 
areas and Ontario’s separated cities and counties can largely be explained by the vastly 
different nature of the relationships between the two. In Ontario, the primarily 
relationship is between urban and rural areas, while American metropolitan areas have 
urban-suburban relationships. Urban and suburban areas have many more common 
servicing areas than urban and rural areas and, as a result, more areas for potential 
cooperation.  
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The timing of when these agreements are signed also reveals some interesting 
trends. Chart 7.2, below, illustrates the number of agreements struck, by year:  
Chart 7.2: Agreements By Year 
 
As the chart indicates, very few agreements were signed in the mid-1990s. However, the 
number of signed agreements increases significantly in the late 1990s following the 
introduction of the CMSM regulations. The number spikes again in 2005 and 2010. This 
coincides with the expiry of the CMSM agreements, which were negotiated in the late 
1990s and early 2000s as five-year terms and re-negotiated in the mid-2000s for another 
five-year term.  
In total, the trend line increases from the 1995 start date of this study until 2011, 
indicating that the amount of agreements signed within these communities has been 
constantly increasing, albeit sporadically. Possibly, the CMSM—which mandated 
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cooperation between these jurisdiction—may have led to more cooperative interaction, in 
that one major cooperative agreement led to the creation of further cooperative 
arrangements. Another potential explanation is that the need for cooperation is somehow 
increasing, perhaps due to budget constraints or other fiscal restrictions. A potential 
decrease in revenue would encourage two jurisdictions to more seriously considering 
how to pool costs in order to provide public services, inevitably necessitating more 
cooperation between the two regions.  
 While policy areas and the year signed differ from agreement to agreement, most 
agreements have common components. Issues such as termination or expiry are routine 
areas of discussion when negotiating agreements and can provide clues about the strength 
of the relationship between jurisdictions. Both cooperative intensity and typologies 
literature examine the common components of agreements between potential municipal 
partners. Table 7.4, below, provides a summary of many of the key components of 
agreements compiled for this study.  
Table 7.4: Summary of Agreement Components 
 Total Percent 
Agreements With Expiry 
Clauses 
167 60.7% 
Agreements With 
Termination Clauses 
220 80% 
Agreements Leading to the 
Creation of Joint 
Committee’s or Boards 
62 22.5% 
Agreements with Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms 
78 28.3% 
Number of Restrictive 
Agreements 
206 74.9% 
Number of Adaptive 
Agreements 
69 25% 
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The vast majority of agreements—80 percent—include termination clauses that allow at 
least one of the partners included in the agreement to leave the arrangement. Many such 
termination clauses include procedures and timelines for withdraw, such as submitting 
termination notices in writing within sixty days of the set withdrawal. The procedures and 
timing of the termination process vary by agreement, however. Just over 60 percent of the 
agreements contain expiry clauses, stating that the agreement will automatically 
terminate after a set period of time unless the jurisdictions included in the agreement 
want to extend it.  
 While most jurisdictions prefer to strike agreements with termination and expiry 
clauses, very few include clauses for monitoring, such as the creation of joint boards, 
commissions or dispute resolution mechanisms. Only 22.5 percent of agreements involve 
the creation of joint boards or commissions to oversee the execution of the agreement. 
Many of these agreements are CMSM agreements, which do occasionally provide for the 
creation of joint social services committees that allow both partners to monitor the 
delivery of social services in their own communities. Similarly, only 28.3 percent of 
agreements include procedures for dispute resolution. The high rates of termination 
clauses indicate that many communities view their ability to terminate the agreement as a 
form of dispute resolution; consequently, each signatory’s ability to leave the agreement 
at any time is, in itself, an incentive to seek an informal resolution to any impasse.  
 The prevalence of expiry and termination clauses also indicates that most 
jurisdictions prefer to establish agreements that carry a low level of risk. Although these 
agreements are formalized, they are for set durations and allow either partner to leave the 
agreement if they feel that participating is no longer in their best interest. Only a minority 
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of agreements establishes independent authorities to monitor and execute the content of 
the agreement, with a similar number having built-in dispute resolution mechanisms. This 
indicates that Ontario’s separated cities and counties are creating agreements of a low 
intensity without the aim of creating long-term relationships. Instead, these agreements 
aim to create policy-specific and purpose driven networks of cooperation. 
 Since 74.9 percent of agreements—the vast majority—are restrictive in that they 
contain formal legal procedures that bind each participant to their actions. As previously 
discussed, these types of agreements aim to mitigate risk and ensure that the expectations 
for each partner are well known. This includes areas in which the province mandates 
cooperation—namely, CMSM policy areas—and the amount of agreements that include 
large contributions towards infrastructure, such as waste and water facilities and public 
transportation.  
In Ontario, adaptive agreements are mainly utilized for mutual aid and protection, 
which is consistent with American ICA literature on emergency response agreements 
(Andrew 2009; Andrew 2010). In both areas, municipalities largely use cooperative 
agreements to supplement existing services, which—not coincidentally—are the type of 
situations that call for adaptive agreements. These agreements are largely formed to add 
to existing services and ensure continuity. Although two municipalities may already have 
a fire department, a mutual aid agreement provides additional protection to potentially 
underserviced border regions. As such, Ontario municipalities use adaptive agreements 
for similar policy areas as American municipalities, although provincial regulation may 
be forcing them to use larger amounts of restrictive agreements than they would 
otherwise.   
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7.3.     Inter-Local Agreements and the Cooperative Process 
 Surveying inter-local agreements indicates that the rate by which the province’s 
separated cities and counties create agreements is below expected levels, mainly due to 
the variation in servicing responsibilities between urban and rural municipalities. Without 
formal institutional linkages, the ICA framework predicted that Ontario’s separated cities 
and counties would need to rely heavily on formal agreements to address gaps in regional 
infrastructure, planning and servicing. This, however, is not the case. Exploring the 
process of how these agreements were formed in each of the three case studies may shine 
some light on why Ontario’s separated cities and counties do not rely more heavily on 
formal inter-local agreements. There is, as previously mentioned some regional variation 
in the amount of agreements signed between 1995 and 2001: Guelph-Wellington has only 
11 agreements, while London-Middlesex has 22 and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe has 33.  
Guelph has a troubled history with cooperation. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, the CMSM arbitration process and the subsequent legal battles between the city 
and the county reduced each partner’s willingness to cooperate. No longer did the two 
sides see each other as cordial partners; rather, their relationship became more “business-
like”, dramatically reducing communication and interaction. Consequently, Guelph and 
Wellington County and its constituent municipalities signed only 11 cooperative 
agreements between 1995 and 2011. Of these, five involve the county itself, while the 
remaining agreements involve lower-tiers in the county.  
 As described in Chapter 6, the CMSM related agreements were terminated at 
Guelph’s request after which, arbitration commenced for these policy areas. The only 
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remaining agreement with the county concerns Provincial Offences. However, Guelph 
does have a number of agreements with the county’s lower-tiers, primarily addressing 
fire dispatch.  
Unlike other separated cities and counties, no informal agreements exist between 
Guelph and Wellington County. Respondents report that after the CMSM arbitration, 
both Guelph and the county sought to ensure that all agreements were codified since the 
county was concerned that any ambiguity surrounding any informal agreements may lead 
to further arbitration and increased legal costs (Personal Interview – April 16, 2012)  
The last issue to be codified that was first initiated through an informal agreement 
involved the Wellington Terrace long-term care facility. The Wellington Terrace is 
located in the county, just outside of the community of Fergus, and accepted residents 
from Guelph. County officials report that funding for the facility began as a “gentleman’s 
agreement” and was not formalized (Personal Interview – April 13, 2012). This 
agreement—which, according to those involved in its creation, was sealed with only a 
handshake—made the county responsible for the construction of the facility while the 
city would contribute funding towards materials and, eventually, towards its yearly 
operating funding (Personal Interview – April 13, 2012). The county maintains that 
although the city paid the agreed-upon amount of yearly operating funding from 1996 to 
2005, they failed to pay the full amount from 2006 onwards (Tracey 2010). In 2010, the 
county filed a lawsuit alleging that the city had underfunded the facility by approximately 
$2.5 million (Tracey 2010[a]).70 The county’s statement of claim argued that, “as a result 
of the city’s continuing breach of contract, the county has suffered and continues to suffer 
                                                 
70
 The county claimed that the city owed $860,000 for 2006, $823,000 for 2007 and $780,000 for 2008.  
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losses…the city has been unjustly enriched as a result of its breach of contract” (Tracey 
2010[a]).  
County officials charge that a change in direction on Guelph’s city council left the 
county the sole funder for the Wellington Terrace (Personal Interview – April 13, 2012). 
Guelph officials did not provide justification for the decrease in their yearly contribution 
to the facility, leaving county councilors with little recourse but legal action. Officials 
from the city argued that under the original agreement, it would not be responsible for 
any “bricks and mortar” costs, such as infrastructure improvements and additions; rather, 
the city was only responsible for operating costs (Tracey 2010[b]). Guelph officials also 
contended that they should not be held responsible for the county’s decision to build a 
new facility adjacent to the original Wellington Terrace after the old facility was leased to 
a private company and rebranded as Heritage River Retirement Residences Tracey 
2010[b]). Moreover, the city objected that it did not receive a share of the revenue raised 
from the sale of the original facility (Tracey 2010[b]).71 County officials countered that 
the old facility was outdated, as it had recently been deemed a “class D” facility by the 
provincial government, falling below the provincial standards for operating a municipal 
home for the aged (Personal Interview – May 10, 2012). Wellington officials contend that 
they decided not to split the funds raised from the sale of the old Terrace with the city 
                                                 
71
 The county’s legal case was buoyed by the discovery the that former City treasurer, David Kennedy, 
suggested in emails to county treasurer, Craig Dyer, that the city would work to pay the $1 million it owed 
to the county between 2006 and 2007, implying that the city did acknowledge some responsibility for 
infrastructure and maintenance costs. The Guelph Mercury obtained Kennedy’s emails through a Freedom 
of Information Act request.  
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because Guelph was so far in arrears with their annual payments (Personal Interview – 
May 10, 2012).72  
This issue was only recently resolved, in March 2012, when both sides finally 
reached an equitable agreement (City of Guelph 2012). In the agreement, Guelph would 
not be required to contribute to the facility’s capital costs, but would assume 
responsibility for 20 percent of Wellington Terrace’s net operating costs (City of Guelph 
2012). Additionally, the city owed the county over $4 million in maintenance obligations 
from 2006 to 2011(City of Guelph 2012).73 Most importantly from the perspective of city 
officials, Guelph would be released from its obligations to Wellington Terrace if they 
opted to construct an alternative facility (City of Guelph 2012).74  
Guelph councilors, for many years, insisted that the Elliot House, a facility within 
the city’s borders, was sufficient to service its population (Personal Interview – April 30, 
2012). The province, however, would not give its consent to designate Elliot House as 
Guelph’s home for the aged, contending that the facility was not compliant with 
provincial standards. Guelph officials, however, felt otherwise and requested its local 
MPP Liz Sandals to forward a letter to the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care 
requesting that the Elliot House be designated as the City of Guelph’s Home for the 
                                                 
72
 Part of the reason why the operational costs for the Wellington Terrace escalated after the new facility 
was built was because the lay out for each room changed. In the old facility, the rooms contained four beds 
and one bathroom; however, in the new facility, the rooms were either private or semi-private with an 
adjacent bathroom, limiting the amount of residents that could be admitted and increasing the operational 
costs. As such, Wellington increased the amount that Guelph was supposed to contribute, a factor in the 
dispute. 
73
 In a March 30, 2012, Guelph Mercury article, Mayor Farbridge admitted that the city had been putting 
money into a reserve fund during the years that the funding formula for the Wellington Terrace was in 
dispute. For more information please see Tracey, 2012.  
74
 Ontario’s Long Term Care Act (Bill 140), and its predecessor the Homes for the Aged and Rest Homes 
Act, mandate all single tier or multi-tier municipalities to establish and maintain a municipal home for the 
aged or to enter into an agreement with another municipality to maintain a long-term care facility.   
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Aged.75 County council objected to the province’s approval of the Elliot House, 
especially considering the city’s outstanding financial contribution to the Wellington 
Terrace (Personal Interview – April 26, 2012). With the agreement for the Wellington 
Terrace now complete, Guelph councilors hope to bring the Elliot House up to provincial 
standards and leave their agreement with the county (Personal Intervew – April 30, 
2012).  
 Respondents suggest that solving this dispute was beneficial in helping to mend 
the relationship between the city and the county. Mayor Karen Farbidge of Guelph, 
commenting publicly in the Guelph Mercury, stated that the dispute was “a source of 
great frustration” between the city and county, but noted that, “I hope it’s signaling a 
greater ability to move forward with other agreements…I think symbolically this was a 
big one” (Tracey 2012). Thus, while it did take over a decade to reach an agreement, 
some county officials argue that the city’s willingness to reach a negotiated settlement is 
positive and a demonstration of a potential change in attitude towards cooperation with 
the county (Personal Interview – April 16, 2012). Additionally, some county respondents 
argue that formalizing all of the agreements into a codified set of agreements will allow 
both parties to start a new relationship, thereby improving cooperation (Personal 
Interview – April 16, 2012).  
 While few agreements exist between Guelph and Wellington County, even fewer 
exist between Guelph and its surrounding county lower-tiers. Most of these agreements 
are related to fire dispatch, fire protection and mutual aid. Officials from these 
communities insist that the fire departments themselves negotiate these types of 
                                                 
75
 For more information on Guelph’s request, see the minutes of the City of Guelph Council meeting from 
March 26, 2007.  
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agreements (Personal Interview – May 2, 2012). With little political involvement, the 
Chiefs of the individual fire departments take the initiative themselves to reach these 
agreements. While councils remain responsible for ratifying the agreements once they are 
negotiated, councils remain mostly removed from the negotiation process. When these 
agreements are removed from consideration, there are few agreements between Guelph 
and Wellington County—in fact, this jurisdiction has the fewest in the province.  
 Two explanations help account for this comparatively low level of cooperative 
agreements. First, the ICA framework repeatedly stresses how important social capital 
and relationship building is to the formation of cooperative agreements. Since arbitration, 
both the county and Guelph have had a low level of interaction. Coupled with a large 
amount of distrust and Guelph-Wellington presents itself as almost the antithesis of the 
type of relationships that ICA scholars point to as ideal. According to the ICA 
framework, municipalities will want to work primarily with those they trust; thus, when 
this trust breaks down, so too do the prospects for regular cooperation.  
 A second explanation focuses on the differences in population density between 
the city and the county. Of the three case studies, Guelph-Wellington has the sharpest 
distinction between urban and rural. Wellington County is mainly rural and has actively 
attempted to remain that way, even allowing Guelph to annex various regions to ensure 
that the distinctions between the county and the city remain in place.76 As such, both 
levels have different servicing demands, which does not establish a clear need for 
cooperation between both areas.  
                                                 
76
 For more information on Guelph’s most recent annexation, please see section 4.4.  
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 While forming agreements in Guelph-Wellington has been challenging, the same 
process in London-Middlesex and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe show more positive results. 
Officials in both areas find few barriers to agreement formation, with 22 agreements 
signed in London-Middlesex between 1995 and 2011 and 33 in Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe. 
Although both areas have experienced tensions with their surrounding jurisdictions, they  
have not let it affect their ability to sign cooperative agreements. 
In London-Middlesex, the majority of these agreements were signed after 2000, 
with only two agreements signed between 1995 and 2000. The majority of the 
agreements came early in the decade with fifteen agreements signed between 2000 and 
2005. The majority of these agreements were between the county and the city, although 
the municipalities surrounding London—Thames Centre and Middlesex Centre—do have 
a limited number of agreements with the city as well. The policy areas vary, but the 
majority of the agreements (6) are for policy areas covered by CMSM agreements or for 
emergency protection, namely fire protection and emergency communications. A number 
of agreements also exist for water and wastewater. Surprisingly, considering how many 
shared roads run from the city into the county, few agreements exist for road 
maintenance. 
In Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe, the presence of a second separated city increases the 
number of inter-local agreements within the Simcoe region and both Barrie and Orillia 
have actively sought to codify many of their arrangements with the county and its lower-
tier municipalities. Staff generally take the lead on negotiating and monitoring 
agreements, with little political involvement. More recently, the mayor of Barrie has 
actively initiated some discussions regarding cooperation on a number of service areas 
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although historically, politicians have generally deferred to senior staff to make these 
decisions. Over the period of study—1995-2011—the number of agreements have been 
steady, indicating that Barrie, Orillia and the county have been consistent in their use of 
inter-local agreements for servicing and policy development.  
Barrie also provides a large amount of servicing to lower-tiers within the county. 
Mainly, this servicing is emergency response, including hazardous material response, fire 
protection and fire communication. Most of the agreements that Barrie and Orillia sign 
directly involve lower-tier municipalities rather than the county.77 The county is mainly 
included in agreements that involve provincially mandated policy areas, such as CMSM 
and public health unit funding.  
Much like Guelph-Wellington, the region of Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe has few 
informal agreements and nearly all agreements are formally codified. Both separated 
cities use similar reasoning, that formal agreements provide them with legal protections 
that informal agreements do not. Most respondents from the Simcoe region agree that this 
is a long-standing institutional practice in the area. Guelph used informal agreements 
until the CMSM arbitration process, after which a concerted effort was made to formalize 
all informal agreements in order to manage expectations between both parties and 
provide a measure of legal protection.  
                                                 
77
 Both Barrie and Orillia also have agreements with First Nations groups within the region. Both 
municipalities find that their negotiations and interactions with these groups are positive. The only other 
municipalities in the region to have a direct agreement with a First Nations group is Ramara, which has one 
formal agreement with the Mnjikaning First Nation. This agreement is for fire protection, although Ramara 
and Mnijaning also have an informal agreement for road maintenance. Officials from Ramara have noted 
that they have gotten in a dispute with Mnijkaning over the construction of a bridge between the two 
communities, which as strained their relationship. Due to their limited relationship with municipalities in 
the region, no First Nations groups were contacted to participate in this study.   
 248 
London, on the other hand, has several informal agreements, with some county 
officials suggesting that they have upwards of 10 informal agreements with the city. 
County staff contend that most of these agreements have not been formalized through 
traditional inter-local agreements (Personal Interview - March 2, 2012). Some examples 
of these types of agreements include the county’s utilization of the city’s IT bunker, the 
creation of joint city and county library privileges, joint city and staff training and skills 
building exercises, and jointly hosting the Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
annual conference. These agreements, county officials note, reflect “more of an 
understanding” between both parties and result from “handshakes and head nods” 
(Personal Interview – March 2, 2012). When asked why these agreements are not 
codified, county officials respond that neither side sees a point in formalizing some of 
these services. Moreover, in some cases—such as the provision that county library 
cardholders can utilize London’s library services and vice versa—only an operations 
policy or regulatory amendment would be able to formally alter existing arrangements.  
These informal agreements exist for two main reasons. The first is that they 
involve relatively minor policy areas that carry a low financial commitment. In general, 
the more complex the policy area, the more likely it is that it will be formalized. The 
second reason is that neither party has ever defaulted on an existing agreement or failed 
to fulfill their commitment to each other. Simply put, these informal agreements exist 
because trust is high and risk is low.  
Respondents in London-Middlesex and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe report that the 
negotiations for these agreements begin at the staff level to identify a need before 
proceeding to the political level for finalization (Personal Interview – February 6, 2012). 
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Staff, they report, are generally the ones who can most easily identify service duplication 
or service gaps. Following the identification of these problems, staff must identify the 
level of government responsible for addressing the problems. At this step city officials 
note that politicians assume responsibility to meet and negotiate a final agreement with 
the staff’s (Personal Interview – February 6, 2012). There are no guidelines for 
approaching the county or any of its lower-tiers nor does the county does not have any 
established protocols with regard to contacting or approaching London. 
 
7.4.     Conclusion 
 Chapter three discussed some of the factors that the ICA framework identifies as 
either having positive or negative effects on the formation of cooperative agreements.78 
While this study has not undertaken a rigorous quantitative examination of data on 
cooperative agreements—as is common with ICA studies—this chapter’s review of 
provincial agreements nevertheless offers many insights into the significance of variables 
that ICA scholars identify. On the one hand, ICA scholars argue that social capital, 
interaction, smaller groups, increased homogeneity among group members, more local 
governments and stronger political leadership lead to higher levels of agreements. On the 
other hand, they also argue that larger groups, increased heterogeneity, fewer local 
governments and weak political leadership decrease the likelihood of agreement 
formation.  
 It is difficult to determine the exact effect of each variable that ICA scholars 
identify. For example, social capital and interaction seem to increase cooperation in most 
                                                 
78
 For more information, please see Table 3.2. 
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of the case studies, but highly positive levels of cooperation do not seem to be enough to 
avoid conflict. In Guelph, for instance, the city and county enjoyed years—if not 
decades—of positive relations during which they held joint events and regular informal 
interaction; however, this relationship rapidly deteriorated once it became clear that they 
could not resolve funding issues surrounding CMSM policy areas. In contrast, London 
and Middlesex County tout their long and positive relationship as the reason why 
arbitration in their CMSM dispute has not yet occurred. Thus, it is impossible to state 
definitively that higher levels of interaction will always lead to higher levels of 
cooperation.  
 Examining geographic density and group composition produces similar results. 
Ontario’s counties with a separated city offer a substantial amount of variation in terms of 
network size. For example, although the Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe area has 18 total 
governing units within its geographic area and has 33 agreements, the Brockville-
Gananoque-Prescott-Leeds and Grenville area also has 18 governing units but only 16 
agreements. Another instance occurs in the Stratford-St. Mary’s-Perth region, which has 
47 agreements, yet only 6 total governing units. Each region varies considerably in 
geographic size, making it difficult to identify patterns in geographic density and 
agreement formation. A simple correlation model found a negative correlation between 
the number of governments within a county and the number of agreements signed, 
signifying that this particular ICA variable does not hold much explanatory power when 
studying Ontario’s separated cities and counties.79  
                                                 
79
 Pearson correlation is -.051. The relationship is not significant.  
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Each case study, however, does show the importance of political leadership in 
identifying areas of cooperation, maintaining inter-local relationships and forming 
cooperative agreements. Where politicians have gotten intimately involved with the 
details of their cooperative agreements with neighbours, cooperation is likely and 
generally sustaining. When political leaders have shown a disinterest, however, 
cooperation is unlikely. The situation in Guelph is a good example of this phenomenon. 
When city and county politicians interacted regularly and showed an interest in 
cooperation, agreements were put in place. When both sides became more insular, 
agreement formation decreased significantly.  
Analyzing the types of inter-local agreements in place across the province 
produces some interesting results. Key among them is the finding that most agreements 
that exist between the separated cities and counties in Ontario concern emergency 
services—primarily fire services—and CMSM policy areas. These are two policy areas in 
which the province mandates cooperation, although to differing degrees. As such, they 
are not completely voluntary and do not neatly fit into the working definition of 
“cooperation” that I established in the first chapter. When these two policy areas are 
removed, there are only a little more than one hundred agreements between Ontario’s 
thirteen counties with a separated town or city. This result was largely unexpected since 
ICA research predicts that separated cities would need to rely heavily on inter-local 
agreements since there are no formal institutional linkages to the county around them. 
This, however, is not the case.  
 Because formal inter-local agreements are used so infrequently, the natural 
assumption is that informal agreements constitute the norm in counties with a separated 
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city. However, as the preceding case studies demonstrate the use of informal agreements 
varies and depends upon the region. In Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe, staff have avoided the use 
of informal agreements, opting instead to codify service agreements. Similarly, Guelph 
and Wellington County have made a concerted effort to formalize their informal 
agreement, largely because of the dispute stemming from their CMSM arbitration. Only 
London and Middlesex utilize informal agreements, although they are used sparingly and, 
often only temporarily, such as their cooperation in hosting a recent Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario conference.  
 Ultimately, Ontario’s separated cities and counties do not rely on formal 
agreements as much as predicted and their use of informal agreements is sporadic. 
Explaining this trend is that most of the separated cities do not need their counties for 
service continuity; consequently, most cities are focused on creating the necessary 
infrastructure to provide their own services without the help of the rural municipalities 
around them.  While some lower-tier municipalities are interested in expanding city 
services, separated cities are been mostly self-sufficient, thereby eliminating the need for 
much policy coordination.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
8.     Introduction 
 In the opening chapter of this study, I argued that linking urban and rural areas 
was one of the great challenges of municipal governance. The two areas have 
traditionally been seen as distinct, possessing not only vastly different economies, labour 
trends and ways of life, but also different sets of values. Ontario initially created separate 
urban and rural areas to uphold this distinction. Thus, when an urban area of a county 
became classified as a city, they were automatically separated politically from its 
surrounding county. This was initially seen as mutually beneficial, as urban areas would 
be freed from the more narrowly focused politics of rural life and rural areas would not 
have any institutional linkages to the urban areas that they historically viewed with 
suspicion. As such, separated cities were institutionally free from their counties, but 
remained geographically linked, placing them in the awkward position of being both 
absent and present in the political life of the county.  
 The Ontario provincial government used city-county separation as a key policy 
tool to organize their municipalities for decades. Beginning in the 1950s, rapid 
suburbanization forced the provincial government to re-evaluate how it saw urban and 
rural. During this period, forms of regional government became dominant. Where past 
organizational thinking viewed urban and rural areas as being distinct, regional 
government saw them as fundamentally linked. Regional government recognized that 
urban areas needed to work with rural areas for regional development and planning; 
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consequently, linking urban and rural—and, by then, suburban—areas through common 
institutions would extend the economic benefits of urban life to surrounding areas.  
Despite the popularity of regional government as the main provincial 
organizational from the 1950s until the 1970s, eighteen cities and towns remain separated 
from their counties. To examine the inherent challenges within this enduring institution, 
this thesis has undertaken the first wide-ranging examining of city-county separation in 
Ontario since the 1970s. This project began by asking two research questions:  
1. Under what conditions does cooperation occur between these institutionally 
autonomous municipal governments? 
2. Does the continued use of city-county separation as an institution still achieve 
its intended objectives? 
To answer these questions, I used a combination of a provincial review of cooperative 
agreements and three in-depth case studies: Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe County, Guelph-
Wellington County and London-Middlesex County. To help guide the study, I selected 
the Institutional Collective Action framework to help identify variables that both hinder 
and help inter-local cooperation. I then examined four main themes: border expansion, 
planning, social service delivery and the signing of formal inter-local agreements.  
 This chapter summarizes these findings and aims to fulfill three objectives. First, 
to explore the nature of cooperation between separated cities and counties as it relates to 
the study’s first research question. Without any institutional linkages, separated cities and 
counties must rely on cooperation to ensure service continuity and fulfill their policy 
mandates. Consequently, the relationship between separated cities and their counties is 
important. I analyze this relationship below, along with some of the factors that both help 
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and hinder cooperation. Second, and related to this project’s second research question, I 
will examine the institution of city-county separation and compare its continued use to 
regional government in Ontario. And, finally, I will explore the applicability of the ICA 
framework to Canadian case studies.  
 
8.1.     Cooperation Between Separated Cities and Counties 
 Without any institutional linkages connecting separated cities and their counties, 
this study began with the hypothesis that cooperation would be key to ensuring service 
continuity between both areas. Consequently, I examined two forms of cooperation in 
chapters 6 and 7: forced and voluntary cooperation, by exploring the CMSM and the 
creation of inter-local agreements. The CMSM process represents a mandated area of 
cooperation. Although municipalities province-wide were forced to absorb the costs of 
social service delivery, only separated cities and counties were required to arrive at their 
own funding formula independently. Most were able to reach amicable agreements, while 
some opted to enter the arbitration process.  
 Arbitration proved costly and divisive. While most areas had very positive 
relations before the CMSM mandate, tensions rose as both sides attempted to reach a 
balanced settlement. In this case, the distinction between urban and rural jurisdictions 
could not be more different, with both expressing their belief that they had different 
needs with regard to social services funding. Counties generally feel that social services 
are largely an urban policy area, whereas cities resent the amount of direction and input 
that counties have over the delivery of social services. 
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In Guelph, the relationship between the city and the county deteriorated 
significantly after arbitration. One official from Wellington County aptly summed up the 
experience, arguing that, “no one comes through that process without any scars” 
(Personal Interview – April 16, 2012). Both sides began to distrust each other, which 
carried over into other policy areas. Soon after, both sides looked to formalize any areas 
of cooperation and refused to enter into informal agreements. The Guelph experience 
informed the strategies of London, Barrie and Orillia officials as they entered into CMSM 
re-negotiations. Seeing how quickly the relationship between Guelph and Wellington 
County declined after arbitration, they hoped to avoid this scenario with their own 
counties.  
 Arbitration represents the minority of experiences with CMSM implementation. 
While some municipalities like Guelph and Wellington County allowed the CMSM 
arbitration process to sour their relationship, others quietly reached funding agreements 
without the need for arbitration. However, even those that were able to reach an initial 
agreement, such as London-Middlesex and Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe, have concerns about 
funding responsibilities and the way in which CMSM policy areas are delivered. While 
some ICA research insists that increased senior government regulation can hinder 
cooperation, Ontario’s municipalities are already heavily regulated to begin with. This 
environment of regulation has not had a negative effect on the relationships between 
separated cities and counties, which is consistent with Canadian ICA studies in this area 
(Alcantara and Nelles 2009).  
 While some municipalities have apprehensions about the cost of delivering social 
services, another source of tension resulting from the CMSM was the inevitable clash 
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between urban and rural areas. The municipalities that went to arbitration built their cases 
around assumptions regarding both areas’ respective need for servicing. Some counties, 
such as Essex, viewed the CMSM as a policy area that their residents did not need. As 
such, they believed they did not need to contribute at the same rate as Windsor. Other 
counties, such as Wellington County, argued that there was a significant two-way flow of 
social service users between both the city and the county. In both cases, the province was 
downloading what was perceived as an “urban service” and expecting rural areas to 
negotiate a contribution model that was equitable with separated cities. Where urban/rural 
distinctions were sharper, there was much more tension resulting from CMSM 
implementation. Areas with suburbanizing municipalities on the outskirts of urban areas 
did not see CMSM policy areas as exclusively “urban” and did not reject funding them 
on principle.  
 While Chapter 6 focused on mandated CMSM agreements, Chapter 7 focused on 
voluntary cooperation.  In total, I collected 275 agreements from Ontario’s separated 
cities and counties. These agreements cover a range of policy areas, although the vast 
majority of the agreements focus on CMSM policy areas or emergency services—both of 
which are areas that the provincial government mandates, to some degree, municipalities 
to have. Only 102 of the 275 identified agreements can be described as truly cooperative 
and voluntary. This result was surprising, given that the first chapter hypothesized that 
the very lack of institutional linkages between separated cities and counties would require 
the two areas to rely heavily on agreement formation. However, this is not the case.  
 In addition to signing fewer formal agreements than expected, separated cities and 
counties also do not seem to be entering into informal agreements either. Some regions 
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do have a number of informal agreements, of which London-Middlesex is a good 
example. However, London and Middlesex differ in their perception of the number of 
informal agreements actually in existence. Guelph officials, on the other hand, have made 
a concerted effort to formalize any informal agreements after their CMSM arbitration 
soured their relationship with the county. Both sides believed that this brought them a 
measure of legal protection if there was ever a subsequent dispute regarding policy areas. 
Barrie-Orillia-Simcoe has avoided the use of informal agreements altogether, mainly due 
to long-standing institutional practices in each area that have always tended to codify any 
inter-governmental activity. Accordingly, not only does the use of informal agreements 
differs by area but many communities also appear to have been actively avoided them.  
 Why do so few agreements exist between separated cities and counties in 
Ontario? The answer to this question may lie in the nature of city-county separation as an 
institution itself. Urban areas were initially separated from rural areas because they were 
seen as economically, socially and politically distinct. With so little in common, 
provincial policy-makers believed that linking them would be counterproductive. 
Furthermore, if the two areas have so few shared interests, both areas should have 
different service needs and demands. As such, cooperation on servicing was not a 
priority.  
 However, as Chapter 5 described, many areas around separated cities are actively 
turning from rural to suburban. Unlike regional governments, separated cities do not have 
any input about the type of development occurring around them. When the municipalities 
around separated cities aggressively pursue development, as in the case of Middlesex 
Centre, separated cities have few options to bring that development within their borders. 
 259 
Thus, separated cities have commonly used annexation to address development outside 
their borders. Officials from London have adopted this tactic while simultaneously 
restricting Middlesex Centre’s access to their resources and services in an effort to slow 
down growth in neighbouring communities. However, some London officials 
acknowledge that this is only a temporary solution and that annexation may be necessary 
in the future.  
While development has, thus far, created some tension between London and its 
surrounding communities, expanding rural areas in other regions has opened up 
additional channels of cooperation as the servicing needs between separated cities and 
their surrounding areas become more aligned. This perhaps explains why there are more 
agreements in urbanizing counties, such as Simcoe County, and fewer in more rural 
areas, such as Renfrew-Pembroke. As rural municipalities become more suburbanized, 
they may reach out to nearby separated cities for help with infrastructure and servicing in 
order to achieve development goals. This is precisely what led to Middlesex Centre and 
London’s water dispute. When Middlesex Centre was primarily rural, they had little need 
for London’s help with servicing since, as a rural community, Middlesex Centre was 
largely self-sufficient and residents placed few service demands on the county. However, 
as the municipality became more suburbanized, Middlesex Centre needed expanded 
access to services in order to accommodate future development. While London 
councilors predictably rejected these requests for service extension, the point remains that 
separated cities and counties will have more need for service cooperation as they become 
increasingly homogenous.  
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This is also why American ICA scholars have identified so many agreements in 
American metropolitan areas. The municipalities around American central cities are 
suburban or urban. Very few are rural. As such, they have similar service demands and, 
thus, more need for cooperation. In separated cities and counties, this is not the case, 
which helps explain why separated cities and counties have produced so few cooperative 
agreements over the past twenty years.  
 
8.2.     City/County Separation as an Enduring Institution 
 City-county separation was the original method of organizing municipalities in 
Ontario as a result of organizational thinking that believed politically separating urban 
areas from rural areas was mutually beneficial. Over time, increased suburbanization 
gradually blurred the distinction between urban and rural, replacing the logic behind city-
county separation with the notion that urban and rural needed to be linked. This shift 
largely occurred in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s with the introduction of regional 
government. Beginning with the creation of Metropolitan Toronto, the province 
established a series of regional governments to help coordinate many of Ontario’s rapidly 
urbanizing counties.  
 Two key reports in the 1960s led the push for regional government: the report of 
the Select Committee on the Municipal Act and Related Acts and the report of the 
Ontario Committee on Taxation. The Select Committee on the Municipal Act and 
Related Acts argued that growth and development was no longer isolated to Ontario’s 
urban centres. Areas around cities, and especially around the province’s separated cities, 
were gradually becoming more suburban. This, the committee noted, created serious 
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governance problems: “not only have our cities developed a new vigour but population 
has spilled over into rural areas which are neither financially or politically equipped to 
deal with the resulting problems” (Ontario 1965, 167). The report referred to these newly 
suburbanizing communities as “dormitory municipalities”, that were becoming bedroom 
communities to their larger, urban neighbours (Ontario 1965, 168). The Ontario 
Committee on Taxation found similar results, arguing that the southern part of the 
province was rapidly urbanizing and that the provincial government needed to create 
municipal structures that could properly address the needs of these areas (Ontario 1967b).  
 Although these two reports helped establish regional governments across the 
province, eighteen cities and towns were left separated from their counties once this 
process had concluded. The province later turned its attention towards these areas in the 
1980s, finding similar trends of urban growth as cities. Patterns for the Future, a 1987 
provincial report, agreed that Ontario’s counties were experiencing rapid rates of growth. 
The report argued that, “few municipalities are now predominantly rural in nature,” and 
that suburban development will likely lead to increased annexation disputes (Ontario 
1987, 19). These problems placed the viability of the separated city-county system into 
doubt.  
 Two additional reports found similar trends. In 1988, County Government in 
Ontario, argued that, “the distinction between the rural and urban communities in 
counties is no longer as clear as it once was…this change has placed new requirements 
and demands on a government system designed for a primarily agricultural society” 
(Ontario 1988, 1). In this case, it appeared that Ontario was outgrowing its old county 
system, necessitating changes to adapt these structures to the new reality of population 
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growth and settlement. Toward an Ideal County, published in 1990, recommended the re-
integration of separated cities back into county structures as a way to overcome the 
problems associated with increased urbanization.  
 Despite this series of reports, city-county separation remains a part of Ontario’s 
municipal landscape to this day. Yet, the urbanization that each report describes has also 
not abated; in fact, in some areas, it has only grown stronger. The previous chapters on 
planning and border expansion effectively highlight this: officials from lower-tiers on the 
outskirts of some separated cities are no longer content to allow their municipalities to 
remain rural. Rather, they hope to attract residential, commercial and industrial 
development and expand their assessment base. Furthermore, in some instances, such as 
in Middlesex County, politicians from these areas are not shy about their ambitions to 
become suburban enclaves to the separated cities they border.  
 These aspirations are the antithesis of the logic that first created city-county 
separation in the province: rural areas were to remain rural and separated cities were to 
remain urban. Shifting population and settlement patterns have eradicated this formerly 
clear and clean-cut distinction. Ultimately, the authors of Patterns for the Future were 
correct: few municipalities remain predominantly rural in nature, especially in southern 
Ontario. This fact has created tensions between some separated cities and their 
surrounding areas. Officials from cities that want to ensure that the majority of 
development and growth around them occurs within their borders must now compete 
against newly ambitious politicians from rural municipalities.  
 Separated cities commonly use annexation to control development. London, 
Orillia, Barrie and Guelph have all incrementally expanded its borders, generally with the 
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help of the province. London has undergone 15 major boundary expansions, while Barrie 
has expanded its borders nine times since 1954. There have been eight rounds of 
annexation in Guelph as the city progressively expands outwards. Provincial officials 
have facilitated these expansions, using the justification that each city must expand to 
facilitate development. In some cases—most notably in London and Barrie—these 
annexation disputes become hostile, requiring provincial intervention to resolve the 
conflict. Other separated cities, such as St. Thomas, use planning collectives to control 
the type of growth and development in their adjoining areas. 
 City-county separation remains most enduring in areas where urban areas want to 
remain urban and rural areas want to remain rural. Guelph’s most recent annexation, for 
example, was aided by the desire of county officials to remain rural and provide the city 
with the land it needed to grow. On the other hand, London and Barrie’s experiences 
have been more negative because the desire of city officials to expand now conflicts with 
their desire of officials from their once rural neighbours to grow. Even St. Thomas’ 
planning collective nearly fell apart when one rural participant removed itself because its 
officials felt that the allocation of development was too one-sided in St. Thomas’ favour.  
Nevertheless, city-county separation is an enduring institution that remains in 
place due largely to the following three factors. The first is that many counties with a 
separated city are still mostly rural. While some areas such as Simcoe County are 
experiencing rapid growth rates in various areas, other regions, such as Renfrew County, 
Lanark County, or the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, remain predominantly 
rural and experience very modest rates of growth compared to their separated cities and 
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other rural municipalities. In these instances, there is not much need for institutional 
change since the original intention of city-county separation is being maintained.  
The second is that the re-integration of separated cities is, in some cases, entirely 
unfeasible. The problem identified in the reports from the 1980s that recommended an 
end to city-county separation remain: there is no clear way to re-integrate large cities 
back into county life without severely curtailing the representation of smaller 
communities on re-constituted county councils. Each report stated that the distinction 
between urban and rural was rapidly breaking down, but none could offer concrete 
recommendations on how to manage this newfound reality. The pragmatics of re-
introducing a separated city into its county are daunting and, as such, institutional change 
is not a realistic option.  
Finally, the province of Ontario has allowed the progressive outward expansion of 
separated cities for decades, ensuring that the maintenance of city-county separation 
remains an institutional practice through the continuous absorption of urbanizing territory 
into separated cities. Despite the insistence of provincial policy makers in the 1980s that 
city-county separation needed to be stopped, the province has continuously maintained 
city-county separation through this incremental expansion. This type of expansion is 
similar to other Canadian municipalities, most notably Calgary, which has slowly 
annexed unincorporated territory and rural municipalities since its inception (Foran 
2009). Through this incremental annexation process, Ontario’s separated cities, much like 
Calgary, have grown enough that that city borders now comfortably contain much of the 
region’s urban growth. While officials from some neighbouring rural municipalities have 
a newfound desire to grow and expand, the province has continuously allowed separated 
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cities to annex developing territory, thereby re-enforcing and maintaining the institution 
of city-county separation.  
 Although separated cities have commonly used provincially supported annexation 
to control growth, these boundary extensions are sometimes controversial. Prior to the 
provincial push towards consolidation in the 1990s, large separated cities were more 
easily able to annex the smaller bordering communities. As Williams and Downey (1999) 
demonstrate, the provincial government’s amalgamation agenda created larger 
municipalities with larger populations. Consequently, it then becomes more difficult to 
annex larger communities since they are now stronger governmental actors. 
Consequently, although Innisfil—a growing community bordering Barrie—was recently 
subjected to an attempted annexation, its increased size allowed it to fight against the 
broader boundary expansion. Barrie eventually received a smaller annexation than 
requested, in large part because Innisfil officials made a convincing case against a bigger 
expansion into their municipality. Thus, the province’s preferences for consolidation 
sometimes work at cross-purposes: while consolidation traditionally facilitates the 
preservation of the system of city-county separation by allowing separated cities to 
expand their borders to take in more urbanizing sections of the county, the provincial 
push for consolidation in the 1990s also created stronger municipalities on the edge of 
separated cites, making further annexations more challenging. 
Since rates of urbanization continue to grow, some counties with a separated 
city—such as Simcoe County—could make a strong case for why they should be 
converted into regional governments that could help with items such as regional 
planning. In the absence of these types of conversions, the province has attempted to fill 
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the gap, acting as an arbiter in annexation disputes and helping to regulate land use and 
development in certain areas. Whatever direction the province chooses to take, the fact 
remains that in many areas, the weakened distinction between urban and rural has wide-
ranging effects, particularly in policy areas such as planning and service delivery. 
Arguably, rural communities could avoid many of these consequences by choosing to 
remain solely rural. However, in many cases, rural communities are encouraging urban 
growth to the detriment of cities that continue to adhere to the original logic of municipal 
organization in their region.  
 
8.3.     Review of the ICA Framework 
 At the outset of this work, I believed the ICA framework—with its emphasis on 
factors that both help and hinder cooperation—would help explore the relationship 
between separated cities and counties. Although I acknowledged that there are vast 
differences between the American metropolitan areas that ICA framework usually studies 
and Ontario’s separated cities and counties, I nevertheless used several ICA factors to 
explore how cooperation could overcome the differing institutional contexts found in 
both areas. However, following a thorough examination of several policy areas, including 
planning, border expansion and service delivery, I have to acknowledge that the ICA 
framework cannot substantially add to our understanding of the types of relationships 
inherent in city-county separation. 
 Metropolitan areas typically include a large central city, with municipalities in 
various states of urbanization that emanate from its core. The municipalities immediately 
surrounding the central city are likely suburban in character, which establishes common 
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servicing needs and a basis for cooperation. In Ontario, the provincial government has 
allowed separated cities to progressively expand outwards, absorbing territory primed for 
urbanization, thereby ensuring that the separated city remains primarily urban and its 
surrounding municipalities remain primarily rural. The province, then, has made 
conscious attempts to maintain the institution of city-county separation.  
As such, the government of Ontario has taken a consolidationist approach to 
separated cities. This mentality has broad consequences for the application of the ICA 
framework. First and foremost, the ICA framework is rooted in new regionalism, which 
takes a negative attitude towards institutional consolidation. New regionalist thinkers 
view consolidation as unnecessary and point to alternative means, such as the 
establishment of cooperative agreements or joint-servicing bodies, to create governance 
networks and link metropolitan areas together. The promotion of a progressive outward 
expansion of separated cities is not a policy that fits with the new regionalist outlook on 
municipal governance. 
The province’s adoption of a consolidationist approach towards its separated 
cities has created regions that have very little in common and few mutual-servicing 
needs. Although policy makers occasionally delimit metropolitan areas for census or 
statistical purposes, very few American ICA studies include rural areas when defining 
metropolitan areas. In Ontario, rural areas are naturally included in the counties that 
surround separated cities since it was, by definition, the entire point of city-county 
separation. This creates another challenge in easily applying the ICA framework to 
Ontario’s separated cities and counties.  
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 The municipalities in American metropolitan areas include central cities and the 
suburban communities that have grown on their periphery over time. As such, they have 
very similar service needs. Within this environment, cooperation comes more naturally 
and, given the similar service demands from residents, likely assumes priority status. 
However, urban and rural areas have fewer areas of cooperation. American metropolitan 
areas and Ontario’s separated cities and counties, then, are not analogous in either size or 
service needs.  
 A further hindrance to the application of the ICA framework within this study is 
the amount of government regulation that control Ontario municipalities. In the United 
States, state governments are much less interventionist than in Canada, where provincial 
and regional governments exert more influence over local governments. Existing ICA 
research is unable to state conclusively to what effect regulation and control from senior 
levels of government has upon American municipalities. Consequently, without any type 
of definitive answers regarding this variable, it is challenging to compare this factor 
across jurisdictions.  
The ICA framework tells us that inter-local agreements link municipalities within 
multi-municipal regions and represent not only a governance model, but also an 
alternative to institutional change and consolidation. In Ontario’s separated cities and 
counties, very little independent cooperation seems to occur. Instead of inter-local 
agreements, Ontario’s separated cities and counties seem mostly linked by provincial 
involvement, which has intervened in planning and boundary expansion, downloaded 
social services and mandated certain types of cooperation. As a result, it is not 
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agreements that link these regions but regulation. Consequently, the basic premise of the 
ICA framework plays only a secondary role in Ontario’s separated cities and counties.  
 
8.4.     Conclusion 
 Separated cities and counties are peculiar institutions. Once a hallmark of 
Ontario’s municipal system, their steady conversion into regional governments 
transforms them into a relic. Replacing the concept of politically separating an urban area 
from its surrounding rural hinterland is the concept of linking these two areas together. 
This change occurred slowly and, consequently, there are currently only a handful of 
separated cities that remain. Many of Ontario’s separated cities were re-integrated with 
their counties either through the creation of regional government or through 
amalgamation.  
 Since provincial policy-makers ended the practice of city-county separation, very 
little research has explored the nature of governance within these areas. Accordingly, this 
project attempts to shed some light on this old institutional practice. By collecting and 
analyzing the inter-local agreements between Ontario’s separated cities and counties and 
conducting interviews with city officials in three counties with separated cities, this study 
demonstrates the antiquation of a system that is challenged by urbanization. As the 
communities around many separated cities become suburbanized and, in some cases 
develop into cities of their own, the provincial government’s consolidationist agenda in 
the 1990s enlarged these municipalities, making them harder to absorb.  
 Notwithstanding this trend, the province has, however, allowed separated cities to 
expand. In the three case studies included in this project, numerous rounds of annexation 
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enabled London, Barrie and Guelph to take in developing territory, ensuring that each 
city remained the dominant urban municipality within their regions. While annexation 
has been the traditional response of separated cities facing rapid development along their 
borders, this may become increasingly hard to enact in the future. Two of the case studies 
included in this project, London and Barrie, have developing rural neighbours that are 
deliberately attempting to attract residents and development. Officials from these areas no 
longer see their neighbouring separated cities as the lone destinations of growth. They 
harbour their own desires to expand. Having been enlarged by the provincial push for 
annexation in the 1990s, these once-rural municipalities have become stronger inter-
governmental actors, making annexation an increasingly more difficult prospect for 
separated cities. It remains to be seen whether annexation will be able to effectively 
address these growth problems in the future.  
 The ICA framework indicates that inter-local agreements can effectively link a 
region together and provide the type of governance that it lacks. Yet, in Ontario’s 
separated cities and counties, few agreements exist; instead, central government 
regulation and control links these areas together. By taking a consolidationist approach to 
its separated cities, the province has allowed them to progressively expand, ultimately 
decreasing the number of common service demands between separated cities and 
counties and removing any natural basis for cooperation.  
 Two main factors, then, can be seen as having the largest impact on the prospects 
of cooperation between separated cities and counties: the provincial government and the 
level of ruralness in the county surrounding a separated city. When the counties 
surrounding separated cities are primarily rural and officials are content to have their 
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communities remain rural, the servicing bases of these communities and their nearby 
separated cities are divergent and do not lend themselves well as a basis for cooperation. 
These areas, by definition, do not have much in common and have no true need to 
cooperate on servicing. When county lower-tier municipalities do develop, and 
eventually become suburban in nature, similar service demands between a county and its 
separated city become apparent. While this new relationship creates more possibility for 
cooperation, separated cities have shown little interest in cooperating on service areas 
that could facilitate growth in the municipalities outside of their borders. As discussed 
above, the provincial government has consistently allowed the expansion of separated 
cities outward, enabling separated cities to absorb urbanizing territory in the county. If 
the province had not allowed such expansion, separated cities would have few options 
remaining and may be forced to cooperate more with their neighbours in the county. 
Provincial initiative and a high degree of ruralness are the main impediments to 
cooperation between separated cities and counties.  
 What does the future hold for city-county separation as an institutional practice? 
Change is unlikely. Several reports in the 1980s strongly recommended the re-integration 
of separated cities back into their counties, believing that this would allow for greater 
regional planning and coordination while reducing conflict between urban and rural 
areas. However, the challenges of such a wide institutional change was—and remains—
too great. While some cities, such as Sarnia, were brought back into their counties, the 
hurdles remained in other areas. Population differences between cities and counties 
ensured that urban areas would virtually control any re-constituted county council, an 
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obstacle too large for most regions to overcome. Since those same challenges exist today, 
this type of institutional change is as unlikely now as it was in the 1980s.  
 Many of Ontario’s separated cities are experiencing a great deal of pressure to 
address growth along their borders. Their once rural neighbours have designs to grow and 
develop, usually at the expense of separated cities. This is an aspect that cannot be 
ignored and puts the entire institution of city-county separation into jeopardy. 
Furthermore, many counties with separated cities likely would benefit from the type of 
joint planning and decision-making bodies that regional governments tend to create. 
Unless separated cities and counties can find ways of addressing the conflicting 
development goals that both communities hold, increased urbanization will continue to 
challenge the relevance of city-county separation as an institutional tool.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 273 
REFERENCES 
 
Aitchison, J.H. “The Municipal Corporations Act of 1849,” in Canadian Historical 
 Review, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1949.  
Alcantara, Christopher and Jen Nelles, “Claiming the City: Co-operation and Making the  
Deal in Urban Comprehensive Land Claims Negotiations in Canada,” in  
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3, September 2009.  
Allan, Howard A. Arbitration This 2nd Day of January 2001, Between The Corporation of 
 the City of Pembroke and the Corporation of the County of Renfrew. Perth, 2001. 
Andrew, Simon A. “Adaptive versus Restrictive Contracts: Can They Resolve Different 
 Risk Problems?” in Self-Organizing Federalism: Collaborative Mechanisms to  
 Mitigate Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 University Press, 2010.  
Andrew, Simon A. Governance by Agreements: Why Do Local Governments Enter  
 Into Multilateral Agreements. Detroit, MI: Working Group on Interlocal Services  
 Cooperation, Wayne State University, 2008. 
Andrew, Simon A. “Recent Developments in the Study of Interjurisdicitonal Agreements:  
 An Overview and Assessment,” in State and Local Government Review, Vol. 41,  
 No. 2, 2009.  
Archer, Ian A. “Politics and Government, 1540-1700,” in The Cambridge Urban History  
 of Britain: Volume II, 1540-1840, eds. Peter Clark, Cambridge: Cambridge  
 University Press, 2000.  
Armstrong, Frederick H. Handbook of Upper Canadian Chronology. Toronto: Dundurn 
 Press, 1985.  
Atkins, Patricia. Local Intergovernmental Agreements: Strategies for Cooperation.  
 International City/County Management Association Management Information 
 System Report. Vol. 29 (7) July 1997.  
Atkins, Patricia, John Dewitt and Jennifer Thangavelu. The Emerging Regional  
Governance Network. Washington, D.C.: National Association of Regional  
Councils and National Academy of Public Administration, 1999.  
Bain, Chester W. “A Body Incorporate”: The Evolution of City-County Separation in 
 Virginia. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1967.  
Baldwin, R.M. and J. Baldwin. The Baldwins and the Great Experiment. Don Mills:  
 Longmans Canada, 1969.  
Basolo, Victoria and Dorian Hastings. “Obstacles to Regional Housing Solutions: A  
 Comparison of Four Metropolitan Areas” in Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 25,  
 No. 4, 2003.  
Beecroft, Eric. Restructuring an Ontario County: The Oxford Achievement. London: 
 Department of Political Science, The University of Western Ontario, 1983. 
Berkley Consulting Group. Simcoe Governance Review Final Report. Toronto: Berkley 
 Consulting Group, 2010. 
Bickers, Kenneth N, Stephanie Post and Robert M. Stein. “The Political Market for  
 Intergovernmetnal Cooperation,” in Self-Organizing Federalism, eds. Ricahrd C. 
 Feiock and John T. Scholz. Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2010.  
Bickers, Kenneth N. and Robert M. Stein. “Interlocal Cooperation and the Distribution of 
 of Federal Grant Awards,” in Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, 2004.  
 274 
Birnbaum, Leah, Lorenzo Nicolet and Zack Taylor. Simcoe County: The New Growth  
 Frontier. Toronto: Neptis Foundation, 2004.  
Bish, Robert. Local Government Amalgamations: Discredited Nineteenth-Century Ideals 
 Alive in the Twenty-First. Ottawa: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, 2001.  
Bish, Robert. The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas. Chicago: Markham, 1971.  
Bish, Robert and Vincent Ostrom. Understanding Urban Government: Metropolitan  
 Reform Reconsidered. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public  
 Policy Research, 1974.  
Blair, George S. American Local Government. New York: Harper & Row Publishers,  
 1964.  
Blanchard, Richard. “South Simcoe Mayors Show Little Appetite for County Police  
 Force,” in The Scope, March 7, 2012.  
Bourne, Larry. “Alternative Models of Managing Metropolitan Regions: The Challenge  
 for North American Cities.” Paper Presented at the International Forum on  
 Metropolitanization. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: March 11-12, 1999.  
Brock, Daniel J. “The Shaping of Middlesex,” in The London and Middlesex Historian,  
 Vol. 17, Autumn 1990.  
Brownstone, Meyer and T.J. Plunkett. Metropolitan Winnipeg: Politics and Reform of  
Local Government. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1983.  
Byerly, A.E. The Beginning of Things in Wellington and Waterloo Counties. Guelph:  
Guelph Publishing Company, 1935.  
Cameron, David M. and Paul A.R. Hobson. “Nova Scotia” in Foundations of  
 Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, eds. Andrew  
Sancton and Robert Young. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.  
Careless, James M.S. Careless at Work: Selected Canadian Historical Studies. Toronto: 
 Dundurn Press, 1990.  
Careless, James M.S. The Pre-Confederation Premiers: Ontario Government Leaders,  
 1841-1867. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.  
Carr, Jared B. “Whose Game Do We Play? Local Government Boundary Change and  
 Metropolitan Governance,” in Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition 
 and Cooperation, eds. Richard C. Feiock. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown  
 University Press, 2004.  
Carroll, Aileen. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Hansard. Toronto: Province of  
Ontario, September 23, 2009.  
Central Elgin. Agreement Between the Corporation of the City of St. Thomas and the 
 Corporation of the Municipality of Central Elgin. December 2011. 
Central Elgin Planning Office. Southwold Withdrawal from Central Elgin Planning Area 
- 2008 Financial Impact. St. Thomas: Central Elgin Planning Advisory 
Committee. 2007.  
Chandler, J.A. Explaining Local Government: Local Government in Britain Since 1800. 
 Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007.  
City of Guelph. “County and City Reach and Agreement on Wellington Terrace 
 Funding.” Guelph: City of Guelph, March 29, 2012.  
City of Guelph. “Guelph’s CAO Steps Down.” Guelph: City of Guelph, March 1,  
2011[a]. 
City of Guelph. “Minutes of the Committee of the Whole.” Guelph: City of Guelph,  
 275 
 April 26, 2010. 
City of Guelph. “Minutes of the Committee of the Whole.” Guelph: City of Guelph,  
 February 15, 2011[b]. 
City of Guelph. “Minutes of the Committee of the Whole.” Guelph: City of Guelph,  
 April 13, 2011 [c] 
City of Guelph. “Minutes of the Committee of the Whole.” Guelph: City of Guelph,  
 April 26, 2011[d].  
City of Guelph. “Minutes of the Committee of the Whole.” Guelph: City of Guelph, 
 September 26, 2011[e]. 
City of Guelph. “SUBBOR to Pay City of Guelph $2.5 million.” Guelph: City of Guelph, 
 November 23, 2009.  
City of London. Proposal for Boundary Adjustments. London: City of London,  
 November 18, 1988.  
City of London. Staff Recommendation To Chair and Members of the Built and  
 Natural Environment Committee Meeting on Monday August 15, 2011. 
 London: City of London, August 15, 2011.  
City of London and Middlesex Centre. Sewage Treatment Amending Agreement.  
 June 21, 2000.  
City of London and Middlesex County. Consolidated Municipal Service Management  
 Agreement. London: City of London, February 19, 2002.  
City of London and Middlesex County. Land Ambulance Municipal Service  
 Management Agreement. London: City of London, 2006. 
City of London/Middlesex County. Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the County/City 
 Liaison Committee. April 6, 2006.  
City of London/Middlesex County. Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the County/City 
 Liaison Committee. October 30, 2007.  
City of London/Middlesex County. Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the County/City 
 Liaison Committee. November 25, 2008.  
City of London/Middlesex County. Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the County/City 
 Liaison Committee. May 18, 2010.  
City of London/Middlesex County. Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the County/City  
 Liaison Committee. August 25, 2006. 
City of Mississauga. Boundary Adjustment Agreement. September 1, 2009.  
Clarke, John J. The Local Government of the United Kingdom. London: Sir Isaac Pitman 
 & Sons, 1948. 
Clarke, John J. A History of Local Government of the United Kingdom. Westport:  
 Greenwood Press Publishers, 1955.  
Cobban, Timothy. The Role of Municipalities in Stimulating Economic Growth: 
 Evidence from the Petroleum Manufacturing Industry in Southern Ontario, 1860- 
 1960. PhD Thesis. The University of Western Ontario, 2008.  
Colbourne, Douglas S. Arbitration Between the Corporation of the City of Guelph and  
 the Corporation of the County of Wellington. Toronto, 2010.  
Colton, Timothy J. Big Daddy: Frederick G. Gardiner and the Building of Metropolitan  
 Toronto. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.  
Cook, Karen S., Russell Hardin and Margaret Levi. Cooperation Without Trust? New  
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005.  
 276 
County of Grey/Owen Sound. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Corporation  
 of the County of Grey and the Corporation of the City of Owen Sound. County of 
 Grey: Owen Sound, 2000.  
County of Wellington. By-Law Number 2661: A By-Law to Authorize the Execution of  
 an Agreement Between the Corporation of the County of Wellington and the  
 Corporation of the City of Guelph for the Administration of Welfare Services.  
 Guelph: County of Wellington, 1969.  
County of Wellington. By-Law 3328-83: A By-Law to Authorize the Execution of an  
 Agreement Between the Corporation of the County of Wellington and the  
 Corporation of the City of Guelph for the Administration of Social Services 
 Dated the 19th Day of May, 1983. Guelph: County of Wellington, 1983.  
County of Wellington. By-Law 3998-94: A By-Law to Authorize the Warden and Clerk  
 to Sign an Agreement with The Corporation of the City of Guelph With Respect  
 to the Administration of Social Services, Dated the 1st Day of January, 1995.  
 Guelph: County of Wellington, 1995.  
County of Wellington. File No. 113.0: Corporation Boundaries. Guelph: County of  
 Wellington, 1994.  
County of Wellington. Options for Wellington: Wellington County Study Interim Report. 
 Guelph: Wellington County, 1990.  
County of Wellington. The Way Ahead: Wellington County Study, Final Report 1990- 
 91. Guelph: Wellington County, 1991.  
Cousins, Gary. Wellington County Study: Future Lands Needs, City of Guelph. Guelph: 
 Wellington County Planning and Development Department, 1990.  
Craig, John. Simcoe County: The Recent Past. Midland: Simcoe County, 1977.  
Crouch, Winston W. “Metropolitan Government in Toronto,” in Public Administration  
 Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1954.  
De Bono, Norman. “Man’s Home Really Is His Castle,” in The London Free Press,  
 September 16, 2012.  
De Bono, Norman. “Mighty Just Got Mightier,” in The London Free Press, November 
 27, 2010.  
Dillon Consulting. Intergovernmental Action Plan for Simcoe, Barrie and Orillia.  
 Toronto: Dillon Consulting, 2006.  
Downey, Terrence J. and Robert J. Williams. “Provincial Agendas, Local Responses: The  
 “Common Sense” Restructuring of Ontario’s Municipal Governments,” in  
 Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1998.  
Duncombe, Herbert Sydney. Modern County Government. Washington, D.C.: National 
 Association of Counties, 1977 
Feiock, Richard C. “Introduction: Regionalism and Institutional Collective Action,” in  
Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation, eds. Richard  
Feiock. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004.  
Feiock, Richard C. “Rational Choice and Regional Governance,” in Journal of Urban  
 Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2007. 
Feiock, Richard C., In Won Lee, Hyung Jun Park and Keon-Hyung Lee. “Collaboration 
 Networks Among Local Elected Officials: Information, Commitment and Risk 
 Aversion,” in Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2010.  
Feiock, Richard C. and Jered Carr. “Incentives, Entrepreneurs and Boundary Change:  
 277 
 A Collective Action Framework,” in Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 36, 2001.  
Feldman, Lionel D. A Compendium of Information Re: County of Strathcona 20,  
 Alberta. Kingston: Lionel D. Feldman Consulting, 1979.  
Fischel, William A. The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local  
 Government Taxation, School Finance and Land-Use Policies. Cambridge:  
 Harvard University Press, 2005.  
Foran, Maxwell L. Expansive Discourses: Urban Sprawl in Calgary, 1945-1978.  
 Athabasca: Athabasca University Press, 2009.  
Foster, Kathryn A. Regionalism on Purpose. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land  
 Policy, 2001.  
Frisken, Frances. The Public Metropolis: The Political Dynamics of Urban Expansion in  
the Toronto Region, 1924 – 2003. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2007. 
Frisken, Francis. “The Toronto Story: Sober Reflections on Fifty Years of Experiments 
 with Regional Governance,” in Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2001.  
Frisken, Frances and Donald F. Norris. “Regionalism Reconsidered,” in Journal of  
Urban Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2001.  
Fyfe, Stewart. “Local Government Reform in Ontario,” in Urban Problems Revised, eds.  
R. Charles Bryfogle and Ralph R. Krueger. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston  
of Canada, 1975 
Fyfe, Stewart and Ron M. Farrow. Waterloo Area Local Government Review: Report on 
 Findings and Recommendations. Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1970.  
Gainsborough, Juliette. “Bridging the City-Suburb Divide: States and the Politics of  
 Regional Cooperation,” in Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2001.  
Garcea, Joseph and Donald Gilchrist. “Saskatchewan,” in Foundation of Governance: 
 Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces. Toronto: University of Toronto 
 Press, 2009.  
Garcea, Joseph and Edward LeSage Jr. Municipal Reform in Canada: Reconfiguration,  
Re-Empowerment and Rebalancing. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Giroux, Dominic. “Towards a New Campus in Downtown Barrie” in President’s Blog 
 <http://blog.laurentian.ca/president/?p=524> September 27, 2011.  
Glazebrook, G.P. deT. “The Origins of Local Government,” in Aspects of Nineteenth- 
 Century Ontario, eds. F.H. Armstrong et al. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
 1974.  
Gough, Lynne. Guelph and Wellington County Arbitration Report on Planning in Guelph 
 and Wellington County. Burlington: Gough Consulting, 2009.  
Guelph Mercury. “City and County Look to Bury Hatchets,” in Guelph Mercury, April 
 2, 2012.  
Gulati, Ranjay and Harbir Singh. “The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing  
Coordination Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances,” in  
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1998.  
Gulick, Luther Harvey. The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas. New York:  
 Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.  
Hain, Bruce. “Innisfil Takes Protest to Queen’s Park,” in Barrie Advance, May 28, 2009.  
Halfnight, Drew. “Guelph-Wellington Relations Not Resonating as Hot Election Issue,”  
 in Guelph Mercury, October 12, 2010.  
Harris, Richard. Creeping Conformity: How Canada Became Suburban, 1900-1960.  
 278 
 Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.  
Hawkins, Christopher V. and Simon A. Andrews. “Understanding Horizontal and  
 Vertical Relations in the Context of Economic Development Joint Venture  
 Agreements,” in Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2011.  
Heinelt, Hubert and Daniel Kübler. Metropolitan Governance: Capacity, Democracy and  
 the Dynamics of Place. New York: Routledge, 2005.  
Higgins, Donald J.H. Local and Urban Politics in Canada. Toronto: Gage Educational 
 Publishing Co., 1986. 
History of the County of Middlesex, Canada. Belleville: Mike Studio, 1972.  
Hollick, Thomas R. and David Siegel. Evolution, Revolution, Amalgamation:  
 Restructuring in Three Ontario Municipalities. London: Department of Political 
 Science, The University of Western Ontario, 2001.  
Hulst, Rudie and Andre van Montfort. “Intermunicipal Cooperation: A Widespread  
 Phenomenon,” in Rudie Hulst and Andre van Montfort, eds. Intermunicipal 
 Cooperation in Europe. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008.  
Indergaard, Michael. “Beyond the Region: The Rise and Fall of Economic Regionalism 
 in Downriver Detroit,” in Urban Affairs Review. Vol. 34, No. 2, 1998.  
Jacek, Henry J. “Regional Government and Development: Initiation Implementation and 
 Impact,” in Government and Politics of Ontario, eds. Donald C. MacDonald.  
 Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1985.  
Jones, Victor. Metropolitan Government. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,  
 1942.  
Innes, Joanna and Nicholas Rogers. “Politics and Government, 1700-1840,” in The  
 Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Vol. II: 1540-1840, eds. Peter Clark.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000.  
Innisfil. Managing Growth and Protecting Innisfil’s Communities: Response to a Report 
 Prepared for the City of Barrie on Municipal Boundaries and Government  
 Structure in South Simcoe County. Innisfil: Marshall Macklin Monaghan, 2002. 
Johnson, Claudius O., Daniel M. Ogden Jr., H. Paul Castleberry and Thor Swanson.  
 American State and Local Government, 5th Edition. New York: Thomas Y.  
 Crowell Company, 1972.  
Johnson, Leo A. History of Guelph, 1827-1927. Guelph: Guelph Historical Society,  
 1977.  
Johnson, Martin and Max Neiman. “Courting Business: Competition for Economic  
 Development Among Cities,” in Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition 
 and Cooperation. Eds. Richard C. Feiock. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown  
 University Press, 2004.  
Kanareck, Abby and Mark Baldassare. “Preferences for State and Regional Planning  
Efforts Among California Mayors and City Planning Directors,” in Journal of  
Planning Education and Research, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1996.  
Kaplan, Harold. “Politics and Policy-Making in Metropolitan Toronto,” in The Canadian  
 Journal of Economics and Political Science. Vol. 31, No. 4, Nov 1965.  
Keith-Lucas, Bryan. English Local Government in the Nineteenth and Twentieth  
 Centuries. London: The Historical Association, 1977.  
Keith-Lucas, Bryan. The Unreformed Local Government System. London: Croom Helm,  
 1980. 
 279 
Kresl, P.K. The Urban Economy and Regional Trade Liberalization. New York: Praeger 
 Press, 1992.  
Krueger, Skip and Ethan M. Bernick. “State Rules and Local Governance Choices,” in 
 Publius. Vol. 40, No. 4, 2010.  
Langpeter, Julie. “Attracting Newcomers Key to Area Growth,” in Orillia Packet &  
 Times, February 8, 2012.  
LeRoux, Kelly and Jared B. Carr. “Explaining Local Governmetn Cooperation on Public 
 Works: Evidence from Michigan.” Working Group on Interlocal Services  
 Cooperation, Paper 26, 2007.  
Lubell, Mark, Mark Schneider, John T. Scholz and Mihriye Mete. “Watershed  
Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions,” in American  
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2002.  
Lypaczewski, Nick. “City Interested in Taking More Control of Tourism,” in St. Thomas  
 Times-Journal. January 28, 2013.  
Lynn, Phil. Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats,  
 New Realities: Law Enforcement in the Post-9/11 Era. Washington, D.C.-US  
 Department of Justice, Office of Justice Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance,  
 2005.  
Magnusson, Warren. “Introduction,” in City Politics in Canada, eds. Warren Magnusson 
 and Andrew Sancton. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.  
Maloney, Patrick. “Arva’s Annexation Raised,” in The London Free Press, February 24, 
 2011[b] 
Maloney, Patrick. “City Gives Up $45M to Arva” in The London Free Press, August 16,  
 2011[a], A3 
Maloney, Patrick and Debora Van Brenk. “Arva Decision Causes and Stink,” in The  
 London Free Press, August 31, 2011, A1.  
Martin, Chip. “London Politicians Reject County Meeting,” in London Free Press,  
 May 8, 2012.  
Martin, Chip. “Stuck in the Middle,” in The London Free Press, November 14, 2011.  
Maser, Steven. “Demographic Factors Affecting Constitutional Decisions: The Case of  
Municipal Charters,” in Public Choice, Vol. 47, 1985.  
Matkin, David S. and H. George Frederickson. “Metropolitan Governance: Institutional  
Roles and Interjurisdictional Cooperation,” in Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 31, 
No. 1, 2009.  
Mayo, H.B. and C. Frank Moore. Niagara Region Local Government Review. Toronto:  
 Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1966.  
McColl, J. Stewart. The Cruel and Unusual Treatment of our Middlesex County  
 Residents, 1992. 
McDougall, A.K. John P. Robarts: His Life and Government. Toronto: University 
 of Toronto Press, 1986.  
McKeough, Darcy. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Toronto: Hansard, 1968.  
Menzel, Donald C. The American County: Frontiers of Knowledge. Tuscaloosa:  
 University of Alabama Press, 1996.  
Meridian Planning Consultants. Greater Barrie Area: Local Government Review:  
 The Challenge of Managing Growth. Barrie: Meridian Planning Consultants,  
 2002.  
 280 
Merewether, H.A. and A.J. Stephens. The History of the Boroughs and Municipal  
Corporations of the United Kingdom. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1972.  
Meyer, David. “City Loses Public Health Case in Court; Appeals to Province,” in 
 Wellington Advertiser, October 21, 2011[b].  
Meyer, David. “City, Public Health Still at Odds Over Two New Buildings,” in  
 Wellington Advertiser, August 19, 2011[c].  
Meyer, David. “Two Counties in Court Over City Bid to Stop New Public Health 
 Buildings,” in Wellington Advertiser, June 17, 2011[a].  
Middlesex Centre. By-Law Number 2011-099: Being a By-Law to Adopt  
 Amendment No. 28 to the Official Plan of the Municipality of  
 Middlesex Centre. Middlesex Centre: Municipality of Middlesex Centre,  
 2011.  
Middlesex Centre. Official Plan of the Municipality of Middlesex Centre. Middlesex  
 Centre: Municipality of Middlesex Centre, 2010. 
Miller, Gary J. Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation. Cambridge: 
 MIT Press, 1981.  
Milner, James B. “The Metropolitan Toronto Plan,” in University of Pennsylvania  
 Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 4, February 1957.  
Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Fact Finding Report on the City of London Boundary  
 Issues. Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1990.  
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. Ministerial Order: Order Made Under the  
 Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c.25: August 26, 2008.  
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. Ontario Regulation 260/01: Town of  
 Richmond Hill and Town of Aurora. July 14, 2001.  
Montgomery, Byron. Annexation and Restructuring in Sarnia-Lambton: A Model for 
 Ontario County Government? London: Department of Political Science, The  
 University of Western Ontario, 1990 
Morgan, David and Michael Hirlinger. “Intergovernmental Service Agreements: A 
 Multivariate Explanation,” in Urban Affairs Quarterly. Vol. 27, 1991.  
Mullin, Megan. “Do Special Districts Act Alone? Exploring the Relationship Between  
 Flexible Boundaries and Intergovernmental Cooperation,” in Working Group on 
 Interlocal Services Cooperation, Paper 27, 2007.  
Municipal World. “South Simcoe Municipalities to be Amalgamated,” in Municipal 
 World, Vol. 33, February 1990.  
Munroe, Julia. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Hansard. Toronto: Province of  
Ontario, June 3, 2009.  
Munroe, Julia. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Hansard. Toronto: Province of  
Ontario, December 2, 2009.  
Nader, G.A. Cities of Canada. Vol 1. Theoretical, Historical and Planning Perspectives.   
 Toronto: Macmillan, 1975.  
Nelles, Jennifer. Civic Capital and the Dynamics of Intermunicipal Cooperation for  
 Regional Economic Development. PhD Thesis: The University of Toronto,  
 Department of Political Science, 2009.  
Nelles, Jennifer. “Civic Capital in the Waterloo Region: Enabling Regional Economic  
 Governance,” Paper presented at the 2005 Canadian Political Science  
 Association Conference: London, On.  
 281 
Nelles, Jennifer and David Wolfe. “Civic Capital in the Waterloo Region: Enabling 
 Regional Economic Governance.” Working Paper. Ontario Network on the  
 Regional Innovation System. Toronto: Munk Centre for International Studies, 
 The University of Toronto, 2008.  
Nelles, Jennifer and Christopher Alcantara. “Strengthening the Ties that Bind? An  
 Analysis of Aboriginal-Municipal Inter-Governmental Agreements in British 
 Columbia,” in Canadian Public Administration. Vol. 54, No. 3, 2011.  
Norris, Donald, Don Phares and Tonya Zimmerman. “Metropolitan Government in the  
 United States? Not Now…Not Likely,” in Governing Metropolitan Regions in the 
 21st Century, eds. Don Phares. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2009.  
Norris, Donald. “Prospects for Regional Governance Under the New Regionalism:  
 Economic Imperatives Versus Political Impediments,” in Journal of Urban  
Affairs Vol. 23, No. 5, 2001.  
Nunn, Samuel and Mark Rosentraub. “Dimensions of Interjurisdictional Cooperation,” in  
 Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 63, No. 2. 1997.  
Oakerson, Ronald. Governing Local Public Economies: Creating the Civic Metropolis.  
 Oakland: ICA Press, 1999.  
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  
1965.  
Ontario. Bill 26 – Savings and Restructuring Act, 1995. Toronto: Province of Ontario,  
 1995.  
Ontario. Consolidation of Municipal Services Management: Consolidation Planning  
 Framework: Southern Ontario, January 1998. Toronto: Province of Ontario,  
1998.  
Ontario. County Government in Ontario: Report of the Consultation Committee to the  
 Minister of Municipal Affairs. Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1988.  
Ontario. Explanation of the London-Middlesex Act, 1992. Ontario: Ministry of 
 Municipal Affairs, 1992.  
Ontario. Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997. Ontario: Ministry of Community 
 Safety and Correctional Services, 1997.  
Ontario. Fourth and Final Report of the Select Committee on the Municipal Act and  
 Related Acts. Toronto: Office of the Premier, 1965.  
Ontario. Patterns for the Future: Report of the Advisory Committee on County  
 Government. Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1987.  
Ontario. Places to Grow: Better Choices, Brighter Future – Growth Plan for 
 the Greater Golden Horseshoe. Toronto: Province of Ontario, 2012. 
Ontario. Places to Grow: Better Choices, Brighter Future – Simcoe Area: A  
 Strategic Vision for Growth. Toronto: Province of Ontario, 2009.  
Ontario. The Ontario Committee on Taxation. Vol. I: Approach, Background and  
 Conclusions. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Finance, 1967a.  
Ontario. The Ontario Committee on Taxation. Vol II: The Local Revenue System.  
 Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Finance, 1967b. 
Ontario. Toward an Ideal County: Principles and Programs for a Strong County  
 Government System in Ontario. Toronto: Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1990. 
Ontario. Waterloo Area Local Government Review: Report of Findings and 
 Recommendations. Toronto: Department of Municipal Affairs, 1970.  
 282 
Ontario Municipal Board. OMB Case No. PL100035. Toronto: Government of Ontario, 
 2010[a]. 
Ontario Municipal Board. OMB Case No. PL091041. Toronto: Government of Ontario,  
 2010[b]. 
Ontario Progressive Conservative Party. The Common Sense Revolution. Toronto:  
 Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, 1994. 
Ostrom, Elinor. “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective  
Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997,” in 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1, 1998.  
Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University 
 Press, 2005 
Ostrom, Vincent, Charles Tiebout and Robert Warren. “The Organization of Government  
 in Metropolitan Regions: A Theoretical Inquiry,” in American Political Science 
 Review, Vol. 55 (December), 1961.  
Perkmann, Markus, “The Rise of the Euroregion: A Bird’s Eye Perspective on  
 European Cross-Border Cooperation.” Lancaster: Department of Sociology,  
 Lancaster University, Lancaster <http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/ 
 papers/Perkmann-Rise-of-Euroregion.pdf>, 2003 
Phares, Don. “Prologue: On Metropolitan Government and Governance,” in Governing  
 Metropolitan Regions in the 21st Century, eds. Don Phares. London: M.E. Sharpe,  
 2009.  
Pierre, Jon. “Comparative Urban Governance: Uncovering Complex Causalities,” in  
 Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2005.  
Pinchbeck, Raymond B. “City-County Separation in Virginia,” in National Municipal 
 Review, Vol. 29, Issue 7, July 1940.  
Post, Stephanie. “Local Government Cooperation: The Relationship Between 
 Metropolitan Area Government Geography and Service Provision.” Paper  
 presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,  
 August 29 – September 1, 2002. Boston, MA.  
Post, Stephanie. “Metropolitan Area Governance and Institutional Collective Action,” in  
Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation, eds. Richard  
C. Feiock. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004.  
Proctor and Redfern Group. Future Land Needs Study: City of Guelph, Vol. 1. Don Mills:  
 Proctor and Redfern Group, 1988a.  
Proctor and Redfern Group. Future Land Needs Study: City of Guelph, Vol. 2. Don  
 Mills: Proctor and Redfern Group, 1988b 
Proctor and Redfern Group. Future Land Needs Study: City of Guelph, Vol. 3. Don 
 Mills: Proctor and Redfern Group, 1989.  
Province of Upper Canada. The Acts for the Erection of Municipal Corporations and the  
 Establishment of Police Regulations in Upper Canada. 12 Victoria, Chaps. 80 & 
 81. Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1850.  
Reilly, Emma. “No Downloading Delay: McGuinty” in The Hamilton Spectator,  
 February 27, 2012.  
Rice, William. Division of Costs Arbitration Between the Corporation of the City of  
 Kingston and the Corporation of the County of Frontenac. Sudbury, 2004. 
Rice, William. Division of Costs Arbitration Between the Corporation of the County of  
 283 
 Essex, the Corporation of the Township of Pelee and the Corporation of the 
 City of Windsor. Sudbury, 1999.  
Richmond, Randy. The Orillia Spirit. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995.  
Robarts, John. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Toronto: Hansard. 1968.  
Robinson, Guy M. A Social Geography of Canada. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991.  
Rose, Alfred. Governing Metropolitan Toronto: A Social and Political Analysis, 1953 – 
1971. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.  
Rose, Alfred. “Two Decades of Metropolitan Government in Toronto: 1953-1973,” in  
 Urban Problems Revised, eds. R. Charles Bryfogle and Ralph R. Krueger.  
 Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1975 
Ross, Romaine K. Local Government In Ontario. Toronto: Canadian Law Publishing  
 Company, 1949.  
Ross, Sara. “Slow Growth the Norm in Orillia,” in The Barrie Examiner, February 9,  
 2012.  
Rothblatt, Donald and Andrew Sancton. Metropolitan Governance: American/Canadian  
Intergovernmental Perspectives. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies 
Press, 1993. 
Rusk, David. Cities Without Suburbs. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre 
 Press, 2003.  
Rusk, David. Inside Game/Outside Game: Winning Strategies for Saving Urban  
 America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.  
Salet, William, Andy Thornley and Anton Kreukels. Metropolitan Governance and  
 Spatial Planning: Comparative Case Studies of European City Regions. London: 
 Spon Press, 2003.  
Sancton, Andrew. “Canadian Cities and the New Regionalism,” in Journal of Urban  
 Affairs, Vol. 23, No 5, 2001.  
Sancton, Andrew. Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective. Don Mills: 
 Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Sancton, Andrew. “Negotiating, Arbitrating, Legislating: Where Was the Public in  
 London’s Boundary Adjustment?” in Citizen Engagement: Lessons in  
 Participation from Local Government, eds. Katherine A. Graham and Susan 
 D. Phillips. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1998. 
Sancton, Andrew. Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government. Montreal and  
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000.  
Sancton, Andrew, Rebecca James and Rick Ramsay. Amalgamation vs. Inter-Municipal  
 Cooperation: Financing Local and Infrastructure Services. Toronto: ICURR  
Press, 2000.  
Sacitch, H.V. and Ronald Vogel. “Paths to the New Regionalism,” in State & Local  
 Government Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn 2000.  
Savitch, H.V. and Ronald Vogel. Regional Politics: America in a Post-City Age,  
 Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996.  
Sheppard, E. Lee. “Courts in Conflict: Town-County Relations in Post-Revolutionary 
 Virginia,” in The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 85, No. 2,  
 April 1977.  
Sher, Jonathan. “Boom Sparks Clash of Titans,” in The London Free Press, August  
 19, 2011, A1. 
 284 
Sher, Jonathan. “Cash Gauntlet Thrown at London: Middlesex County is Demanding the  
 City Pay $2.37 Million More for Social Housing, Which Would Make a  
 Tax Freeze Even Tougher Next Year,” in London Free Press, May 7, 2012. 
Shrestha, Manoj. “Do Risk Profiles of Services Alter Contractual Patterns? A  
 Comparison Across Multiple Metropolitan Services,” in Self-Organizing  
 Federalism: Collaborative Mechanisms to Mitigate Institutional Collective Action  
 Dilemmas, eds. Richard C. Feiock and John T. Scholz. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 University Press, 2010.  
Shrestha, Manoj. “Inter-Local Fiscal Cooperation in the Provision of Local Public  
 Services – The Case of Large US Cities.” Presented at the annual meeting of the  
 American Society for Public Administration. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 2-5,  
 2005 
Shrestha, Manoj and Feiock, Richard. “Interlocal Cooperation in the Supply of Local  
 Public Goods: A Transaction Cost and Social Exchange Explanations.” Working 
 Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Paper 29. Detroit: Wayne State  
 University, 2007.  
Siegel, David. “Local Government in Ontario,” in The Government and Politics of  
 Ontario, 5th Edition. Eds. Graham White. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
 1997.  
Siegel, David. “Municipal Reform in Ontario,” in Municipal Reform in Canada: 
 Reconfiguration, Re-Empowerment and Rebalancing, eds. Joseph Garcea and  
 Edward C. Lesage Jr. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005.  
Simon, Chris. “Jackson Turns To Barrie Ward for Re-Election Bid,” in Innisfil Scope,  
 September 9, 2010.  
Sohn, Christophe, Bernard Reitel, and Olivier Walther. “Cross-border Metropolitan 
 Integration in Europe: The Case of Luxembourg, Basel and Geneva,” in  
 Environment and Planning, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2009.  
South Simcoe Economic Alliance. About Us <http://www.southsimcoeea.ca/ 
Public/Default.aspx?I=203&n=About+Us> Accessed June 11, 2012. 
Southwest Economic Alliance. SWEA Members in 2011. <http://www.swea.ca/index 
.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=41&Itemid=57> 
Accessed March 2, 2012.  
Standing Committee on Justice Policy. Committee Transcripts: Bill 196, Barrie-Innisfil 
 Boundary Adjustment Act, 2009. Toronto: Ontario Legislature, November 5,  
 2009 
Steele, Donald R., Edwin A Jarrett, and Brian W.B. Morison. The Hamilton-Burlington- 
 Wentworth Local Government Review Commission. Toronto: Ministry of  
 Municipal Affairs, 1969.  
Stein, Robert. Urban Alternatives: Public and Private Markets in the Provision of  
 Local Services. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1990.  
Steinacker, Annette. “Metropolitan Area Governance and Institutional Collective 
 Action,” in Richard Feiock, eds. Metropolitan Governance: Conflict,  
 Competition and Cooperation. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
 2004.  
Studenski, Paul. The Government of Metropolitan Areas in the United States. New York: 
 National Municipal League, 1930.  
 285 
Sweet, Rosemary. The English Town, 1680-1840: Government, Society and Culture.  
 London: Longman, 1999.  
Swanstrom, Todd. “The Limits of Strategic Planning for Cities,” in Journal of Urban  
 Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1987  
Taylor, Zack and Gabriel Eidelman. “Canadian Political Science and the City: Then and 
 Now,” Presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science  
 Association. Ottawa, ON: May, 29, 2009.  
Thurmaier, Kurt. “Elements of Successful Interlocal Agreements An Iowa Case Study.” 
 Working Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Paper 2, 2005.  
Thurmaier, Kurt and Curtis H. Wood. “Interlocal Agreements as Overlapping Social  
 Networks: Picket-Fence Regionalism in Metropolitan Kansas City,” in  
 Public Administration Review. Vol. 62, 2002.  
Tiebout, Charles. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” in Journal of Political  
 Economy, Vol. 64 (October), 1956.  
Tracey, Scott. “City, County Look For a Way to Get Along,” in Guelph Mercury,  
 February 6, 2010[c].  
Tracey, Scott. “County Lawsuit Seeks $4M from City,” in Guelph Mercury, January 
 16, 2010[a]. 
Tracey, Scott. “Guelph and Wellington County Reach Deal on Terrace Lawsuit,” in  
 Guelph Mercury, March 30, 2012.  
Tracey, Scott. “Terrace Lawsuit May Draw Out Some Answers,” in Guelph Mercury,  
 January 22, 2010[b].   
Van Brenk, Debora. “Growing Friction Looms on London’s Outskirts” in The London  
 Free Press, November 7, 2011, A1. 
Vanberg, Viktor. “Rational Choice Versus Program Based Behaviour: Alternative 
 Theoretical Approaches and their Relevance for the Study of Institutions,” 
 in Rationality and Society. Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002.  
Vanderlinde, Rick. “Innisfil Reacts to Annexation,” in Barrie Advance, June 4, 2009c. 
Vanderlinde, Rick. “Mayor Meets With Municipal Affairs Minister,” in Barrie  
 Advance, February 17, 2009a. 
Vanderlinde, Rick. “Start Negotiating, Minister Tells Mayor,” in Barrie Advance, 
 February 19, 2009b. 
Visser, James. “Townships and Nested Governance: Spoilers or Collaborators in  
Metropolitan Services Delivery,” in Public Performance and Management  
Review, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2004.  
Vogel, Ronald and John Harrington. Political Change in the Metropolis. New York:  
 Longman, 2003.  
Vojnovic, Igor. “Municipal Consolidation, Regional Planning and Fiscal Accountability:  
The Recent Experience in Two Maritime Provinces,” in Canadian Journal of 
Regional Science, Vol. 23, 2000.  
Walker, David B. “Snow White and the 17 Dwarfs: From Metro Cooperation to  
 Governance,” in National Civic Review, Vol. 76, 1987.  
Walter-Rogg, Melonie. “Metropolitan Governance in Germany.” Paper presented at the  
 IPSA Workshop International Metropolitan Observatory. Bordeaux, France,  
 January 9-10, 2004.  
Warner, Mildred E. “Inter-Municipal Cooperation in the US: A Regional Governance  
 286 
 Solution?” Urban Public Economics Review. Vol. 7, 2006.  
Watt, Laurie. “Barrie’s Know-It-All Message ‘Really Scary’ Says Warden,” in Barrie 
 Advance, May 14, 2009f.  
Watt, Laurie. “Barrie Slams County Growth Plan,” in Barrie Advance, May 6, 2008c.  
Watt, Laurie. “Barrie Wants Province to Resolve Boundary Dispute,” in Barrie Advance, 
 May 9, 2008e. 
Watt, Laurie. “Boundary Dispute Has Cost Jobs: Carroll,” in Barrie Advance, June 1,  
2009i. 
Watt, Laurie. “Border Dispute Sparks Verbal Joust,” in Barrie Advance, February 4, 
 2009c. 
Watt, Laurie. “Boundary Talks to Resume,” in Barrie Advance, March 11, 2009d. 
Watt, Laurie. “Council Creates Team to Focus on Expansion,” in Barrie Advance,  
 October 27, 2008e.  
Watt, Laurie. “Councilors Receive Barrage of E-Mails Against Growth,” in Barrie  
 Advance, May 25, 2009h. 
Watt, Laurie. “County to Barrie: Let’s Start Fresh,” in Barrie Advance, December 7, 
 2009j.  
Watt, Laurie “Facilitator Sees Progress Despite Collapse of Boundary Talks,” in Barrie  
 Advance, February 12, 2008b.  
Watt, Laurie. “Fact and Fiction Regarding Barrie’s Growth,” in Barrie Advance, May 20, 
 2009g.  
Watt, Laurie. “Innisfil’s Got Public on Its Side: Jackson” in Barrie Advance, February 4, 
 2009b.  
Watt, Laurie. “Innisfil Says No To Boundary Proposal,” in Barrie Advance, February 8,  
 2008a.  
Watt, Laurie. “Rating Agency Puts City Under Microscope,” in Barrie Advance, July 9, 
 2008d. 
Watt, Laurie. “Time for Ont. to have say in Boundary Issue: Carroll,” in Barrie Advance, 
 February 3, 2009a.  
Watson, Jim. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Hansard. Toronto: Province of Ontario,  
 June 4, 2009.  
Watson, Jim. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Hansard. Toronto: Province of Ontario,  
 September 23, 2009.  
Weaver, Emily P. The Story of the Counties of Ontario. Toronto: Bell and Cockburn,  
 1913.  
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice Webb. The Development of English Local Government,  
 1689-1835. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.  
Wellington-Dufferin-Guelph Public Health. Board Minutes. Guelph: Wellington- 
Dufferin-Guelph Public Health. March 7, 2012 
Whebell, C.F.J. “Robert Baldwin and Decentralization, 1841-9” in Aspects of  
 Nineteenth Century Ontario, eds. F.H. Armstrong et al. Toronto: University of  
 Toronto Press, 1974.  
Williams, Oliver. “Life-Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan  
Areas,” in Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, 1967.  
Williams, Robert J. and Terrence J. Downey. “Reforming Rural Ontario,” in Canadian  
 Public Administration. Vol. 42, No. 2, 1999.  
 287 
Wilson, David and Chris Game. Local Government in the United Kingdom, Second 
 Edition. London: MacMillan Press, 1998.  
Wilson, George E. The Life of Robert Baldwin; A Study in the Struggle for Responsible 
 Government. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1933.  
Wilson, Jim. Speech to the Ontario Legislature. Hansard. Toronto: Province of Ontario,  
 June 4, 2009.  
Wood, Curtis H. “The Nature of Metropolitan Governance in Urban American: A Study  
 of Cooperation, Conflict, and Avoidance in the Kansas City Region.” Working  
 Group on Interlocal Services Cooperation, Paper 9, 2005.  
Worral, Reid Alan. The Evolution of the Boundaries of the City of London. London:  
 Department of Geography, The University of Western Ontario, 1980.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 288 
Appendix A: List of Separated Cities and Counties 
Simcoe County 
- Barrie and Orillia 
- Collingwood, Tiny, Ramara, Severn, Essa, Midland, Penetanguishene, 
Clearview, Wasaga Beach, Springwater, Oro-Medonte, Innisfill, Tay, Adjala-
Tosorontio, New Tecumseh, Bradford West Gwillimbury 
 
Essex County 
- Windsor 
- Amherstburg, Essex, Kingsville, Lakeshore, LaSalle, Leamington, Tecumseh 
 
Wellington County 
- Guelph 
- Erin, Minto, Centre Wellington, Guelph-Eramosa, Mepleton, Puslinch, 
Wellington North 
 
Middlesex County 
- London 
- Adelaide Metcalfe, Lucan Biddulph, Middlesex Centre, North Middlesex, 
Southwest Middlesex, Strathroy-Caradoc, Thames Centre, Village of Newbury 
 
Frontenac County 
- Kingston 
- Township of Frontenac Islands, South Frontenac Township, Central 
Frontenac Township, North Frontenac 
 
Peterborough County 
- Peterborough 
- Asphodel-Norwood, Cavan Monaghan, Douro Drummer, Galway Cavendish 
and Harvey, Havelock Belmont and Methulen, North Kawartha, Otonabee-
South Monaghan, Smith Ennismore Lakefield 
 
Renfrew County 
- Pembroke 
- Amprior, Deep River, Laurentian Hills, Petawawa, Renfrew, Adamston, 
Bromley, Bonnechere Valley, Brudnell Lyndoch and Raglan, Greater 
Madawaska, Heed-Clara-Maria, Horton, Kollaloe, Haggerty and Richards, 
Laurentian Valley, McNabb-Breaside, North Algona, Wilberforce Township, 
Whitewater Region 
 
The United Counties of Leeds and Grenville 
- Brockville, Gananoque and Prescott 
- Athens, Augusta, Edwardsburough Cardinal, Elizabethtown Kitley, Front of 
Yonge, Leeds and the Thousand Islands, Merrickville Wolford, North 
Grenville, Rideau Lakes, Westport 
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The United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 
- Cornwall 
- North Dundas, North Stormont, North Glengarry, South Dundas, South 
Stormont, South Glengarry 
 
Lanark County 
- Smith’s Falls 
- Beckwith Township, Town of Carleton Place, Drummond North Elmsley, 
Lanark Highlands, Town of Mississippi Mills, Montague, Perth, Tay Valley 
Township 
 
Elgin County 
- St. Thomas 
- Bayham, Central Elgin, Dutton/Dunwich, Aylmer, Malahide, Soutwold, West 
Elgin 
 
Hastings County 
- Belleville, Quinte West 
- Bancroft, Carlow/Mayo, Centre Hastings, Desoronto, Faraday, Highlands, 
Limerick, Madoc, Marmora and Lake, Stirling-Rawdon, Tudor and Cashel, 
Tweed, Tyendinaga, Wollaston 
 
Perth County 
- Stratford, St. Mary’s 
- North Perth, Perth East, Perth South, West Perth 
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Appendix B: Interview Matrix 
Thank you for meeting with me today. I appreciate it. I’m interested in understanding the 
relationship between [City/County] and [City/County] and how cooperation between the 
two jurisdictions and other governments with the County can be achieved.  
 
First, I will begin by asking some very general questions about yourself and the 
relationship between [City/County] and [City/County].   
 
1. Background 
 
- How long have you served in your current position? 
- How long have you been with [City/County]? 
- Have you ever been employed by [City/County]? Or any other municipalities 
within the region? 
 
2. General City/County Relationship 
 
- How would you describe the current relationship between [City/County] and 
[City/County]? 
o [IF POSITIVE] Has this always been the case? Why do you think this 
relationship has been so positive?  
o [IF NEGATIVE] Has this always been the case? Can you point to a time 
or event when the relationship became negative? 
- Does [City/County] make an active effort to improve or maintain their 
relationship with [City/County]?  
o [IF YES] What specifically has been done to enhance your relationship 
with [City/County]? 
o [IF NO] Why not? 
- Do you think that [City/County] also makes an active effort to improve their 
relationship with you? 
o [IF YES] How do you know? Can you provide some examples? 
o [IF NO] What makes you think that? 
 
3. Interaction 
 
- How often do you meet with your counterpart in [City/County]? 
- How many informal inter-jurisdictional boards and groups exist between 
[City/County] and [City/County]? 
o [IF 1 OR MORE] What are they? Why were they created? Who initiated 
them? Are they well attended? How often do they meet? Do you believe 
that they are generally looked upon positively? 
o [IF NO – Proceed to next question]  
- Do you interact with your counterpart informally, outside of work? 
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As I understand it, you have [X] agreements in place with [City/County]. I’d like to ask 
you bit of information about those agreements and how they came into place.  
 
4. Current Agreements 
 
- Am I correct that you have [X] agreements currently in place? 
o [IF NO] Which other agreements do you currently have? What service 
areas do they cover? Would I be able to obtain copies of them? 
o [IF YES – Continue to next question] 
- For each agreement, who identified the need to cooperate? 
- Who initiated discussions? 
- Is the [City/County] satisfied with each agreement? 
- If each agreement could be re-negotiated, would you adjust any of them?  
o [IF YES] How? 
o [IF NO – Proceed to next question] 
 
 
In 1997, the province developed the Consolidation of Municipal Services Management 
program, which saw municipalities assume responsibility for Ontario Works, Child Care, 
social housing, land ambulance and public health. I’d like to ask you about the experience 
of [City/County] with the CMSM. 
 
5. CMSM 
 
- Were you employed with [City/County] during the time of the CMSM? 
o [IF YES – Continue to Next Question] 
o [IF NO] Do you know the details of CMSM implementation locally? Is the 
[City/County] currently satisfied with the servicing arrangement it has 
with [City/County] regarding the CMSM?  
- What was your role, if any, during the negotiations and implementation of the 
CMSM? 
- How did [City/County] receive the CMSM? Was it looked upon favourably? 
- Did [City/County] have any interaction or discussion with the province about 
implementing the CMSM locally? 
- How did [City/County] and [City/County] decide to allocate the servicing for the 
policy areas covered by the CMSM? 
- How long did it take to decide on a distribution model between [City/County] and 
[City/County] for the CMSM? 
- Is [City/County] satisfied with the current CMSM agreement? 
o [IF YES – Proceed to next question] 
o [IF NO] Why not? If you could re-negotiate the agreement, what would 
you change? 
- Do you think that [City/County] is satisfied with the current CMSM agreement? 
- Has your experience with the CMSM made you more or less willing to cooperate 
with [City/County] 
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The time span of my study is 1995 to 2011. I’d like to ask about any past agreements you 
may have with [City/County]. I’d also like to ask about any potential agreements that 
may be created in the future or are being negotiated right now.  
 
6. Past Agreements 
 
- Do you have any agreements with [City/County] that have expired?  
o [IF YES] What policy areas did they cover? Would I be able to obtain 
copies of them? Why are they no longer in place? 
o [IF NO] Why do you think there were not any agreements? 
 
7. Potential Agreements 
 
- Is [City/County] in negotiations with the [City/County] that may result in 
cooperative service agreements? 
o [IF YES] What service areas are covered? Who began negotiations? What 
do you believe will be the outcome of these discussions? 
o [IF NO – Proceed to next question] 
 
I would like to ask some further questions about the negotiation process for the 
agreements that the [City/County] currently has and may possibly have in the future 
 
8. The Negotiation Process 
 
- How are negotiations initiated? 
- What is your role during negotiations? 
o [IF NONE] Who mostly handles negotiations?  
- Which representative from [City/County] would you normally negotiate with? 
o [ALTERNATIVE QUESTION IF THEY DON’T LEAD 
NEGOTIATIONS] Who would be involved in the negotiations from 
[City/County]? 
- [IF RESPONDENT IS MUNICIPAL STAFF] How much direction is provided by 
council and the mayor? 
- [IF RESPONDENT IS A MEMBER OF COUNCIL OR THE MAYOR] How 
much assistance is provided by municipal staff? 
- Does the [City/County] have any written guidelines about best practices when 
communicating or negotiating with another municipality? 
o [IF YES] What are they? Can I obtain a copy of the guidelines? 
o [IF NO - Proceed to next question] 
- Have you ever had a negative experience while negotiating with [City/County] or 
another municipality? 
- How many representatives from other jurisdictions are normally involved in 
negotiations? 
- How many other jurisdictions are normally involved in negotiations? 
- Do you find it easier to negotiate with fewer other jurisdictions? 
- What obstacles have you encountered during negotiations with [City/County]? 
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- Are there any policy areas that seem to be more challenging to reach agreement 
on than others? 
- Is it challenging finding common ground with [City/County]? 
 
I’m also very interested in the provincial role played in cooperation and negotiations.  
 
9. Provincial Involvement 
 
- Do you ever feel pressure from the province or provincial officials, including any 
local Members of Provincial Parliament, to engage in discussion with 
[City/County] about cooperative servicing arrangements? 
o [IF YES] What sort of pressure? Do they provide incentives for 
cooperation? 
o [IF NO – Proceed to next question] 
- What role, if any, does your local Member of Provincial Parliament have during 
negotiations with other jurisdictions? 
- Does your local MPP help to facilitate cooperation between jurisdictions within 
his or her riding?  
- Who would be your main contact with the province? 
- Who is mainly responsible for interacting with the province? 
- How often do you interact with provincial officials? 
- How often do you interact with provincial official regarding matters affecting 
your relationship with [City/County]? 
 
10. General Attitude Towards Cooperation 
 
- In light of our conversation today, how do you generally view your relationship 
with [City/County] and how do you generally view cooperation between both 
jurisdictions?  
- Do you believe that [City/County] feels similarly? 
 
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR SEPARATED CITY RESPONDENTS 
 
4. Current Agreements 
 
- Do you have any agreements with jurisdictions outside of the county? 
o [IF YES] Who are they signed with? What services are covered? How 
were these agreements reached? Who negotiated them? 
o [IF NO – Proceed to next question] 
 
8. The Negotiation Process 
 
- Do you notice any differences negotiating with the County as opposed to a lower-
tier municipality? 
- When negotiating with a lower tier, does the County involve itself at all? 
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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR COUNTY RESPONDENTS 
 
4. Current Agreements 
 
- Do you have any agreements with jurisdictions aside from [Separated City]? 
o [IF YES] Who are they signed with? What services are covered? Is 
[Separated City] informed of these discussions? What is there response? 
o [IF NO – Proceed to next question] 
 
 
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR LOWER-TIER MUNICIPALITIES 
 
4. Current Agreements 
 
- Do you have any agreements with jurisdictions outside of the County? 
o [IF YES] What service areas do they cover? What is the Counties role in 
negotiating these agreements? Is [Separated City] involved in any way? 
 
8. The Negotiation Process 
 
- When negotiating with [Separated City], does the County get involved? 
o [IF YES] How so? Is this involvement helpful? Is this involvement 
requested? 
o [IF NO – Proceed to next question] 
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Appendix C: Summary of Inter-local Agreements in Ontario 
 
Region Municipal Partners Purpose Date 
Simcoe Barrie, Orillia and 
Simcoe County 
Health Unit Funding January 1, 1998 
Simcoe Orillia and Simcoe 
County 
Affordable Housing 
Funding 
March 31, 2006 
Simcoe Barrie, Orillia and 
Simcoe County 
CMSM – Long Term 
Care, Paramedic 
Services, Ontario 
Works, ODSP, Social 
Housing 
April 28, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and Simcoe 
County 
Archival Services March 23, 1999 
Simcoe Barrie and Simcoe 
County 
Museum Services March 23, 1999 
Simcoe Barrie, Orillia and 
Simcoe County 
Court Services and 
Provincial Offences  
June 1, 1999 
Simcoe Barrie and Simcoe 
County 
Emergency Response February 2, 2007 
Simcoe Barrie and Simcoe 
County 
Geospatial Data 
Exchange 
December 30, 2008 
Simcoe Innisfil, Barrie and 
Simcoe County 
Boundary Adjustment December 21, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and Simcoe 
County 
Temporary Transfer 
of Historic Property 
for Display Purposes 
and County Museum 
August 20, 2008 
Simcoe Barrie and Simcoe 
County 
Paramedic Services June 14, 2011 
Simcoe Simcoe County, 
Adjala-Tosorontio, 
Bradford West 
Gwillimbury, 
Clearview, 
Collingwood, Essa, 
Innisfil, Midland, 
New Tecumseh, 
Orillia, Oro-Medonte, 
Penetanguishene, The 
Chipewas of Rama 
First Nation, Severn, 
Springwater, Tiny, 
Wasaga Beach, 
Barrie 
Establishment of 
Joint Hazmat Incident 
Response Team 
within County 
March 2, 2011 
Simcoe Barrie and Wasaga Emergency January 1, 2009 
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Beach Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
Simcoe Barrie and 
Springwater 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 1, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and Adjala-
Tosoronito 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 1, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and 
Rosemount 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 1, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and 
Penetanguishene 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 19, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and Tiny Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 1, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and Beausoleil 
First Nation Christian 
Island 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
May 27, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and Georgian 
Bay 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 1, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and Simcoe 
County 
Winter Road 
Maintenance 
February 1, 1998 
Simcoe Barrie and Oro-
Medonte 
Boundary Line 
Highway 
Maintenance 
June 11, 2008 
Simcoe Barrie and Tay Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 19, 2009 
Simcoe Barrie and 
Collingwood 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 1, 2011 
Simcoe Barrie and New 
Tecumseth 
Emergency 
Communications and 
Fire Dispatch 
January 11, 2009 
Simcoe Orillia and Ramara  Fire Protection November 17, 2008 
Simcoe Orillia and Simcoe 
County District 
School Board 
Joint Use of Facilities August 31, 2006 
Simcoe Orillia and 
Gravenhurst 
Fire Dispatch November 17, 2008 
Simcoe Orillia and 
M’Njikaning First 
Nation 
Fire Protection September 10, 2001 
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Simcoe Orillia and the 
Chippewas of the 
Rama 
Emergency 
Communications 
November 17, 2008 
Simcoe Orillia and Ramara Emergency 
Communications 
December 11, 2006 
Simcoe Simcoe County, 
Orillia and Barrie 
Land Ambulance November 7, 2002 
Simcoe Simcoe County, 
Barrie and Orillia 
CMSM – Long Term 
Care, Paramedic 
Services, Ontario 
Works, ODSP, Social 
Housing 
April 1, 1999 
    
Essex Amherstburg, Town 
of Essex, Kingsville, 
Lakeshore, LaSalle, 
Leamington, Pelee, 
Tecumseh, County of 
Essex, City of 
Windsor 
Provincial Offences March 7, 2011 
Essex Amherstburg, Town 
of Essex, Kingsville, 
Lakeshore, LaSalle, 
Leamington, Pelee, 
Tecumseh, County of 
Essex, City of 
Windsor  
Provincial Offences November 20, 2000 
Essex Amherstburg, Town 
of Essex, Kingsville, 
LaSalle, Leamington, 
Lakeshore, 
Tecumseh, Pelee, 
City of Windsor  
Mutual Aid 
Agreement 
September, 2010 
Essex  Windsor and Lasalle Water and 
Wastewater 
April 22, 2003 
Essex Windsor, Lasalle and 
Essex Golf and 
Country Club 
Water and Waste 
Water 
April 30, 1997 
Essex Windsor, Lasalle and 
the Essex County 
Roman Catholic 
Separate School 
Board 
Water and Waste 
Water 
July 4, 1995 
Essex Windsor and 
Tecumseh 
Water and Waste 
Water 
February 1, 2006 
Essex  Windsor and Water and Waste November 1, 2004 
 298 
Tecumseh Water 
Essex Windsor, Essex 
County, Anderon, 
Colchester North, 
Colchester South, 
Gosfield South, 
Maidstone, Malden, 
Mersea, Rochester, 
Sandwich South, 
Lasalle, Tilbury 
North, Tilbury West, 
St. Clair Beach, 
Amherstburg, Belle 
River, Essex, 
Harrow, Kingsville, 
Leamington, 
Tecumseh 
Hazardous Materials 
Response 
October 15, 1997 
    
Wellington Guelph and 
Wellington County 
CMSM – Land 
Ambulance 
March 14, 2000 
Wellington Guelph, Wellington 
County, Puslinch, 
Guelph-Eramosa, 
Centre Wellington, 
Erin, Minto, 
Mapleton, and 
Wellington North 
CMSM – Provincial 
Offenses 
January 1, 2001 
Wellington Guelph and 
Wellington County 
CMSM – Social 
Services 
January 1, 1995 
Wellington Guelph and Centre 
Wellington 
Fire Dispatch December 2, 2010 
Wellington Guelph and 
Wellington County 
Administration of 
Social Services 
January 1, 1995 
Wellington Guelph and 
Wellington County 
Social Service 
Consolidation 
Arrangement  
January 1, 1998 
Wellington Guelph and 
Wellington North 
Fire Dispatch December 2, 2010 
Wellington Guelph and 
Wellington North 
Fire Dispatch February 7, 2011 
Wellington Guelph and 
Guelph/Eramosa 
Water Services July 30, 2009 
Wellington Guelph and 
Guelph/Eramosa 
Boundary Expansion February 2, 2004 
Wellington Guelph and Erin Fire Dispatch December 31, 2010 
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Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
CMSM – OW, 
Childcare and Social 
Housing  
February 19, 2002 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
CMSM – Land 
Ambulance 
January 1, 2006 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Road Maintenance 
Agreement for 
Winter Maintenance 
Services 
June 1, 2009 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
CMSM – Extension 
of social housing 
agreement 
January 1, 2005 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Disaster and 
Emergency 
Coordination 
May 10, 2005 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Social Housing  January 1, 2005 
Middlesex  London and 
Middlesex County 
Geography Mapping January 11, 2005 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Mutual Aid – Fire 
Protection 
December 11, 2007 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex Centre 
Provision of 
Wastewater Services 
to Arva 
April 3, 2000 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Land Ambulance January 1, 1999 
Middlesex London and 
Delaware 
Water Services January 1, 1999 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Provision of CERB January 1, 1997 
Middlesex  London and 
Middlesex Centre 
Provision of 
Wastewater Services 
to Arva 
(Amendment) 
June 21, 2000 
Middlesex London, Middlesex 
County, Adelaide-
Metcalfe, Lucan 
Biddulph, Middlesex 
Centre, North 
Middlesex, 
Southwest 
Middlesex, Strathroy-
Caradoc, Thames 
Centre, Newbury 
Provincial Offences  January 7, 2001 
Middlesex London, Middlesex 
Centre, Lake Huron 
Water Supply to 
Delaware 
July 4, 2003 
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Primary Water 
Supply System Joint 
Board of 
Management 
Middlesex London and Thames 
Centre 
Winter Road 
Maintenance 
October 26, 2009 
Middlesex London and Thames 
Centre 
Fire Protection – 
Mutual Aid 
May 23, 2002 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Fire Protection – 
Mutual Aid 
March 1, 2011 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Fire Protection – 
Mutual Aid 
November 28, 2001 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Fire Protection – 
Mutual Aid 
February 21, 2000 
Middlesex London and 
Middlesex County 
Waste July 1, 2010 
Middlesex London and the 
London Cross-
Cultural Learner 
Centre 
Immigration 
Settlement and 
Training 
March 14, 2007 
    
Frontenac Kingston and the 
County of Lennox 
and Addington 
Road Maintenance September 7, 2010 
Frontenac Kingston, North 
Frontenac, Central 
Frontenac, South 
Frontenac and 
Frontenac Islands 
Finalization of capital 
transfer and boundary 
confirmation 
December 12, 1997 
Frontenac Kingston and 
Loyalist Township 
Transfer of 
ownership of 
Kingston and Area 
Recycling 
Corporation from 
Loyalist to Kingston 
December 21, 2000 
Frontenac Kingston and Central 
Frontenac 
Building lease 
agreement 
February 20, 2001 
Frontenac Kingston and 
Frontenac County 
CMSM – Arbitration 
regarding OW, Child 
Care, ODSP and 
Social Housing 
August 24, 2005 
Frontenac  Kingston and 
Loyalist Township 
Recycling Agreement January 27, 2005 
Frontenac Kingston and South 
Frontenac 
Waste Management August 31, 2006 
Frontenac Kingston and Lanark IT Technical Support February 20, 2007 
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County 
Frontenac Kingston and 
Frontenac County 
Arbitration 
Agreement 
December 8, 2003 
Frontenac Kingston and 
Loyalist Township 
Renewal of Joint 
Recycling Agreement 
November 6, 2000 
Frontenac Kingston and 
Loyalist Township 
Municipal Transit July 10, 2007 
Frontenac Kingston and South 
Frontenac 
Emergency 
Communications 
October 2, 2001 
Frontenac Kingston and 
Frontenac County 
Emergency Health 
Services 
February 6, 2008 
Frontenac Kingston and 
Loyalist Township 
Municipal Transit June 1, 2001 
    
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
CMSM – Social 
Services, Social 
Housing, Provincial 
Offences and Land 
Ambulance 
December 1, 2008 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Recycling Plant April 24, 1996 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
HGC Management 
3rd party contractor to 
operate recycling 
plant 
January 17, 2008 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Waste Management July 1, 2002 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Winter Road 
Maintenance 
November 16, 2011 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Winter Road 
Maintenance 
November 17, 2010 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Winter Road 
Maintenance 
December 2, 2010 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Waste Management November 17, 2010 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
Township of 
Otonabee-South 
Boundary Extension September 22, 2010 
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Monaghan 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Joint Purchase of 
Land 
August 4, 2010 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
Township of 
Otonabee-South 
Monaghan 
Boundary Extension February 3, 2010 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Waste Management December 4, 2009 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
Peterborough 
Utilities Inc 
Facilities Lease 
Agreement 
March 26, 2009 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
Peterborough 
Utilities Inc 
Facilities Lease 
Agreement 
March 18, 2009 
Peterborough Asphodel-Norwood, 
Cavan Monaghan, 
Douro-Dummer, 
Galway Cavendish 
and Harvey, 
Havelock Belmont 
Methuen, North 
Kawartha, Otonabee-
South Monaghan, 
Smith-Ennismore-
Lakefield, County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough  
Emergency 
Communications - 
Fire 
March 1, 2009 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
Greater Peterborough 
Area Economic 
Development 
Corporation 
Economic 
Development 
Operations 
August 6, 2008 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough, 
Emergency 
Management Mutual 
Assistance 
January 9, 2008 
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Asphodel-Norwood, 
Cavan-Monaghan, 
Douro-Dummer, 
Galway-Cavendish 
and Harvey, 
Havelock-Belmont 
Methuen, North 
Kawartha, Otonabee-
South Monaghan, and 
Smith Ennismore 
Lakefield 
Peterborough Asphodel-Norwood, 
Cavan Millbrook-
North Monaghan, 
Douro-Dummer, 
Galway-Cavendish 
and Harvey, 
Havelock Belmont-
Methuen, North 
Kawartha, Otonabee-
South Monaghan, 
Smith-Ennismore-
Lakefield, County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough 
Creation of Public 
Inquiry Centre 
May 30, 2006 
Peterborough Asphodel-Norwood, 
Cavan Millbrook-
North Monaghan, 
Douro-Dummer, 
Galway-Cavendish 
and Harvey, 
Havelock Belmont-
Methuen, North 
Kawartha, Otonabee-
South Monaghan, 
Smith-Ennismore-
Lakefield, County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough 
Emergency 
Communications – 
Fire Dispatch 
December 21, 2005 
Peterborough County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough 
CMSM Amendment  July 28, 2005 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
Greater Peterborough 
Economic 
Development 
Operations 
July 28, 2005 
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Area Economic 
Development 
Corporation 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Waste Management January 8, 2003 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
CMSM November 5, 2003 
Peterborough City of Peterborough 
and County of 
Peterborough 
Waste Management August 7, 2002 
Peterborough City of Peterborough, 
County of 
Peterborough and 
Township of 
Otonabee-South 
Monaghan 
Waste Management July 17, 2002 
Peterborough County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough 
Waste Management – 
Recycling and 
Hazardous Waste 
December 15, 2000 
Peterborough County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough 
Waste Management – 
Recycling 
August 22, 2000 
Peterborough County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough 
Provincial Offences July 5, 2000 
Peterborough County of 
Peterborough and 
City of Peterborough 
Provincial Offences June 1, 2000 
Peterborough County of 
Peterborough, City of 
Peterborough and 
Otonabee-South 
Monaghan 
Waste Management December 9, 2005 
    
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Renfrew County 
CMSM – OW August 19, 1997 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Renfrew County 
Provincial Offenses March 1, 2000 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Renfrew County 
Tourism Association November 27, 2002 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Laurentian Valley 
Shared Recreational 
Facilities 
December 20, 2011 
Renfrew Valley Arts Council, 
Pembroke, 
Management and 
Operation of Festival 
February 19, 2008 
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Laurentian Valley 
and Petawawa 
Hall 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Conseil De District 
Des Ecoles Publiques 
De Langue Francaise 
No. 59 
Facilities 
Rental/Licensing 
November 21, 2006 
Renfrew Pembroke, 
Laurentian Valley, 
Petawawa, North 
Algona Wilberforce 
and Bonnechere 
Valley 
Waste Services June 16, 2009 
Renfrew Pembroke Regional 
Hospital, Pembroke, 
Laurentian Valley, 
Algonquins of 
Pikwakanagn First 
Nation, Petawawa, 
Whitewater Region, 
Bonnechere Valley 
and North Algona 
Wilberforce 
Establishment of the 
Upper Ottawa Valley 
Medical Recruitment 
Committee 
December 20, 2011 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Laurentian Valley 
Fire Protection May 19, 2009 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Renfrew County 
Land Lease November 19, 2002 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Stafford 
Water Service October 31, 1996 
Renfrew Pembroke and 
Stafford 
Sewage Service October 31, 1996 
Renfrew Pembroke, Deep 
River, Petawawa, 
Westmeath, Stafford 
and Pembroke, Alice 
and Fraser, Rolph, 
Cuchanan, Wylie and 
McKay, Chalk River, 
Beachburg 
Airport Operation August 17, 1999 
    
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Brockville, 
Gananoque, Prescott 
and the County of 
Leeds and Grenville 
CMSM – Social 
Services, Social 
Housing, Provincial 
Offenses and Land 
Ambulance 
May 25, 2000 
Leeds and Gananoque and Shared Fire Chief October 19, 2010 
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Grenville Leeds and the 
Thousand Islands 
Township 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Gananoque and the 
Township of Leeds 
and the Thousand 
Islands  
Shared Fire Chief March 7, 2006 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Gananoque and the 
Township of Leeds 
and the Thousand 
Islands  
Shared Fire Chief September 1, 2009 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Gananoque and the 
Township of Leeds 
and the Thousand 
Islands 
Recreation Centre 
Cost Sharing 
April 19, 2011 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Leeds and Grenville 
and Brockville 
Emergency 
Communications – 
Fire 
February 1, 2012 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Prescott and 
Brockville 
Communications 
Service 
March 14, 2012 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Brockville and 
Edwardsburg-
Cardinal 
Recreation Service 
Fees 
(DATE) 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Brockville and 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville 
Emergency 
Communications 
February 1, 2012 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Bell Canada, United 
Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville, 
Brockville and 
Prescott 
Emergency 
Communications 
June 20, 1996 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Bell Canada, United 
Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville, 
Brockville and 
Prescott 
Emergency 
Communications 
(Neutral Answering 
Service) 
June 20, 1996 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville, 
Prescott and 
Brockville 
Emergency 
Communications 
November 21, 1996 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville, 
Brockville, Prescott 
and Gananoque 
CMSM – Social 
Services, Child Care, 
Social Housing, 
Provincial Offences 
and Land Ambulance 
July 24, 2003 
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Leeds and 
Grenville 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville, 
Brockville, Prescott 
and Gananoque 
Construction and 
Operation of St. 
Lawrence Lodge 
April 22, 2004 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville, 
Brockville, Prescott 
and Gananoque 
Construction and 
Operation of St. 
Lawrence Lodge 
July 6, 2004 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Ontario Provincial 
Police, United 
Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville, 
Brockville and 
Prescott 
Provision of 911 
Services 
November 18, 2004 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville, 
Brockville, 
Gananoque, Prescott 
Economic 
Development 
March 17, 2005 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville, 
Brockville, Prescott 
and Gananoque 
Construction and 
Operation of St. 
Lawrence Lodge 
April 21, 2005 
Leeds and 
Grenville 
Ontario Provincial 
Police, United 
Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville, 
Brockville, and 
Prescott 
Provision of 911 
Services 
September 26, 2007 
    
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas, 
and Glengarry and 
Cornwall 
CMSM – Social 
Housing, OW, and 
Child Care 
February 16, 2004 
 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry, 
Cornwall, South 
Stormont, North 
Stormont, South 
Dundas, North 
Dundas, South 
Glengarry, North 
Glengarry 
Provincial Offences  December 18, 2000 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
CMSM  - OW November 24, 1997 
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and Glengarry 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Emergency 
Communications 
April 22, 1998 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Emergency 
Communications 
February 9, 1998 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
CMSM April 12, 1999 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Home Child Care September 10, 2001 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Homemaker and 
Nursing Services 
September 10, 2001 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Hostel Operation September 10, 2001 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Homemaker and 
Nursing Services 
January 14, 2002 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
CMSM – OW, 
Childcare, Social 
Housing, Land 
Ambulance, POA 
January 14, 2002 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and the 
United Counties of 
Prescott and Russell 
Temporary 
Ambulance Rental  
January 14, 2002 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry, Beek 
Lindsay Seniors 
Residences Cornwall, 
Cornwall and Area 
Housing Corporation, 
Cornwall and Area 
Non-Profit Housing 
Social Housing February 11, 2002 
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Corporation, Finch 
and District Seniors 
Housing Corporation, 
Lancaster and District 
Non-Profit Housing 
Corporation, 
Logemant La Nativite 
Inc, The Alexandra 
Non-Profit Housing 
Corporation, 
Township of 
Roxborough Non-
Profit Housing 
Corporation, 
Williamsburg Non-
Profit Housing 
Corporation 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of Prescott 
and Russell 
Temporary 
Ambulance Rental 
June 10, 2002 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
CMSM – 
Amendment 
January 12, 2004 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Ambulance Service February 23, 2004 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry, and 
United Counties of 
Prescott and Russell 
Creation of District 
Health Unit (Eastern 
Ontario Health Unit) 
February 23, 2004 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry, 
Family Counseling 
Centre of Cornwall 
Social Service 
Delivery 
March 8, 2004 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Land Ambulance January 1, 2004 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Hazardous Materials 
Response  
November 8, 2004 
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Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Homemaker and 
Nursing Services 
February 13, 2006 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry and 
Family Counseling 
Centre of Cornwall  
Social Service 
Delivery 
August 9, 2004 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry and 
Family Counseling 
Centre of Cornwall 
Social Housing 
Allotment  
February 26, 2007 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry and 
Family Counseling 
Centre of Cornwall 
Rent Bank and 
Tenant Assistance 
March 26, 2007 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry and 
Northern 911 
Emergency Response August 13, 2007 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall, United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry and 
Family Counseling 
Centre of Cornwall 
Rent Bank and 
Tenant Assistance 
May 26, 2008 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Boundary Road 
Maintenance  
September 8, 2008 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Operation of a Home 
for the Aged (Glen 
Stor Dun Lodge) 
September 13, 2010 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and 
Canadian Red Cross 
Emergency Lodging September 13, 2010 
Stormont, Dundas Cornwall and Heart Public Access September 13, 2010 
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and Glengarry and Stroke 
Foundation 
Defibrillation 
Program 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Cornwall and United 
Counties of 
Stormont, Dundas 
and Glengarry 
Hazardous Materials 
Response 
January 10, 2011 
    
Elgin Aylmer, Bayham, 
Central Elgin, 
Dutton/Dunwich, 
West Elgin, 
Southwold, St. 
Thomas, Malahide 
and the County of 
Elgin 
Mutual Aid for 
Emergency 
Management 
March 29, 2011 
Elgin County of Elgin, 
West Elgin, 
Dutton/Dunwich, 
Southwold, Central 
Elgin, Malahide, 
Bayham, Aylmer and 
St. Thomas 
County Collection of 
Provincial Offence 
Fines 
August 22, 2005 
Elgin County of Elgin and 
St. Thomas 
Emergency 
Communications 
September 19, 2005 
Elgin Tri-County 
Management 
Committee of the 
West Elgin Primary 
Water Supply 
System, Southwold, 
St. Thomas, Joint 
Board of 
Management of the 
Elgin Area Primary 
Water Supply System 
Water Supply July 7, 2003 
Elgin St. Thomas and 
Central Elgin 
Mutual Aid for 
Emergency 
Management 
December 13, 2010 
Elgin St. Thomas and 
Central Elgin 
Municipal Boundary 
Adjustment 
November 21, 2005 
Elgin St. Thomas and 
Southwold 
Operation of an 
Animal Control 
Shelter 
January 12, 2005 
Elgin St. Thomas and Elgin 
County 
CMSM – OW, Child 
Care, Social Housing, 
Land Ambulance and 
April 14, 1998 
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Public Health 
Elgin St. Thomas and Elgin 
County 
Intersection 
Construction 
November 23, 1999 
Elgin St. Thomas and Elgin 
County 
Emergency 
Communications 
June 23, 1998 
    
Hastings Belleville, Trenton, 
Hastings County 
911 Emergency 
Services 
March 26, 1997 
Hastings Hastings County, 
Belleville, Quinte 
West 
CMSM – Social 
Services 
September 30, 1999 
Hastings Belleville and 
Township of Thurlow 
Amalgamation 
Agreement 
July 4, 1997 
Hastings Hastings County, 
Belleville and 
Trenton 
Home for the Aged November 25, 1996 
Hastings Quinte West and 
Hastings County 
Emergency Services N/A 
Hastings Belleville, Quinte 
West, Centre 
Hastings, Marmora 
and Lake, Tweed, 
Tyendinaga, County 
of Prince Edward, 
Stirling-Rawdon, 
Madoc 
Waste Diversion January 1, 2003 
Hastings Belleville, Quinte 
West and Hastings 
County 
CMSM – OW, Social 
Assistance, 
Childcare, Social 
Housing 
April 10, 2006 
Hastings Belleville, Quinte 
West and Hastings 
County 
Long-Term Care May 31, 2001 
Hastings Belleville and 
Hastings County 
Installation of 
Automated External 
Defibrillators 
July 14, 2008 
Hastings Quinte West and 
Belleville 
Boundary Road 
Maintenance 
January 13, 2003 
Hastings  Belleville and County 
of Hastings 
Joint Development 
and Operation of 
Hastings County 
Historical Society 
Archives 
September 14, 2009 
Hastings Belleville and County 
of Hastings 
Joint Development 
and Operation of 
Hastings County 
November 8, 2010 
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Historical Society 
Archives 
Hastings Ministry of Canadian 
Heritage, Belleville, 
and County of 
Hastings 
Conservation of 
Glanmore National 
Historic Site 
March 17, 1997 
Hastings Belleville and Centre 
and South Hasting 
Waste Services Board 
Establishment of a 
Household Hazardous 
Waste Depot Facility 
August 9, 2010 
Hastings Hastings County, 
Tyendinaga, Stirling-
Rawdown, Centre 
Hastings, Tweed, 
Marmora & Lake, 
Madoc, Tudor & 
Cashel, Wollaston, 
Limerick, Faraday, 
Carlow/Mayo, 
Hastings Highlands, 
Deseronto, Bancroft, 
Bicroft, Cardiff, 
Belleville, Quinte 
West 
Provincial Offences April 23, 2001 
Hastings Belleville, Quinte 
West, Bancroft, 
Faraday, Hastings 
Highlands, Limerick, 
Wollaston, Mohawks 
of the Bay of Quinte, 
Madoc, Stirling 
Rawdown, Centre 
Hastings, Tweed, 
Marmora and Lake, 
Tudor Cashel 
Emergency Dispatch 
and Communications 
September 13, 2010 
Hastings Belleville, Quinte 
West, Centre 
Hastings, Marmora 
and Lake, Tweed, 
Tyendinaga, County 
of Prince Edward, 
Stirling-Rawdon, 
Madoc,  
Waste Services and 
Diversion 
February 9, 2009 
Hastings County of Hastings 
and Belleville 
Vital Services 
Administration and 
Enforcement  
February 11, 2008 
Hastings Belleville and Emergency September 13, 2010 
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Mohawks of the Bay 
of Quinte 
Communications 
    
Perth Stratford, Perth East 
and Perth County 
Annexation 
Agreement 
July 15, 2010 
Perth  St. Mary’s and Perth 
South 
Water and Waste 
Water Agreement 
June 22, 2010 
Perth  St. Mary’s and Perth 
South 
Fire Protection January 1, 2010 
Perth Stratford, North 
Perth, St. Mary’s and 
West Perth 
Mobile Fire Training February 12, 2007 
Perth Stratford, St. Mary’s 
and Perth County 
CMSM – Land 
Ambulance 
January 1, 2002 
Perth Stratford, St. Mary’s 
and Perth County 
CMSM – OW, Child 
Care and Social 
Housing 
March 31, 1998 
Perth St. Mary’s and 
Stratford 
CMSM – Day Care January 11, 2000 
Perth St. Mary’s and Perth 
South 
Arena Operations and 
Funding 
January 1, 2006 
Perth Perth County, North 
Perth, West Perth, 
Perth East, Perth 
South, St. Mary’s, 
Stratford and the 
United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville 
Emergency 
Management 
Agreement 
June 23, 2011 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
County 
Boundary Extension 
Cost Sharing (Social 
Services, EMS, 
Health Unit, Regional 
Roads, Spruce 
Lodge) 
July 15, 2010 
Perth Stratford, North Perth 
and West Perth 
Fire Dispatch April 14, 1998 
Perth Stratford and St. 
Mary’s 
Fire Dispatch April 14, 1998 
Perth Stratford and North 
Perth 
Fire Dispatch August 30, 1999 
Perth Perth County and 
Stratford 
CMSM (Amendment) December 20, 1999 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
County 
Reforestation along 
Avon River 
Watershed 
February 13, 1996 
Perth Stratford, Perth Home for the Aged June 1, 1995 
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County, St. Mary’s 
and Hamlet Non-
Profit Estates of 
Stratford and District 
Perth Stratford and St. 
Mary’s 
Fire Dispatch June 9, 1997 
Perth Stratford, St. Mary’s 
and Perth County 
Child Care March 23, 1999 
Perth Stratford and St. 
Mary’s 
Fire Dispatch November 24, 1998 
Perth Stratford, Perth South 
and Pert East 
Fire Dispatch November 24, 1998 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
East 
Fire Dispatch November 24, 1998 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
East 
Fire Dispatch November 24, 1998 
Perth Stratford and West 
Perth 
Fire Dispatch November 24, 1998 
Perth  St. Mary’s and 
Stratford 
Child Care Fee 
Subsidy 
January 1, 2000 
Perth Stratford, St. Mary’s, 
Perth County, Perth 
East, Perth South, 
West Perth, North 
Perth 
Provincial Offences February 28, 2000 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
East 
Sale of Hydro 
Transmission Wire 
September 11, 2000 
Perth Stratford, Perth 
South, Perth East, 
and Perth County 
Boundary Adjustment 
Agreement 
October 12, 2000 
Perth Middlesex County, 
Oxford County, Perth 
County, City of 
London, City of 
Stratford, St. Mary’s 
Rural Water Quality 
Testing 
December 17, 2001 
Perth Stratford, Perth 
County, St. Mary’s 
and Northern 
Communications 
Services Inc.  
Emergency 
Communications 
November 15, 2002 
Perth Perth South and 
Stratford 
Road Maintenance April 15, 2003 
Perth Perth County, 
Stratford and St. 
Mary’s 
CMSM – 
Amendment  
August 11, 2003 
Perth Stratford, Perth Boundary Adjustment November 17, 2005 
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South, and Perth 
County 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
East 
Fire Protection November 14, 2005 
Perth Stratford and North 
Perth 
Fire Protection November 14, 2005 
Perth Stratford and St. 
Mary’s 
Fire Protection November 14, 2005 
Perth Perth County, 
Stratford, St. Mary’s 
and Wightman 
Communications 
Emergency 
Communications 
November 22, 2005 
Perth Stratford, Perth 
County and 
Stratford/Perth 
Museum Association 
Museum Funding December 12, 2005 
Perth Stratford, Perth 
County and 
Stratford/Perth 
Museum Association 
Creation of Museum 
Trust 
December 12, 2005 
Perth Perth County, 
Stratford, St. Mary’s 
and Competitive 
Local Exchange 
Carrier 
Emergency 
Communications 
February 9, 2006 
Perth Stratford, Perth 
County and 
Stratford/Perth 
Museum Association 
Creation of Museum 
Taskforce 
December 12, 2005 
Perth Stratford, Region of 
Waterloo, Perth 
County 
Child Care Fee 
Subsidy 
July 30, 2009 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
East 
Fire Protection October 12, 2010 
Perth Stratford and St. 
Mary’s 
Fire Protection October 12, 2010 
Perth Stratford and North 
Perth 
Fire Protection October 12, 2010 
Perth Stratford, Perth 
County and St. 
Mary’s 
Mutual Aid January 25, 2011 
Perth Stratford and Perth 
East 
Boundary Extension July 12, 2010 
Perth Stratford, Wellington 
County and Perth 
County 
Child Care March 5, 2012 
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Perth  Perth County, St. 
Mary’s, Stratford and 
Northern 
Communications 
Emergency 
Communications 
June 13, 2005 
    
Lanark Lanark County, 
Town of Perth and 
Town of Smith’s 
Falls 
Emergency 
Communications 
July 2, 2002 
Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
Emergency 
Communications 
June 27, 2005 
Lanark Lanark County, 
Beckwith, Carleton 
Place, 
Drummond/North 
Elmsley, Lanark 
Highlands, 
Mississippi Mills, 
Montague, Perth, Tay 
Valley, Smith Fall’s 
GIS Data Sharing August 2, 2005 
Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
Emergency 
Communications 
November 21, 2005 
Lanark Lanark County, 
Beckwith, Carleton 
Place, 
Drummond/North 
Elmsley, Lanark 
Highlands, 
Mississippi Mills, 
Montague, Perth, Tay 
Valley, Smith Fall’s 
Mutual Assistance February 20, 2006 
Lanark Lanark County, 
Beckwith, Carleton 
Place, 
Drummond/North 
Elmsley, Lanark 
Highlands, 
Mississippi Mills, 
Montague, Perth, Tay 
Valley, Smith Fall’s 
Mutual Assistance – 
Fire Protection 
December 21, 2005 
Lanark Lanark County, 
Smith’s Falls and the 
Catholic District 
School Board of 
Eastern Ontario 
Best Start Funding October 2, 2006 
Lanark Lanark County and CMSM: Land November 6, 2006 
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Smith’s Falls Ambulance 
Lanark  Amateur Radio 
Emergency Services, 
Lanark County, 
Carleton Place, 
Mississippi Mills, 
Beckwith, 
Drummond/North 
Elmsley, Lanark 
Highlands, 
Montague, Tay 
Valley and Smith’s 
Falls 
 Emergency 
Communications 
March 19, 2007  
Lanark Amateur Radio 
Emergency Services, 
Lanark County, 
Carleton Place, 
Mississippi Mills, 
Beckwith, 
Drummond/North 
Elmsley, Lanark 
Highlands, 
Montague, Tay 
Valley and Smith’s 
Falls 
Emergency 
Communications 
April 23, 2008 
Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
CMSM: Land 
Ambulance 
December 3, 2007 
Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
Information 
Technology 
January 5, 2009 
Lanark Lanark County, 
Beckwith, Carleton 
Place, 
Drummond/North 
Elmsley, Lanark 
Highlands, 
Mississippi Mills, 
Montague, Perth, Tay 
Valley, Smith Fall’s 
Mutual Assistance March 2, 2009 
Lanark  Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
CMSM: Land 
Ambulance 
September 20, 2010  
Lanark  Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
Emergency 
Communications 
October 4, 2010  
Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
Fire Dispatch December 20, 2010 
Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
Information 
Technology 
September 6, 2011 
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Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
CMSM: Social 
Services 
December 16, 1998 
Lanark Lanark County, 
Beckwith, Carleton 
Place, 
Drummond/North 
Elmsley, Lanark 
Highlands, 
Mississippi Mills, 
Montague, Perth, Tay 
Valley, Smith Fall’s 
Mutual Assistance October 22, 2008 
Lanark Lanark County and 
Smith’s Falls 
Fire Dispatch November 26, 2008 
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Appendix D: Interview Listing by Case Study 
 
Region Municipality Position Date 
Middlesex London Director, Intergovernmental 
and Community Liaison 
Feb. 6, 2012 
Middlesex London Ward 3 Councilor Feb 13, 2012 
Middlesex North 
Middlesex / 
Middlesex 
County 
Mayor / County Councilor Feb 14, 2012 
Middlesex Middlesex 
Centre / 
Middlesex 
County 
Mayor / County Councilor  Feb 15, 2012 
Middlesex Southwest 
Middlesex 
Administrator/ Clerk Feb 17, 2012 
Middlesex Middlesex 
Centre 
Ward 3 Councilor Feb 21, 2012 
Middlesex Lucan Biddulph CAO/Clerk Feb 21, 2012 
Middlesex  Middlesex 
County 
CAO Mar 2, 2012 
Middlesex  Middlesex 
County / 
Thames Centre 
Mayor/County Warden Mar 2, 2012 
Middlesex London Ward 5 Councilor Mar 5, 2012 
Middlesex Middlesex 
Centre 
Ward 1 Councilor Mar 5, 2012 
Middlesex  Middlesex 
Centre 
Deputy Mayor Mar 7, 2012 
Middlesex Adelaide 
Metcalfe / 
Middlesex 
County 
Mayor/County Councilor Mar 8, 2012 
Middlesex  London Former Mayor Mar 8, 2012 
Middlesex Middlesex 
Centre 
Ward 5 Councilor Mar 8, 2012 
Middlesex  Middlesex 
Centre 
CAO Mar 13, 2012 
Middlesex London Ward 14 Councilor Mar 13, 2012 
Middlesex London Former CAO Mar 15, 2012 
Middlesex Southwest 
Middlesex 
Mayor/County Councilor Mar 16, 2012 
Middlesex Strathroy 
Caradoc 
CAO Mar 21, 2012 
Middlesex  Strathroy Mayor/ County Councilor April 4, 2012 
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Caradoc 
    
Wellington Wellington 
North 
Mayor/County Councilor April 12, 2012 
Wellington Minto  CAO April 13, 2012 
Wellington Puslinch CAO/Clerk-Treasurer April 13, 2012 
Wellington Puslinch Mayor/County Councilor April 16, 2012 
Wellington Centre 
Wellington 
Mayor/Former County 
Warden 
April 16, 2012 
Wellington Guelph/Eramosa Mayor/County Warden April 26, 2012 
Wellington Guelph Ward 2 Councilor April 30, 2012 
Wellington Guelph/Eramosa Ward 4 Councilor April 30, 2012 
Wellington Puslinch Councilor May 2, 2012 
Wellington Guelph Ward 1 Councilor May 2, 2012 
Wellington Guelph  Former Ward 4 Councilor May 2, 2012 
Wellington Guelph Ward 4 Councilor May 2, 2012 
Wellington Erin Former Mayor/Former 
County Councilor 
May 10, 2012 
Wellington Guelph  Ward 5 Councilor May 10, 2012 
Wellington Mapleton Mayor/County Councilor May 16, 2012 
Wellington Guelph Ward 3 Councilor May 17, 2012 
Wellington Wellington-
Halton Hills 
Member of Provincial 
Parliament 
May 18, 2012 
Wellington Guelph Former Ward 3 Councilor May 25, 2012 
Wellington Guelph/Eramosa CAO June 4, 2012 
Wellington Erin Mayor/County Councilor June 4, 2012 
    
Simcoe Tay CAO May 23, 2012 
Simcoe Wasaga Beach CAO May 25, 2012 
Simcoe  Springwater Mayor/County Councilor May 29, 2012 
Simcoe Collingwood Mayor/County Councilor May 29, 2012 
Simcoe New Tecumseth Mayor May 30, 2012 
Simcoe Adjala-
Tosorontio 
CAO May 30, 2012 
Simcoe Orillia Ward 3 Councilors May 30, 2012 
Simcoe Orillia Deputy CAO/CFO May 30, 2012 
Simcoe Bradford West 
Gwillimbury 
CAO May 31, 2012 
Simcoe Penetanguishene Mayor/ County Councilor May 31, 2012 
Simcoe Tay Mayor/County Councilor May 31, 2012 
Simcoe Severn Mayor/County Councilor May 31, 2012 
Simcoe Brandford West 
Gwillimbury 
Mayor/County Councilor May 31, 2012 
Simcoe Orillia Ward 4 Councilor June 1, 2012 
Simcoe  Barrie Ward 2 Councilor June 1, 2012 
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Simcoe Oro-Medonte Mayor/County Councilor June 1, 2012 
Simcoe Oro-Medonte Deputy Mayor/County 
Councilor 
June 1, 2012 
Simcoe Orillia Ward 4 Councilor June 1, 2012 
Simcoe Simcoe North Member of Provincial 
Parliament/Former County 
Warden/Former Mayor 
June 5, 2012 
Simcoe Barrie Ward 8 Councilor  June 5, 2012 
Simcoe Tiny Mayor/County Councilor June 8, 2012 
Simcoe Collingwood Deputy Mayor/County 
Councilor 
June 8, 2012 
Simcoe Adjala-
Tosorontio 
Deputy Mayor/County 
Councilor 
June 8, 2012 
Simcoe Springwater Former Mayor/Former 
County Warden 
June 8, 2012 
Simcoe  Barrie  Mayor June 14, 2012 
Simcoe Midland Mayor/County Councilor June 14, 2012 
Simcoe York Simcoe Member of Provincial 
Parliament 
June 15, 2012 
 
I conducted interviews in Elgin County and St. Thomas during the initial research stages 
of this project although, with the exception of one section in Chapter 5, they were not 
included. These interviews are listed below.  
 
Jurisdiction Position Interview Date 
Elgin County Chief Administrative 
Officer 
April 5, 2011 
Elgin County/West Elgin Regional Councilor/Mayor April 12, 2011 
St. Thomas Chief Administrative 
Officer 
April 14, 2011 
Southwold Chief Administrative 
Officer 
April 15, 2011 
Elgin County/Bayham Regional Councilor/Mayor April 19, 2011 
Central Elgin Councilor April 22, 2011 
Southwold Deputy Mayor April 22, 2011 
St. Thomas Councilor April 23, 2011 
Bayham Chief Administrative 
Officer 
April 26, 2011 
Elgin County/Malahide Warden/Mayor April 28, 2011 
St. Thomas Mayor May 4, 2011 
St. Thomas Director, Planning May 4, 2011 
St. Thomas Manager, Economic 
Development 
May 4, 2011 
Elgin-Middlesex-London Member of Provincial 
Parliament 
May 27, 2011 
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